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Abstract 
 
In terms of studies of British imperialism, the Royal Navy, and more particularly its sailors 
during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, has remained a neglected topic. 
Historical studies of the navy continue to be dominated by naval historians, who are primarily 
concerned with the technical and strategic aspects of the Royal Navy. In the past 10 years 
there has been a gradual intrusion upon this and a number of socio-cultural and gender 
historians have turned their attention in this direction. Therefore, this thesis continues this 
development and examines the relationship that the lower deck had with imperialism by 
examining the testimony of sailors through unpublished diaries held in museum collections. It 
charts the period chronologically and thematically through events of naval pageantry and war, 
which reveals the complexities of the sailor’s character particularly around the concepts of 
imperialism, identity, pride and patriotism. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
By examining sailors as they experienced imperialism through both peace and war, it reveals 
that the Empire was a vital aspect of their lives and also their own identity. As a significant part 
of the imperial construct within British culture, sailors consequently viewed their experiences 
through an imperialistic prism. However, it reveals that sailors were not simply passive 
recipients of imperial inculcation and demonstrated a level of independence to this. Thus it is 
argued that their relationship with imperialism was part of a wider independent sailor culture, 
which competed with individual beliefs, differing loyalties, and could mean different things at 
different times. 
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Chapter One 
Sailors and the Empire: Voices from the Lower Deck 
Introduction 
On attending the funeral service of a young sailor killed at the Dardanelles in 1915, Seaman 
William Abbott heard his captain say: ‘there is nothing better than to fight and die for your 
country’.1 Later, confiding in his diary, Abbott proudly wrote: ‘I agree with him’.2 Such displays 
of patriotism are not uncommon for this period. In particular, historians such as Niall Ferguson, 
Adrian Gregory, Gerard DeGroot and David Silbey have considered the influencing effect of 
patriotism on men volunteering for the army during the First World War.3 However, Abbott did 
not volunteer to join the navy out of patriotism generated by the declaration of war; for him, 
as with the majority of sailors who served during the conflict, the navy was his career.4 Studies 
of patriotism amongst British sailors remains a relatively ignored area of research for two key 
reasons: firstly, because sailors were not volunteers they have been excluded from studies 
which have focused specifically on the relationship between volunteering, imperialism and 
society. Secondly, and perhaps more seriously, the maritime sphere has received significantly 
less consideration from socio-cultural historians. This point has been readily acknowledged by 
Brian Lavery who has said ‘Traditional naval history has tended to ignore the “common 
seaman”’.5 Instead, sailors and the Royal Navy as a topic remains the preserve of naval 
historians like Nicholas Rodger who have been critical of more recent approaches.6 
This lack of engagement is striking especially considering the continued interest in the 
relationship between imperialism and British popular culture. As a topic, imperialism and 
society continues to be a contested area of historical research with strong arguments voiced 
on both sides. On the one hand, there are those such as John M. Mackenzie who have argued 
that British culture was strongly influenced by imperial sentiment and his pioneering research 
has led to the successful Studies in Imperialism series.7 In particular, Mackenzie argued that 
imperialism created ‘for the British a world view which was central to their perceptions of 
                                            
1 RNM 2004/103/5: Diary of William Thomas Abbott 
2 RNM 2004/103/5: Diary of William Thomas Abbott 
3 Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War, (London: Penguin, 1999 [first edition 1998]); Adrian Gregory, The Last Great War: 
British society and the First World War, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Gerard DeGroot, Blighty: British 
society in the era of the great war, (London: Longman, 1996); David Silbey, The British working class and enthusiasm 
for war, (London: Frank Cass, 2005) 
4 Although volunteers in the form of “Hostilities Only” ratings did serve with the Royal Navy during the Great War, and 
this point will be considered in more detail below.  
5 This point has been well made and is a recurring comment in recent historiography. See Brian Lavery, Able Seamen: 
The Lower Deck of the Royal Navy, 1850-1939, (London: Conway, 2011); p. 9; Mary A. Conley, From Jack Tar to Union 
Jack: Representing naval manhood in the British Empire, 1870-1918, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009); 
p. 11 
6 Nicholas Rodger, The Command of the Ocean: a naval history of Britain, 1649-1815, (London: Penguin, 2006); Don 
Leggett, ‘Navy, nation and identity in the long nineteenth century’, Journal for Maritime Research, 13, 2, 2011; pp. 151-
163, p. 152 
7 The series was founded by John M. Mackenzie and is published by the Manchester University Press. For further 
information about this project see http://www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk/series/studies-in-imperialism/.  
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themselves’.8 He posited that ‘Even if they knew little and cared less about imperial philosophies 
or colonial territories, nonetheless imperial status set them apart’.9 Whilst on the other side of 
the argument are those such as Bernard Porter, who has argued that although present in 
popular culture, imperialism meant little to the working classes. Porter has argued that 
although the face presented by Britain to the world was its imperial one, ‘All the while, however, 
she was presenting an entirely different self-image to most of her own people’.10 As such he 
has downplayed the impact of imperialism on British society and culture, suggesting that ‘All 
that was required was a minimum of apathy’.11 
However, recent approaches have argued the importance of the nuances of British imperialism. 
For instance, Andrew Thompson has countered Porter’s interpretation and analysis, stating that 
there has been a ‘failure to recognise how diverse and pluralistic that empire was: it is not 
sufficient simply to assess the “amount” of imperialism in Britain’.12 He has criticized these 
approaches noting ‘it was always highly improbable that a single or monolithic “imperial culture” 
would emerge in Britain’.13 In itself, imperialism is a complicated concept to define and there 
is merit to Mackenzie’s argument that it ‘meant different things to different people at different 
times’.14 However, broadly speaking, it drew together three key tenets: tones of militarism, 
loyalty to the monarchy, and racial beliefs propagated by theories of Social Darwinism.15 
Imperial culture could then be disseminated via sermons, school, advertisements, songs, 
theatre, leisure, and many other cultural forms.16 More recently Brad Beaven has added to the 
importance of this individuality of imperial culture by examining the ‘process of dissemination 
of imperialism, the form it took and its consumption’.17 Beaven concludes that ‘Imperial culture 
was neither generic nor unimportant but was instead multi-layered and recast to capture the 
concerns of a locality’.18 Therefore, the nuances of imperial culture and the concepts contained 
within it form a key focus of this thesis. 
Whether or not the British public was overtly imperialistic (however they interpreted it and 
associated with it), certain symbols became central to the Empire and the way it was portrayed 
in popular culture. This imagery occupied a prominent place in the public sphere, and formed 
a keystone of Government, commercial and leisure outreach. In particular, the Royal Navy 
became a prominent feature in British popular culture and has been called ‘a powerful cultural 
                                            
8 John M. Mackenzie, Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 1880-1960, (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2003 [first edition 1984]); p. 2 
9 Mackenzie, Propaganda, p. 2 
10 Bernard Porter, The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006 [first published 2004]; p. 306 
11 Porter, Absent-Minded, p. 307 
12 Andrew Thompson, The Empire Strikes Back? The impact of imperialism on Britain from the mid-nineteenth century, 
(Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2005); p. xiv 
13 Thompson, Empire, p. xiv 
14 Mackenzie, Propaganda, p. 1 
15 Mackenzie, Propaganda, p. 2 
16 Brad Beaven, Visions of Empire: Patriotism, popular culture and the city, 1870-1939, (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2012); pp. 2-3 
17 Beaven, Visions, p. 1 
18 Beaven, Visions, p. 208 
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symbol’ by Jan Rüger.19 The Royal Navy was the premier British military force, policing the 
oceans, protecting trade routes and enforcing Pax Britannica. The importance of naval tradition 
within British culture has been noted by Mackenzie, who for example considered its popularity 
as a theatre topic in the nineteenth century where ‘Nelson was idolized, and the myth of the 
archetypal simple and heroic British tar developed’.20 Thus the importance of the navy to the 
Empire and its position within imperial culture has been acknowledged, however these studies 
have not considered the navy as a distinct and separate element, or engaged with this 
relationship. It is only more recent historiography which has begun to redress this omission. In 
particular, there has been a growing interest in the character and identity of sailors, and also 
in the relationship between empire, the navy and masculinity in British society, spurred on by 
social and gender historians.21  
Whilst welcome additions, which have drawn together considerations of the relationship 
between the Royal Navy and imperial culture, there remains a lack of engagement with the 
sailor as an individual in terms of his relationship with imperialism and how he viewed himself 
within the imperial world he was a part of. Therefore, this thesis continues these developments 
by examining the relationship between sailors and imperialism by means of their own 
testimony, primarily in the form of unpublished diaries. It considers sailors from the late 
nineteenth century to the start of the Second World War. As Lavery has noted, ‘much of the 
period from 1850 to the present is a clean sheet as far as the historian is concerned’.22 
Examining the vicissitudes through which the British Empire went at this time allows for a range 
of sailors’ experiences to be considered.  What is clearly shown is that sailors became, in the 
eyes of the British public, brave servants of the Empire, in the words of contemporaries: the 
“handyman” of Empire.23 However, this image is not “one size fits all” and it is argued that it 
is vital for sailors to be considered on both an individual and collective basis in order to examine 
the nuances of this relationship in detail. In doing this it engages with recent historiographical 
trends and considers the specific themes of imperialism, identity and masculinity, pride and 
patriotism to show how these came together as part of a collective sailor culture. An 
understanding of these concepts is fundamental to any consideration of this topic, and it will 
be demonstrated how they can be both disassociated from each other and viewed separately, 
yet also be viewed as having an interdependency and being mutually reinforcing.  
Closely linked to this are concepts of race and the belief in white racial superiority over 
indigenous races who were increasingly viewed as backward and inferior.24 At the same time 
there existed a hierarchy of race which differentiated between perceptions of black and Asiatic 
                                            
19 Jan Rüger, The Great Naval Game: Britain and Germany in the Age of Empire, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009 [first edition 2007]); p. 1 
20 Mackenzie, Propaganda, p. 47 
21 See for example Isaac Land, War, Nationalism, and the British Sailor, 1750-1850, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2009) and Conley, From Jack. 
22 Brian Lavery, Able, p. 9 
23 Archibald Hurd, How our Navy is Run: A Description of Life in the King’s Fleet, (London: C. Arthur Pearson Ltd, 1902); 
p. 187 
24 See for example Thompson, Empire, p. 65 
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cultures, for example.25 It will be demonstrated that sailors both absorbed and displayed these 
cultural norms, whilst also assisting in their propagation. In particular, it will examine the 
perceived idea of the ‘other’ and the ‘exotic’ alongside ideas of racial superiority. It will also 
consider ideas of racial superiority over other European nations and the concept of racial 
hierarchy amongst white races, and how this sat alongside ideas of national superiority with 
fluid terms of understanding. In doing so, it will be argued that sailors fully embraced existing 
concepts of superiority as part of their identity.  
Its secondary aim is to produce a socio-cultural study of the lower deck using its own words, 
which situates it within the construct of imperialist studies and bridges the gap between existing 
research. As will be demonstrated, the “common seaman”, can be easily fitted within existing 
investigatory frameworks used in imperial and gender studies. Whilst some notable works have 
considered the history of British seamen, the lack of the sailors’ voice is self-evident. An 
important reason for this, as highlighted by Don Leggett, Mary A. Conley and Isaac Land, is 
that the voice of British sailors has been ‘almost entirely lost’.26 As such, Leggett has argued, 
the ‘relative silence of Jack Tar meant that others often spoke for him’.27 However, during the 
period considered by this thesis, lower-deck literacy had markedly improved as a result of 
Education Acts such as Forster’s Education Act of 1870 and the further Education Act of 1880. 
As Charles Beresford proudly stated in The Times, the ‘children of Nelson are not degenerate’.28 
Consequently, museum collections hold a wealth of personal testimonies in the form of diaries, 
scrap books and letters.  
In addition, this study adds to recent literature that has countered the widespread perception 
of the period that sailors were naïve and child-like, unsophisticated and unintellectual.29 Whilst 
not doubting the skill and bravery of sailors, these views fostered the belief amongst many 
contemporaries that sailors were unlikely to ruminate seriously on such complex issues as 
patriotism or imperialism. Therefore, considering their testimony augments the arguments of 
Mary Conley and Jan Rüger and demonstrates that sailors were not passive recipients of 
imperialist ideas; they were active in their interactions with these concepts and used them to 
shape their own identity.  Whilst this study groups sailors as an homogenous body of men in 
order to demonstrate the lower deck relationship with imperialism, it should be emphasized 
that the lower deck was instead highly stratified and cross-cut. Therefore, individually sailors’ 
understanding may have been more varied and, in particular, influenced by length of service, 
experiences, and age. 
This chapter sets out the fundamental purpose of this thesis and the premise for its arguments. 
It also set out the methodology for the study and explains the reasoning behind the sources 
                                            
25 Porter, Absent-minded, p. 76; Daniel Owen Spence, Colonial naval culture and British imperialism, 1922-67, 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015); p. 81 
26 Leggett, ‘Navy’, p. 153; See also Conley, From Jack and Land, War. 
27 Leggett, ‘Navy’, p. 155 
28 The Times, 31 July 1909 
29 This point regarding sailor character ties in with identity and as such will be discussed in further detail throughout 
this thesis but it is important to raise this common perception at this stage. 
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used to ensure that robust arguments can be adequately supported. By synthesizing the 
existing literature it demonstrates the position of lower-deck social history within wider 
historical studies. Furthermore, it argues that as a result of modernization the image of the 
Royal Navy and its sailors became vital to British imperial culture and became a means by 
which sailors identified themselves. As such, imperialism became an integral part of a 
developed, independent lower-deck culture which drew together sailors’ key ideas, customs, 
and understanding of their image and the world.30  
Historiography of the lower deck 
By the second half of the nineteenth century, the Royal Navy was undergoing significant 
changes. Industrialization brought advances in technology and fundamental changes in ship 
design, however it also brought dramatic changes to the navy’s social structure and its 
relationship with British society. To investigate these changes and the interrelationship between 
the Royal Navy, sailors and British imperialism, this chapter considers a number of 
historiographies of the lower deck.   
An early attempt to produce a social history of the lower deck was made by Peter Kemp in 
1970.31 The primary aim of Kemp’s study was to demonstrate the changing social conscience 
of sailors from the Tudor period until the beginning of the twentieth century. In order to do this 
Kemp drew on a number of sources available at that time, which consisted mainly of official 
papers and admiralty letters.32 Kemp argued that although the image of the pre-Elizabethan 
sailor has been lost, as the Empire took shape ‘The seaman began to emerge as an entity in 
his own right, a necessary and desirable member of a growing community’.33 However, Kemp 
was aware of the limitations presented by this approach and drew a line in the sand at the First 
World War. Although he acknowledged the importance of the Great War and inter-war years 
on the lower deck, he argued that ‘We are still too near these events to see them in a proper 
perspective’.34  
On the other hand, Henry Baynham approached the lower deck from the point of view of the 
sailors themselves.35 Baynham was instrumental in creating an oral history collection of sailor 
testimony held by the Imperial War Museum and in particular, his book Men from the 
Dreadnoughts, published in 1976, documented the history of the lower deck using sailors’ 
testimony in the form of interviews and diaries alongside official sources. Baynham’s 
methodology is relatively primitive, and he explained his criteria for selection as: ‘All joined the 
Lower Deck of the Royal Navy before the First World War; this, indeed, was my qualification 
for interview’.36 He does not detail how his interviews were conducted or explain the basis of 
                                            
30 This independent lower-deck culture is hereafter referred to as “sailor culture” for shorthand.  
31 See Peter Kemp, The British Sailor: A Social History of the Lower Deck, (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1970).  
32 Kemp, British, p. xiv 
33 Kemp, British, p. x 
34 Kemp, British, p. xiv 
35 See Henry Baynham, Men from the Dreadnoughts, (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1976). 
36 Baynham, Men, p. 15 
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the questions he posed to sailors. Furthermore, Baynham admits the limitations of his study: 
‘I have doubted the accuracy of some of the seamen’s observations… but generally I have left 
it unanswered, preferring rather to give others a chance of pondering on the problem’.37 
Therefore, there is little evaluation or engagement with the source material other than to 
situate it within the background history. In addition, he edited the testimony he collected for 
publication from oral interviews. Nevertheless, as a social history of the lower deck it remains 
vital, drawing upon life in the changing navy, the different branches, experiences ashore and 
afloat, and the First World War.  As such, it has set the tone for such studies which draw 
together background history interspersed with sailor testimony such as those by Max Arthur 
and to some extent Brian Lavery and Christopher McKee.38  
Interest continued during the 1980s, most notably by Anthony Carew who approached the 
lower deck from an industrial relations perspective. Carew directed his study towards political 
and economic themes, focusing on the politicization of the lower deck, charting the progression 
of naval rights and pay culminating in the mutiny at Invergordon in 1931.39 In conducting this 
study, Carew drew on a number of archive collections including the personal collections of Harry 
Pursey and Stephen Roskill, as well as official papers, lower deck newspapers and oral 
testimony.40 It presents a detailed study of the various reforms introduced and the growth of 
industrial activity on the lower deck alongside attempts by the Admiralty to resist such 
grievances. Consequently, Carew’s study remains the key text on the politics of the lower deck 
from 1900 to 1931.41 However, Carew clearly approaches the topic from his industrial relations 
background and at times it is questionable whether this is an appropriate framework for 
analysis.  
Nevertheless, despite these investigations, between the 1980s through to the 2000s, social 
histories of the lower deck have been significantly outweighed by more traditionalist naval 
historians such as Nicholas Rodger.42 Therefore, Christopher McKee’s approach in 2002 was a 
welcome addition. In particular, McKee focused on the ‘voice’ of sailors using both diaries and 
letters, and also oral testimony, with the purpose of questioning the stereotype of Jack Tar.43 
McKee noted: ‘I decided to ask those who know naval sailors best – the ratings themselves’.44 
Drawing on key aspects of their lives, McKee has explored sailors’ own views on their 
backgrounds and reasons for joining the navy, travelling the world, and experiences in battle. 
                                            
37 Baynham, Men, p. 16 
38 See Max Arthur, True Glory: the Royal Navy, 1914-1939, (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1996); Lavery, Able; 
Christopher McKee, Sober Men and True: Sailor Lives in the Royal Navy, 1900-1945, (London: Harvard University Press, 
2002). 
39 See Anthony Carew, The Lower Deck of the Royal Navy, 1900-39: Invergordon in Perspective, (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1981). 
40 Carew, The Lower Deck, pp. viii-xi 
41 McKee calls Carew’s study the ‘superlative book’. McKee, Sober Men, p. 5  
42 Nicholas Rodger has written extensively on the Royal Navy. See for example Rodger, Command. 
43 McKee, Sober Men, p. 1 
44 McKee, Sober Men, p. 1 
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In doing so he has demonstrated the complexities of sailors rather than conforming simply to 
the stereotype, and their dual image as rogues and defenders of empire.45  
Furthermore, McKee has shied away from heavy overdependence on published memoirs which 
other studies have used, citing the key danger of conscious/subconscious editing, and has 
argued that they often only ‘focus on major happenings which the old sailor thinks were 
important’.46 In particular, one published autobiography which has been heavily used by others 
such as Brian Lavery is Aye, Aye, Sir by Clinker Knocker.47 The authenticity of this memoir has 
been questioned by Chris Henry who suggests that it was actually written by an officer and 
conforms to perceptions of the lower deck rather than give an honest view.48 This point has 
also been well made by Tony Chamberlain in his social history of the stoker branch.49  
The most recent social history of the lower deck has been produced by Brian Lavery. In Able 
Seamen, the second part of his trilogy of the history of the lower deck, he examines the lower 
deck chronologically between 1850 and 1939, investigating the key technological changes, 
imperialism and war, and the effect upon sailors. Lavery continues to demonstrate the 
complexities of the sailor’s character. In particular, he has argued that, ‘Despite his highly 
controlled environment, the sailor developed his own very strong culture’.50 This is an important 
observation, but one that Lavery does not capitalize on. Furthermore, it continues to draws 
upon a range of official sources as well as published autobiographies and personal papers rather 
than sailor testimony as McKee did. This is a broad study but one that has nevertheless done 
much to update the historiography of the lower deck. Importantly, Lavery raises the issue of 
sailor loyalty noting that ‘Sailors have at least as much loyalty to their messmates, their ship, 
the navy as a whole and their country’.51  
However, in recent years there has been a growing interest from socio-cultural and gender 
historians who have begun to consider the lower deck through these themes.52 Although not 
specifically social histories of the lower deck in themselves, importantly they have introduced 
wider trends in historical discourse to studies of sailors. For example Quintin Colville has 
considered the navy from a gender perspective, examining masculine identities through the 
medium of naval uniforms. Naval uniforms have become ubiquitous as part of the imperial 
image. In a highly stratified naval society, Colville argued that the ‘uniform was of crucial 
significance in defining the understanding of class and masculinity held by all ranks’ and in 
                                            
45 McKee, Sober Men, p. 227 
46 McKee, Sober Men, pp. 7-8 
47 Clinker Knocker, Aye, Aye, Sir, (London: Rich & Cowan, 1938) 
48 Chris Henry, Depth Charge!: royal naval mines, depth charges and underwater weapons, 1914-1945, (Barnsley: Pen 
& Sword, 2005), p. 191 
49 Tony Chamberlain, ‘Stokers – the lowest of the low?’ A Social History of Royal Navy Stokers 1850-1950, Unpublished 
Dissertation, Exeter, 2013; pp. 16-17 
50 Lavery, Able, p. 306 
51 Lavery, Able, p. 11 
52 See for example Mary A. Conley who comments on the lack of historical study from a social perspective. Conley, From 
Jack, p. 5 
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shaping their image and identity.53 Tailored and made their own, the importance of Colville’s 
argument is that ‘Jack Tar… was consequently not just imposed from above; it was also 
inhabited and exploited by working-class men as a source of social kudos and esteem’.54 
The concept of the sailor stereotype and relationship between his image and imperial culture 
has been further developed by Mary A. Conley. Conley stated her study ‘is not a social history 
of the lives of the non-commissioned men who formed the lower deck of the navy, but more a 
cultural history’.55 Approaching the topic from a gender perspective, Conley thus provides a 
refreshing investigation into the links between the navy, empire and manhood in British society. 
In doing so she has investigated how the image of the Royal Navy was re-constructed during 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, and expanded the discourse within the 
construct of imperialist studies. In particular, she has considered the masculinity of sailors and 
investigated the construction of the masculine bluejacket image: a reliable, honest and brave 
man who was ready to serve the Empire.56 By framing this alongside the changing nature of 
the navy, and the effect of imperial scares and anxieties, Conley has demonstrated how the 
modern image of the navy was engendered and constructed during this time. Furthermore, by 
drawing on the work of Joanna Bourke, Conley has suggested the transferability of similar 
gender studies.57 Whilst Lavery and McKee have alluded to the crisis of masculinity created by 
wartime conditions, this is an insightful approach to the topic.58 As Conley has demonstrated, 
heroic masculinity in the navy struck a chord with the British public. In particular, the 
significance of the death of Jack Cornwell at Jutland, held a key place in the “popular” memory 
of the war, and was an important part of the national struggle.59 
Introducing sailors to studies of British imperialism has been an important step forward, 
especially given the role of the Royal Navy’s image in imperial culture. Approaching this theme 
from a cultural perspective, Jan Rüger has considered the interplay between politics and ritual, 
the public and the navy. In recognizing that the navy was ‘a powerful cultural symbol’, Rüger 
has demonstrated the importance of large-scale naval displays and ship launches, and how 
they served as a means of promoting the Empire by putting the navy on ‘the public stage’.60 
Primarily, Rüger’s study focuses on the relationship between the navy and the public: how the 
spectacle of naval pageantry reinforced imperialistic beliefs. In particular, the possibility for 
feelings to co-exist, suggesting that ‘conflict was hidden, consensus was staged’.61 However, 
Rüger also noted that this was the same for sailors and that ‘there did not have to be a 
                                            
53 Quintin Colville, ‘Jack Tar and the Gentleman Officer: The role of uniform in shaping the class- and gender-related 
identities of British naval personnel, 1930-1939’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 13, 2003; pp. 105-129, 
p. 106 
54 Colville, ‘Jack Tar’, p. 119 
55 Conley, From Jack, p. 11 
56 Conley, From Jack, p. 3 
57 Conley, From Jack, pp. 165-167; Joanna Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing: face-to-face killing in twentieth-
century warfare, (London: Granta, 1999); See also Gail Braybon, Evidence, history, and the Great War: historians and 
the impact of 1914-18, (Oxford: Berghahn, 2003); Sue Bruley, Women in Britain since 1900, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1999). 
58 Lavery, Able, pp. 215-220; McKee, Sober Men, pp. 107-114 
59 Conley, From Jack, p. 165 
60 Rüger, Great Naval, p. 1 
61 Rüger, Great Naval, p. 122 
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contradiction between being proud of the show that the navy put on, and feeling profound 
dissatisfaction with those who most seemed to benefit from it’.62 Thus sailors could draw a 
sense of pride in the navy and their role without getting drawn into the wider imperial message. 
Singling out the sailor himself, Isaac Land has produced an illuminating study which has 
situated Jack Tar into the discourse of national identity. Although considering an earlier 
timeframe than this thesis (1750-1850), this study has done much to develop the idea of 
examining sailors in the wider cultural context. Importantly, Land argues that his study ‘is not 
a work of maritime history’, rather it considers ‘the nation-state itself as the problem that 
sailors confronted’.63 In examining how sailors responded, it sets the tone for the direction in 
which historiography needs to travel and be approached by those outside traditional naval 
history. In particular to this thesis, Land has argued that the loyalty of sailors needs to be 
addressed and that historians need to move beyond the ‘not very plausible, but still influential, 
assumption… that a degree of nationalist fervour in the context of military service is self-
explanatory’.64 Furthermore, Land supports Conley and Colville in arguing that sailors had their 
own minds and interpretation of their identity, and noted that ‘their ultimate relationship to 
British nationalism was, predictably, complex and ambivalent’.65 Consequently, Land has 
argued the importance of the sailor’s voice, and that amongst the extant material there is a 
‘diversity of voices’ demonstrating that sailors did not have to conform to stereotypes.66 What 
sailors said differed ‘as the situation required, and assumed roles that they thought would best 
suit their purposes of the moment’.67 
A further welcome study is that of Daniel Owen Spence who has examined the history of the 
Royal Navy specifically from the viewpoint of empire and imperialism. This study charts the 
navy through 500 years of history, beginning with the Tudors and continuing to de-colonization. 
In particular, he argues that the ‘Mental valuations of prestige were vital to Britain’s imperial 
and “Great Power” status, and as Britain’s most visible and persuasive global ambassadors, the 
Royal Navy played a front-line role in its cultivation’.68 That the navy could do this was due to 
‘a symbiotic relationship where the colonies materially strengthened the senior service so that 
it could strengthen the empire further’.69 Following a chronological approach, this is not a 
history of the lower deck, nor is it a strict naval history, but it examines key aspects of the 
Royal Navy. However, it considers the navy over a very broad time frame and is not an 
extensive study. Nevertheless, this should not detract from what is a remarkable addition to 
the historiography and highlights a number of areas where more research needs to be done, 
especially in relation to the Empire from a colonial point of view.  
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A further two studies are worthy of consideration at this point. Although not social histories or 
specifically focused on the lower deck, both examine the naval brigades who served ashore in 
a number of conflicts during the second half of the nineteenth century. The first by Tony 
Bridgland, a journalist and amateur historian, was a study specifically focusing on the naval 
brigades landed during the Boer War. Bridgland charted the war as it developed and produced 
an excellent account of the actions of the naval brigades ashore throughout the war. Although 
a greater emphasis is placed on the story of the officers who served as members of the 
brigades, such as Captain Percy Scott of HMS Terrible who devised the mountings that allowed 
the naval guns to go ashore, he also provided anecdotal information from sailors.70 In 
particular, the hardships they endured whilst at Ladysmith and in the relief columns. Thus this 
allows some further insight to be gained and also sits alongside the official reports of War 
Correspondents such as Donald McDonald and H. H. S. Pearce.71 However, the source of 
Bridgland’s material is not always clear and it is uncertain whether it is second-hand 
information. Similarly Arther Bleby is a retired naval officer who approached the subject 
because he ‘could find no single book recording the efforts and adventures of these Naval 
Brigades’.72 Bleby’s work is primarily an account of the different engagements the naval 
brigades served in during ‘eleven of the Wars of the Empire’ and recounts these with limited 
wider historical context or engagement with historical debates.73 Nevertheless, he wrote that 
in conducting this study: ‘I should like to add something of what the men were like’.74 In doing 
so Bleby produced a brief examination of sailors serving in the naval brigades. Although his 
methodology was primitive and shows no advance from other generalists such as Max Arthur, 
it is an important study of an area of the Royal Navy which has been almost completely 
ignored.75                                         
From reviewing this literature, it is evident that the majority of studies focusing simply on 
lower-deck social history have followed a set methodological pattern: overreliance on 
autobiographies, collating sailor testimony alongside official information and setting this against 
the key developments of the lower deck. In particular, many of these studies deploy limited 
engagement with historiography and, more importantly, wider historical themes. Furthermore, 
the continued reliance on lower-deck autobiographies without additional information in support 
is problematic. For this reason Christopher McKee has taken a step in the right direction by 
attempting to curtail their usage and seek out the sailor’s voice, extrapolating a number of 
individual diaries to demonstrate key arguments. In addition, McKee and Lavery have noted 
the complexity of the sailor’s identity. The recent contributions of Conley and Rüger have 
therefore broken new ground in introducing and developing the navy within the constructs of 
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imperialism and gender. By arguing the importance of the navy in society, Rüger has drawn a 
key link between sailors and naval pageantry. Although not the focus of his study, this 
demonstrates a significant gap in the historiography as to how they related to pageantry as it 
became an increasingly important aspect of their lives. Similarly, Conley has revealed how the 
imperial character of the sailor was adopted and that they took pride in their reputation and 
image of respectability. Together they demonstrate the need for a socio-cultural study of the 
lower deck focusing on sailors and their relationship to the Empire.  
Creating the modern navy and the sailor’s image 
During the second half of the nineteenth century the Royal Navy entered a period of significant 
modernization, which culminated in the Anglo-German Arms race in the early twentieth 
century. In particular, the last quarter of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century 
took on particular importance as New Imperialism gained momentum, and European imperial 
powers expanded and consolidated their holdings overseas. Concepts of imperialism, identity, 
pride and patriotism were increasingly bound together through the prism of British imperial 
prestige and influenced sailor culture. Therefore, it is necessary to briefly examine both the 
modernization of the navy and creation of the sailor’s image to examine issues of change and 
continuity over the period considered by this thesis. 
In his study of the lower deck, Peter Kemp argued that the ‘great turning point’ in its social 
history was the Crimean War, because it highlighted the urgent need for reform.76 This resulted 
in the Continuous Service Act (CSA) of 1853, which Anthony Carew has argued led to the birth 
of the modern navy, and modern sailors.77 The Act replaced the ‘deeply unpopular’ practice of 
pressganging sailors at times of high demand and the economical, but impractical, hire-and-
discharge system.78 Furthermore, it shifted the responsibility for crewing ships to the Admiralty 
rather than ship’s captains.79 This meant that men and boys no longer joined a ship based upon 
its or its captain’s reputation: they joined the Royal Navy and would be assigned to any ship in 
the fleet.80 As such, the Admiralty became responsible for actively encouraging men and boys 
to join the navy. Therefore, reform was not only necessary, it was vital to ensure that the navy 
remained adequately manned.81  
The CSA was followed by the Naval Discipline Act of 1860 which reformed the naval regulations 
and, as Kemp noted, removed the ‘ferocious charter’ by which the navy was governed.82 Conley 
further argued the importance of this Act, recognizing it as an attempt to change the popular 
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belief that the Royal Navy was little more than a ‘prison afloat’.83 Although Kemp noted that 
many punishments were still ‘harsh’, they ‘were no longer mandatory and could be relaxed at 
discretion’.84 Similarly, Conley argued that the NDA ‘was particularly ground-breaking because 
it reduced the number of offences that either called for or required a death sentence’.85 This 
was a significant step towards increasing the appeal of the navy to the British public and paved 
the way for the development of sailor culture as the navy re-established its image. In particular, 
Conley has noted that it was hoped this would counter the appeal of the navy’s chief competitor: 
the Merchant Marine.86 The Merchant Marine operated under far less draconian rules and 
regulations, and afforded better rates of pay, thus it was often more appealing for skilled 
seamen.87  
Through the CSA and NDA, with the increase in pay and removal of the strict and often brutal 
punishments, the Royal Navy began to be more attractive as a profession. Consequently, Brian 
Lavery has argued that the navy’s attempt to improve the situation should be viewed as ‘a 
success’.88 In particular, he highlighted a report from the First Sea Lord to the House of 
Commons which stated: 
It is worthy of note that, simultaneously with the growing popularity of the 
Navy with parents as a career for their sons, there exists a dread of dismissal 
from the Service which previously did not exist.89 
Although the First Sea Lord would wish to give a success story to the Commons so as to secure 
the Royal Navy’s budget, the respectability of the Royal Navy was on the rise. Whether from a 
middle-class or working-class background, the man or boy in question would have a secure 
position, a respectable wage and clear career progression.90  
Career progression was certainly an improving factor, especially as ships became more 
technologically advanced and sail was abandoned, and the need for skilled men increased.91 
For example, the engine rooms of coal-fired ships required an army of engineers and stokers 
to operate them, and by the mid-1870s this demand was increasing.92 Engineer officers were 
better trained and earned higher wages, engine room artificers did the majority of the more 
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menial work and stokers kept the fires burning. Similarly sailors had opportunities for 
promotion and the creation of the new ratings of chief petty officer and leading seaman offered 
improved benefits and wages.93 
By 1880 recruitment propaganda portrayed the Royal Navy ‘as an honourable and respectable 
career for a young man’.94 The importance of an “honourable” career may be negligible but 
“respectable” and secure employment would have been desirable.95 As Conley rightly states, 
working-class children were required to contribute to the family finances and the navy must 
have seemed more exotic than the mill as it had the potential to offer exciting adventures in 
far-off lands.96 Carew had also made this point, saying that ‘most [were] seeking adventure’, 
although he also noted that ‘some simply [wanted] escape from an unhappy home life’.97 
However, Conley wisely caveated this point by revealing that nationally the level of exotic 
appeal appears to have been limited.98 It is understandable that locales should be intrinsically 
linked to this, and those living near the coast or in port towns would have been far more likely 
to become sailors. Firstly, this is because historically the sea would have provided one of the 
main sources of employment in these towns, and other family members were likely to be 
employed in similar roles. Secondly, as recent historiography has shown, the importance of 
growing local and civic pride in these locales and their firm association with the Royal Navy 
should not be underestimated.99 The heightened sense of local, civic and imperial culture may 
also have influenced sailors, who by necessity regularly found themselves in these 
environments, and influenced their own understanding of these concepts.  
As the public image of the sailor became increasingly respectable, it has become an area of 
consideration in trying to deconstruct the stereotype and uncover the reality behind the man. 
Christopher McKee has summed up the enduring image of Jack Tar rather succinctly:  
He is a globe-wandering adventurer, dressed in distinctive and attractive 
costume, short on shoreside personal responsibilities, who flexes the national 
muscle at enemies, would-be and real, beyond or on the seas. His dark side is 
a strong part of his appeal; with prodigious appetite for alcohol and sex, he 
delights in anti-social behaviour which is held in check only by the fear of harsh 
punishment.100 
As McKee pointed out, this ‘traditional image of the sailor comes from information historians 
have collected from elite sources: officers, journalists, and social reformers’.101 He argued that 
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these groups, particularly the officers, ‘had a vested interest in portraying naval ratings as the 
other’ in order to augment ‘their own elite status’.102 In particular, McKee has suggested that 
the majority of evidence consists of ‘colourful disciplinary records’, drawing a comparison with 
those who end up on prison records: a cause célèbre, not an accurate cross-section of 
society.103 
More recently, Conley has studied in detail the 
evolution of the sailor’s image during the nineteenth 
century to become the masculine hero of the Empire. 
This has developed further the arguments of Kemp 
who noted that the sailor became ‘the darling of the 
people, [and] his life was glamorized’, however he did 
not develop this point.104 Yet Conley has argued that 
by 1870 the image of naval men had been 
reconstructed: navy men were now seen ‘as both 
patriotic defender and dutiful husband and father’ 
which, as Conley noted, ‘stood in sharp contrast to the 
image of the brave but bawdy tar of the Georgian navy 
whose bravery afloat was only matched by his 
licentiousness ashore’.105 In particular, Conley has 
shown ‘the interconnectedness of empire, naval 
manhood and British society’ through imagery and 
culture.106 Highlighting the use of the sailor’s image in 
advertising such as for Carr & Co. Biscuits, Conley has demonstrated how the modern, 
respectable sailor was a part of everyday culture.107 In the advertisement the respectable, 
manly bluejacket stands with his daughter sat on his shoulder, waving a Union Flag, and shows 
a clear link to Britain and the Empire. More importantly, many sailors keenly embraced this 
image of respectability which fostered pride in the navy as an institution and pride in 
themselves.   
Central to this was the sailor’s iconic uniform. The effect of this on British society can be seen 
in its popularity especially amongst the upper and middle classes, who regularly dressed their 
children in sailor suits.108 George Orwell reflected on this and noted the Edwardian period as 
the ‘great days of the navy’s popularity. Small boys wore sailor suits and everyone belonged 
to something called the Navy League’.109 Introduced in 1857, naval uniform was an aspect of 
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the progressive phase upon which the Admiralty was embarking, and as Conley has said, 
‘signalled the professionalism of the fleet’.110 Kemp also noted the importance of this 
introduction and called it an ‘important milestone’, although he did not consider the wider 
effects of this.111 However, Conley has argued that the uniform was essential to the creation of 
the ‘British Bluejacket’ as a brand.112  
A slightly different approach has been conducted by Quintin Colville who broke new ground 
with his investigation of the role of the naval uniform ‘in shaping the class- and gender-related 
identities of British naval personnel’ during the 1930s.113 Colville has argued that the uniform 
was ‘crucial’ to naval personnel’s ‘understanding of class and masculinity’.114 In particular, 
uniforms ‘associated their wearers with specific clusters of stereotyped qualities and 
characteristics’.115 Furthermore, he recognized that its close resemblance to civilian clothing 
styles allowed the uniform ‘to communicate socio-cultural information’ to all ranks.116 In 
addition, this was a period of increased militarization and, as Philipp Blom has said, ‘whole 
societies were in the thrall of uniforms and military strength’.117 It is unsurprising, therefore, 
that Colville noted that sailors in uniform were ‘consciously employed… to maintain the cultural 
visibility of Jack Tar’.118 
However, whilst iconic within society, Colville has demonstrated the importance of uniform to 
sailors and examined their relationship with it. In particular, he has argued that the otherwise 
commonplace act of boxing up and posting home of a new rating’s civilian clothes took on a far 
more profound meaning.119 It was an act designed to remove the rating from the civilian world 
and then the process of moulding them into the new Jack Tar persona could begin. Although 
this would be predominantly inculcated by the enforced navy-culture and training regimes, 
Colville also considered and highlighted the importance of the more mundane acts of new 
recruits. For instance, he draws attention to the banal act of sailors sewing their names into 
their kit, suggesting that this was ‘symbolising the sublimation of his [the sailor’s] personal 
identity within the stereotyped cultural identity of Jack Tar’.120  
Therefore, it is also important to consider how sailors responded to this top-down attempt at 
social identity construction. The consideration of uniform allows a useful platform from which 
to do this. On the one hand, historians such as McKee have pointed out that until the inter-war 
period sailors were mainly conservative in nature and likely to follow the strict traditions of the 
navy.121 Colville also recognized that sailors ‘frequently displayed great attachment to the 
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navy’s ordered, secure and conservative socio-cultural world’.122 However, he is cognizant that 
ratings should not be viewed ‘as simply the passive victims’, especially when it came to 
uniforms and the social constrictions they imposed.123 This point was also made by Lavery who, 
despite his more general history of lower-deck life, raised several valid points regarding the 
importance of naval uniform. In particular, both Colville and Lavery have argued that by 
modifying their uniforms to suit their own tastes, seamen were consciously stamping their own 
mark on the image.124 Furthermore, Lavery argued that sailors felt it was their ‘moral right’ to 
alter the uniform as they saw fit because they were required to purchase all kit themselves.125 
It is due to their personal modifications, argued Lavery, that ‘the uniform became increasingly 
beloved by the public’.126 Consequently, it is argued that the uniform became a vital part of 
their identity and a means by how they understood themselves. 
Professionalizing the Royal Navy was crucial and yet, despite cleaning up the image of Jack 
Tar, Colville has suggested that the Admiralty continued to perpetuate the image ‘of the bawdy, 
womanising rating’.127 The reason for this, Colville argued, was that being distinct from 
gentlemanly officers, sailors ‘were associated with feminised qualities such as a love of 
domesticity, sentimentality, emotional spontaneity and immaturity’.128 The bawdy image 
alongside the image of the masculine hero of empire countered any issues of femininity.  
Nevertheless, Colville does not investigate this point fully, concentrating on the impact rather 
than the reasoning. It was, however, accepted as popular belief that sailors were naïve and 
child-like in temperament.129 Thus by keeping elements of the older image alive, it allowed the 
Jack Tar persona to support both popular images, and allowed sailors to utilize the benefits of 
both.   
Furthermore, although Colville suggested that sailors embraced the image of respectability, 
they also contributed to the continuation of the bawdy persona. He noted that many were 
‘convinced of the sexual attractiveness of their uniform to women, and were pleased with the 
roguish quality it conferred’.130 This is a rather different view to that proposed by Anthony 
Carew in his landmark study of the lower deck. Carew argued that ‘This new generation of 
ratings rejected the popular caricature of naval personnel. They resented the image of the jolly 
drunken sailor’.131 The difference in these interpretations is interesting. It is not possible to 
argue that their differences stem from the period covered; indeed both overlap significantly. 
However, Carew is noticeably protective of his lower-deck subjects and his approach from an 
industrial relations background possibly creates this slant on the serious-mindedness of the 
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lower deck.132 On the other hand, Conley has also considered this point and concurs with Colville 
that sailors were not completely against the image but that the drunken image was becoming 
increasingly resented by sailors.  In particular, this is highlighted by the anger expressed 
towards an element of Agnes Weston’s temperance campaign.133 The cartoon, ‘A Sad Hobby’, 
published in Ashore and Afloat in 1901 depicted a sailor riding a hobby horse constructed from 
a barrel, looking dishevelled and with an empty bottle in his hand whilst his family suffered in 
the background.134 It drew immediate criticism 
from sailors and Conley has argued they resented 
the implication that they were all drunkards, and 
furthermore it ‘emasculated him by portraying 
him as a dishonourable husband and irresponsible 
father’.135 As one sailor, Sidney Knock explained, 
they did not like being made a mockery or 
condescended to.136 Rather, they embraced the 
image when it suited them but it was not the basis 
of their identity. This is supported by Linda Colley 
who noted, ‘Identities are not like hats. Human 
beings can and do put on several at a time’.137  
Nevertheless, despite this growing respectability, 
McKee has argued that aside from the 
technological changes, sailors from 1850 had 
much in common with a sailor from 1939, 
suggesting little change.138 However, Conley calls 
this ‘a playful argument’.139 Although Conley 
recognized, ‘there is some truth in this statement’, the navy had ‘made marked changes’ and 
increasingly sailors viewed themselves as professionals and ‘differently from their 
predecessors’.140 Conley says that ‘Naval seamen represented themselves as an intelligent 
professional body of men who resented attempts to dishonour their character by accusations, 
however crudely designed, which impugned their roles as husbands, fathers and seamen’.141 
Kemp had noted this in the 1970s stating that the ‘social standing of the sailor had never been 
higher… he held a place in the public heart’.142 Furthermore, Colville has argued that their 
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respectability was firmly established amongst their own working-class communities, where they 
received ‘considerable regard’.143 
Therefore, although some sailors enjoyed the roguish image of jolly Jack Tar, by wearing the 
uniform they were part of the socio-cultural construct of the sailor.  Their uniform ‘reflected 
the cultural status of the navy, and its global profile… and associated these qualities with the 
wearer’.144 Consequently, it is evident that the uniform was an influencing factor both in 
professionalizing the sailor and constructing their image within specific class- and gender-
defined stereotypes, and British imperial culture. However, it was equally important to sailors 
themselves and their own interpretation of their identity. As Colville has argued, sailors were 
not passive and used the uniform to implement their own individualism.145  
As the Royal Navy and the image of the sailor increasingly became symbols of the Empire, Jan 
Rüger has argued that the navy became an important cultural image.146 Through a comparative 
study of the Anglo-German naval race, Rüger examined the increasingly theatrical nature of 
the ‘the naval game’ and the development of the navy as a popular icon in British culture.147 
Rüger stated:  
This was a public theatre in which the domestic and the foreign intersected, 
where the modern mass market of media and consumerism collided with 
politics and international, and where identity and conflict were acted out 
between the nations.148 
Whilst Carew noted the importance of Anglo-German rivalry and how this ‘was to increase the 
British public’s sense of dependence on the navy’, Rüger’s study reflects the first real 
engagement and development of this theme within wider cultural studies.149 Although Kemp 
noted the changing position of the navy in British society he stated that it was ‘An odd 
phenomenon of the second half of the nineteenth century’.150 By considering naval theatre, 
particularly ship launches and fleet reviews, Rüger has demonstrated the importance of popular 
culture and its relationship with imperial culture. In doing so this has moved the debate into 
the wider historical discourse away from the more local focus of K. Lunn and R. Thomas, who 
examined imperialism in Portsmouth through ship launches.151  
However, a further direction in which to take this argument is the involvement of sailors 
themselves in naval pageantry. As has been demonstrated, the sailor was an iconic image in 
                                            
143 Colville, ‘Jack Tar’, p.121; Kemp, British, p. 208 
144 Colville, ‘Jack Tar’, p. 119 
145 Colville, ‘Jack Tar’, p. 119 
146 Rüger, Great Naval, p. 1 
147 Rüger, Great Naval, p. 1 
148 Rüger, Great Naval, p. 1 
149 Carew, Lower Deck, pp. 188-189  
150 Kemp, British, p. 208 
151 K. Lunn and R. Thomas, ‘Naval Imperialism in Portsmouth, 1905 to 1914’, Southern History, 10, 1988; pp. 142-159; 
For other general accounts see for example see Blom, Vertigo Years, who comments on the launch of HMS Dreadnought. 
Blom’s work, although a general sojourn through western culture, demonstrates a good overview of the period. 
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his own right, and intrinsically linked to British imperial culture.  Importantly, Rüger has 
suggested that the navy is a useful means by which to examine notions of national identity.152 
In particular, he is critical of historians such as Linda Colley who have overlooked the navy’s 
role and consequently has argued that: ‘The Royal Navy became one of the most important 
metaphors of Britishness in the nineteenth century’.153 Therefore, it is important to question 
the relationship sailors had with imperial culture. They were at once an integral part of the 
imperial image on display to the public and yet also participants in events of pageantry. What 
this meant to them and how they understood as part of their image and identity needs to be 
considered.  
This point regarding national identity has also been considered by Isaac Land who similarly 
noted Colley’s failure to consider sailors ‘in her searching analysis of British patriotism’.154 In 
particular, Land noted the importance of the issue of their loyalty.155 Although Land was 
primarily concerned with sailors and impressment, this theme is one that is equally important 
for the period under consideration in this thesis. This is complex and historians such as Lavery 
and McKee have accepted that there existed multiple loyalties: to the Empire, to the navy, to 
the ship, to crewmates.156 However, they have not specifically engaged with it nor approached 
this theme through the wider prism of imperialism, gender and cultural studies. Similar studies 
of the army on the other hand have used the Boer War and the First World War as a means to 
examine British society in particular to test levels of imperial sentiment.157  
Both the Boer War and the First World War involved British sailors and the Royal Navy in a 
number of roles. At the time of the Boer War for instance, the sailor’s image was intertwined 
with symbols of imperialism and he was held out as the ‘handyman’ of Empire and praised as 
such by social commentators like Bullen, Hurd and Kipling, and indeed by sailors themselves.158 
As Conley wrote: ‘His adaptability for fighting afloat or ashore had not only made the modern 
sailor a “handyman” but also made him a more valuable defender of empire than an army 
soldier’.159 Furthermore, the wider implications of battle on the sailor’s character needs to be 
considered. The concept of masculinity was clearly defined by the Victorians and Edwardians 
and has been demonstrated to be a key aspect of sailors’ identity. In her examination of the 
death of Boy Seaman Jack Cornwell at Jutland in 1916 and the creation of ‘his heroic legend’, 
Conley noted that despite some historians suggesting the horror of the conflict destroyed the 
romantic idyll of war, a strong sense of patriotic duty and Christian sacrifice remained.160 In 
                                            
152 Rüger, Great Naval, p. 3 
153 Rüger, Great Naval, p. 3 
154 Land, War, p. 2 
155 Land, War, p. 2  
156 Lavery, Able, p. 11; McKee, Sober Men, p. 67 
157 For examples of this see Gregory, The last; Silbey, British; Miller, Volunteers; Beaven, Visions. 
158 Conley From Jack, p. 147; RNM 2001/6/1: Diary of Frank Ottaway 
159 Conley, From Jack, pp. 149-150 
160 Conley, From Jack, pp. 164-166; See for example Mark Girouard, The Return to Camelot: Chivalry and the English 
Gentleman, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981). 
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doing so she supports the arguments of both Jay Winter and Joanna Bourke.161 This was a boy 
who dutifully stood by his gun and sacrificed his life for the Empire, fulfilling the ‘Victorian 
models of heroism defined by duty, honour and sacrifice’.162 Conley argued that Jack Cornwell’s 
death ‘rescued British manhood from the experiences of unimaginable brutality in the trenches 
of France’.163 
Therefore, how war affected sailors and their sense of identity, bound up in imperial imagery, 
is a point that needs consideration. This has been considered in some detail by historians of 
gender since the 1990s and in particular Joanna Bourke has analysed the ‘experiences of 
intimate killing’ and how these experiences revealed them ‘as individuals transformed by a 
range of conflicting emotions’.164 Using the construct of gender studies like Bourke’s allows an 
examination of the lower deck and masculinity during wartime and determines the experience 
of sailors alongside their masculine image. As Conley, Colville and Rüger have shown, sailors 
were individuals with their own thoughts and agendas, constantly conforming and resisting 
different facets of the imposed social and military norms, and these combined within a distinct 
sailor culture.  
Thus, considering the sailor’s experience of war is a useful way in which to examine their 
relationship with imperialism as it allows both their expressions of imperial sentiment and 
imperial masculine image to be deconstructed. Henry Baynham considered sailors on the 
outbreak of the Great War, arguing that they had ‘no particular hostility against the 
Germans’.165 The testimony he collected suggests that sailors were nevertheless enthusiastic 
about going to war, however this enthusiasm requires analysis. Likewise, studies by Max Arthur 
similarly fail to engage with these wider themes.166 These studies have done little more than 
combine the basic background of the conflict with selected sailor testimony to tell the story. 
Consequently, the experience of sailors on the outbreak of war will be considered in Chapters 
Three and Four.  
The recent work of the historians considered above has shown that there is a pressing need for 
further socio-cultural research on the Royal Navy in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth 
centuries. In particular, the approach from a gender perspective has provided an excellent 
means of deconstructing the character of Jack Tar. Recent historiography has provided a 
nuanced view of British sailors and developed this beyond the socio-political spectrum of earlier 
historians such as Carew and Kemp, whose work was specifically aimed at exploring the socio-
political aspect of sailors and their struggle towards better pay and conditions. Conley’s work 
has done much to bring together the themes of gender and imperialism in the Royal Navy and 
                                            
161 Conley, From Jack, p. 165; See also Jay Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European 
Cultural History, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) and Joanna Bourke, Dismembering the Male: Men’s 
Bodies, Britain and the Great War, (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1996). 
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provided a useful analysis of how the masculine imperial image of Jack Tar was constructed. 
Similarly Colville’s work is especially insightful as it demonstrates the ways in which sailors 
responded to the changing image of Jack Tar. Demonstrating that sailors were not simply 
passive but could think for themselves, these approaches have shown the importance of sailors’ 
independence and the need to consider them alongside wider historical themes. The following 
chapters will draw together this line of reasoning and demonstrate the ways in which sailors 
used their understanding of imperialism to shape their identity, how they embraced and served 
the Empire, but at the same time remained individuals and interpreted their identity in their 
own way. In particular, it will argue that there existed a sailor culture that was heavily 
influenced by imperialism but also contained a number of beliefs and ideologies. This culture 
enabled sailors to be patriotic and dutiful servants of the Empire but also allowed other 
competing sentiments to take precedence when necessary.  
Methodology 
This thesis primarily draws upon unpublished sailor testimony, particularly the collection held 
by the National Museum of the Royal Navy in Portsmouth (NMRN). The material most utilized 
by this study is that of diaries kept by those on the lower deck during the late nineteenth and 
twentieth century. The reasons for this are twofold: firstly, the collections held at the NMRN 
have been underused by other historians, those who have used lower deck testimony have 
instead relied upon the collections at the Imperial War Museum (IWM) and the National 
Maritime Museum (NMM); secondly, by using sailor diaries it allows this thesis to frame the 
question of sailor’s relationship with imperialism through their own words. In particular, the 
use of unpublished diaries allows for a greater understanding of the character of the men who 
served on the lower deck between 1890 and 1939. A number of existing studies are primarily 
weighted towards using published diaries and officers’ accounts, which continue to mask lower-
deck views. Furthermore, studies of sailors such as those by Brian Lavery and Christopher 
McKee have recycled testimony previously collected by Henry Baynham. Although memoirs and 
autobiographies are beneficial sources contextually, they present a number of problems for 
historians. As John Tosh has argued, ‘Autobiographies may be very revealing of mentality and 
values, but as a record of events they are often inaccurate and selective to the point of 
distortion’.167 Furthermore, often written sometime after the event, they are subject to self-
censorship in order to present the picture as the author sees it and may also ‘recount only what 
people found worthy of note’.168   
Nevertheless, this is not to suggest that unpublished diaries are free from these limitations. 
They are also subject to what the writer deemed important or interesting, and can demonstrate 
self-censorship. Although Tosh has argued that ‘the vast majority… were written without 
thought of a wider readership’, many sailor diaries were written with the knowledge or intention 
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that they would be read by the writer’s family.169 However, Nancy Martin has succinctly 
summarized diaries as a source, demonstrating the importance of their difference: ‘As a genre, 
the diary defies the traditional structural forms of narrative. Focusing generally on the 
immediate present, it is serial, open-ended, often repetitive and contradictory. Diaries often 
display a reshaping and revising of an individual’s experiences and perceptions’.170 Similarly 
Michael Roper has postulated that diaries allow for ‘the behaviour and emotional dispositions 
of individual men’.171 Sailor diaries were written up a short time after the experiences, usually 
on a daily basis and thus although not negating the dangers associated with autobiographies, 
allow greater circumspection of their thought process as it developed. 
However, in order to utilize this material effectively a number of methodological parameters 
have been set. Firstly, a sample size of approximately 45 diaries was chosen. This is on the 
basis of existing studies and a need to use a comprehensive yet manageable number. These 
were further selected based upon the timeframes of the chapters and the quality of the material 
available. Holdings that were simply ships’ logs with little or no personal information were 
discounted from the sample. The sample of diaries collected and analysed is composed of 
diaries drawn from the lower deck. This was a varied strata of ranks and throughout this thesis 
when the term “lower deck” or “sailor” is used, it refers to those who were not officers. 
Therefore, the diaries used include those written by men from a variety of ranks such as 
Ordinary, Able, Leading Seamen, and Petty Officers.172 Stokers are also considered as a point 
of comparison because, although technically distinct from seamen, they also inhabited the 
same space on the lower deck. The purpose of selecting an analysing this variation of ranks 
was to determine a wide range of testimony for men with a shared social identity, and examine 
on an individual basis their personal experiences through the key themes of imperialism, 
gender and identity.   
In addition, the unpublished diaries are supplemented by published memoirs from the lower 
deck. This is to enable points of comparison and determine whether any silences exist on certain 
topics. However, the use of officer diaries has been kept to a minimum except to provide further 
contextual information and highlight any similar or differing viewpoints. Alongside this, 
additional material such as newspapers (national and local and overseas), letters, Admiralty 
records and oral history collections have been reviewed in order to contextualize and 
demonstrate contrasting information. This material has also been approached from an 
analytical viewpoint to determine its suitability and usefulness to this study.  
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Whilst the majority of the material has been drawn from the National Museum of the Royal 
Navy, this study also includes material from the collections held at the Imperial War Museum, 
National Archives and the National Maritime Museum in order to gain a wider understanding 
and give greater context.  
The ethics of this study have been considered and due to all the material being in the public 
domain and approximately over 80 years old, no further permissions have been sought other 
than by the museums to reproduce images from their holdings and comply with copyright laws.  
Structure of the thesis 
By examining the topic within the constructs of social, cultural and gender studies, this thesis 
considers the men of the lower deck and their relationship with the Empire they served. It 
places sailors within imperial studies and moves beyond simply demonstrating their importance 
to the popular image of the Empire, but rather it considers the Empire’s importance to them. 
In their everyday life the Empire was ever-present. As the navy began to occupy an increasingly 
visual status in the public mind, sailors were exposed to imperial imagery and symbolism. 
Furthermore, abroad the navy was the premier instrument of British imperialism and was used 
to defend and further the Empire on a global level. Thus this thesis examines the nuances of 
lower deck imperialism and argues that they embraced the Empire as a significant part of their 
culture, shaping their identity, and using it to frame their understanding of experiences. 
However, they were also independent and not simply passive recipients of imperial teachings. 
As such they exhibited a level of independence and deserve a far greater level of consideration 
than has so far been allowed.  
There are a further five archival chapters which broadly follow a chronological order from 
c.1890 through to 1939, and examine the key aims of this thesis in context with the changing 
international situation through these years to provide a framework to examine sailors’ 
relationship to the Empire.   
Chapter Two examines the rise of naval pageantry prior to the First World War and the 
repositioning of the Royal Navy in British popular culture. In particular, it builds upon the work 
of Jan Rüger who has argued that the navy was a key symbol of the Empire and subsequently 
occupied a very prominent place in society. Examining the background changes and the use of 
invented traditions it considers how the spectacle of naval pageantry was implemented. In 
contrast to Rüger, it turns the focus from the public to the sailors who took part in these events 
of pageantry. It thus proposes that sailors were the forgotten participants of naval pageantry: 
they were at once a vital part of the spectacle designed for consumption by the public and also 
participants, similarly observing the imperial themes and symbolism being propounded. 
Through this they demonstrated their own ideas and reveal their relationship with the Empire. 
In addition, this influenced their own impression of their identity. In considering this, it is 
argued that multiple feelings were created by being part of these imperial spectacles rather 
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than a single deep relationship: pride in the service and the Empire but also a dislike of the 
effort required whilst friends and other crewmates could enjoy themselves. Therefore, as with 
the public, both sentiments of enjoyment and animosity towards the spectacle could co-exist. 
Chapter Three considers sailors within the framework of war as a key part of their imperial 
duty. During Britain’s late imperial wars the Royal Navy and its sailors were repeatedly called 
upon to protect the Empire’s interests. This chapter pays specific attention to the Boer War as 
the last great imperial war prior to the experience of total war in the First World War. As with 
many of Britain’s imperial wars, the navy played a prominent role and in particular sailors 
served in naval brigades ashore alongside the army and endured the hardships of siege warfare 
at Ladysmith. The Boer War has been widely used as a case study by many socio-cultural 
studies of British imperialism to examine levels of patriotism within society. By examining 
sailors in this respect, it considers their involvement and reactions, and their perceptions of 
imperial sentiment. Furthermore, it allows further examination of their imperial identity 
juxtaposing the popular image of the steadfast “handyman” of the Empire with their experience 
through the medium of masculinity. By approaching the topic in this way it demonstrates the 
importance of their imperial identity and expressions of imperial sentiment.  
Chapter Four is a natural progression from the themes of Chapter Three and investigates sailors 
during the First World War. As a conflict, the Great War is an important topic for studies of the 
Royal Navy. Due to the Anglo-German arms race during the early twentieth century, naval 
tradition, pageantry and rhetoric had become increasingly powerful as Chapter Two has 
demonstrated. Consequently, the British public went to war in 1914 believing that the navy 
would soon meet the Germans at sea and, in a battle worthy of Nelson, defeat them. The belief 
in a “second Trafalgar” was therefore a strong element within society. However, this chapter 
demonstrates that many sailors equally believed in their ability and as the war dragged on 
without such decisive victories taking place this impacted upon their perceptions of their 
imperial identity. By drawing comparisons with existing gender and cultural studies of the army 
and society during the First World War, this chapter demonstrates how the stress and 
uncertainty of serving at sea, engaging in battle, and everyday boredom challenged sailors’ 
sense of masculinity and their imperial identity as they tried to do their bit and live up to their 
public image. 
Chapter Five investigates sailors in the post-war setting, particularly the contrast caused by a 
society concerned with disarmament treaties, and the impact this had upon the image and 
prestige of the Royal Navy. Examining the wider impact of disarmament and the Washington 
Treaty, it positions this alongside the gradual re-introduction of naval pageantry. In particular, 
it considers the Empire Cruise of the Special Service Squadron between 1923 and 1924. 
Designed to strengthen links between Britain and the colonies whilst also attracting economic 
investment in British dockyards, it reasserted the Royal Navy’s position on the world stage. To 
the sailors who took part in the cruise, it provided an opportunity to visit many of the Empire’s 
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colonies and experience the “other”. Examination of this allows an insight into their interactions 
with the colonies and their expectations. This chapter demonstrates that pride in the Empire 
and the navy as the symbol of British power remained an integral part of sailor culture despite 
the challenges faced by the Royal Navy during the decade.  
Chapter Six continues these investigations into the 1930s and considers sailors and imperialism 
within the framework of economic uncertainty and deteriorating international situations. In 
particular, it questions sailors’ loyalty against the backdrop of the Invergordon Mutiny in 1931, 
which threatened the prestige of the Royal Navy and its sailors in the world’s eyes. It 
demonstrates that their loyalty was never in question, rather it was considered the only option 
left open to them to voice their grievances. In addition, as the international political situation 
worsened, it demonstrates the rivalry between British sailors and the rising navies of Italy and 
the USA who threatened their dominance and consequently their identity. Furthermore, it 
reveals the difficulty in continuing the Royal Navy’s age-old role as policeman of the seas in a 
decade fraught by rising challenges in the form of the Abyssinian Crisis and the Spanish Civil 
War and the navy’s role in both conflicts. In doing so it reveals that sailors continued to believe 
in their superiority and that it was Britain’s duty to continue its age-old role.  
Chapter Seven draws together the themes considered in the previous chapters in order to argue 
that many sailors were imperialistic. In particular, examining sailor diaries reveals that the 
Empire was an important part of their lives and how they identified themselves. However, the 
Empire could mean different things to them depending upon the circumstances and influencing 
factors at the relevant time, and there was no universal feeling consistently present. Too often 
they have been viewed as simple and passive respondents to British imperial culture. Sailors 
did not simply absorb top-down imperial teachings and imagery. The sailor’s character was 
more complex than this with a range of aspects creating his identity. Nevertheless, it was a 
significant element of their lives and it is therefore argued that imperialism formed a key part 
of a distinct independent sailor culture which existed on the lower deck. Consequently, 
imperialism served as a means to frame their experiences and shape their understandings but 
it was one of a number of competing beliefs, sometimes taking precedence, sometimes 
becoming subservient, depending on the circumstances.   
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Chapter Two  
‘I name this ship…’: Pageantry in the Royal Navy and 
the forgotten participants before the First World War 
 
There are few acts more poetical than that of launching a great ship, few 
spectacles more moving and more thrilling than that of the vessel in which so 
many hopes are centred gliding with swanlike grace into the water which is 
henceforth to be her element.1  
 
During the second half of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, naval pageantry 
became an essential method by which to disseminate imperial propaganda and propagate 
imperialistic values. A maritime empire, built upon trade with overseas colonies, by 1914 the 
imperial power and prestige of Britain was approaching its zenith and the Royal Navy had 
secured its position in British society as the Senior Service: the epitome of British imperial 
power. Since the middle of the nineteenth century, the public image of the Royal Navy had 
been carefully re-positioned to fit in with and promote Britain’s imperial image both at home 
and internationally. Naval pageantry became a vital part of this, a key facet of British imperial 
culture combining Victorian and Edwardian militarism with developing imperial culture and 
leisure. Yet despite the acceptance of the prominent position of the Royal Navy within British 
imperial culture, historians have paid naval pageantry limited attention.2 This failing was 
poignantly demonstrated by Jan Rüger in his ground-breaking thesis, and by deconstructing 
the public spectacle of naval theatre he produced a much needed study for British cultural and 
imperial history which opened the field for further socio-cultural research.3  
Nevertheless, the specific consideration of sailors and their participation in naval pageantry and 
wider imperial sentiment remains relatively ignored. Although Rüger has commented on their 
involvement it is only a brief engagement to demonstrate how consensus was staged, and how 
feelings of pride and antipathy could co-exist.4 Likewise recent studies concerned with the 
history of the lower deck, such as those by Christopher McKee and Brian Lavery, have not 
engaged with sailor testimony in the wider sense of imperial studies either.5 Therefore, this 
chapter builds upon recent historical trends which have considered the Royal Navy alongside 
socio-cultural studies of British imperialism by expanding the debate beyond the 
interrelationship between the British public and their Empire, to examine the relationship 
                                            
1 The Times, 12 February 1906 
2 Jan Rüger, The Great Naval Game: Britain and Germany in the Age of Empire, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009 [first edition 2007]); pp. 2-5 
3 Rüger, Great Naval, p. 32; Although Rüger overlooked the work of Ken Lunn and Roger Thomas on imperialism and 
naval pageantry. For further recent research and a more in-depth discussion of this debate see Chapter One.  
4 Rüger, Great Naval, pp. 123-124 
5 See Christopher McKee, Sober Men and True: Sailor Lives in the Royal Navy, 1900-1945, (London: Harvard University 
Press, 2002); Brian Lavery, Able Seamen: The Lower Deck of the Royal Navy, 1850-1939, (London: Conway, 2011).  
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between naval pageantry and British sailors: the “forgotten” participants. As Don Leggett has 
recently opined, ‘sailors were at the forefront of the nation-forging process’.6 They were at once 
servants of the Empire and part of the imperial image carefully crafted for public consumption, 
therefore greater consideration needs to be given to their thoughts and impressions regarding 
the Empire they served.  
In opening up this debate, this chapter will investigate the development of naval pageantry in 
the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. It will then consider and situate within this 
the sailors who took part, and examine their relationship with imperialism, pride and patriotism. 
In order to do this it will examine the main aspects of naval pageantry, which was primarily 
displayed in the form of ship launches and fleet reviews. However, it will also examine 
pageantry overseas in the Empire in order to determine how sailors were at the forefront of 
the imperial spectacle for subjects of the Empire. Consequently, it will argue that imperialism 
became a prism through which they experienced “otherness”.7   
The Royal Navy in British imperial culture and the expansion of naval pageantry 
Whilst the level of imperial sentiment amongst the British public remains contested by 
historians, as John M. Mackenzie has argued, British culture was undeniably consciously 
manipulated to prominently feature the Empire during this period.8 This empire, built on trade 
and dependant on maritime security, allowed the Royal Navy a unique opportunity to position 
itself within the cultural iconography of the Empire. In addition, these themes were propounded 
by social commentators and were heavily embraced by commercialism.9 This was aided by the 
Royal Navy’s long and successful history, for instance its historic victories over the Spanish 
Armada and the French at Trafalgar, which helped cement pride in the minds of the British 
public. Contemporaries often drew upon these former naval victories and the shared naval 
heritage of Britain when discussing the power of the Royal Navy.10 
However, as discussed in Chapter One, although the Royal Navy had a long and prestigious 
heritage, it had to work hard to reconstruct its image, and in particular the image of those men 
who served. For instance, Nicholas Rodger highlighted the public perception of the eighteenth 
century sailor succinctly: ‘The sailor on a run ashore, probably drunk and riotous, was a popular 
image’.11 There existed a dual ashore and afloat image which portrayed the negative 
                                            
6 Don Leggett, ‘Navy, nation and identity in the long nineteenth century’, Journal for Maritime Research, 13, 2, 2011; 
pp. 151-163, p. 5 
7 This is discussed in more detail in Chapter Five. 
8 This debate is discussed in more detail in Chapter One but for more information see the arguments of John Mackenzie, 
Bernard Porter and Andrew Thompson in particular. 
9 For example Archibald Hurd and Rudyard Kipling; See also advertisements such as Coleman’s Starch 1900, Carr & Co. 
biscuits, 1899; See also Mary A. Conley, From Jack Tar to Union Jack: Representing naval manhood in the British Empire, 
1870-1918, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009). 
10 For instance Rüger noted the growth of games in popular culture that demonstrated victory over the French at 
Trafalgar. Furthermore, on the fleet’s visit to London in 1909, many links were drawn to Nelson and Nelson’s Column. 
See Rüger, Great Naval, p. 61; p.101; The importance of these victories in shaping both popular opinion and naval 
opinion is also discussed in Chapter Four.  
11 Nicholas Rodger, The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy, (London: W. W. Norton & Co., 1996 [first 
edition 1986]); p. 15 
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characteristics of the sailor: a man who was a public menace.12 However, by the nineteenth 
century much had been done to alter this impression, and Mary A. Conley has argued that the 
image of the bawdy Jack Tar of the Georgian navy was replaced with an image of ‘cohesive 
masculinity that was endowed with self-restraint, respectability and bravery’.13 This strong, 
masculine stalwart of the Empire was an image that readily lent itself to be used in all manner 
of advertisements, such as Carr & Co biscuits and the face of Players Cigarettes, with the iconic 
image of the sailor with HMS Hero on his cap tally.14 Consequently, sailors became an integral 
part of imperial symbolism, and the manner in which it was presented to the British public and 
to the world. Thus by the early twentieth century this new image of the sailor had been firmly 
embedded in British culture. 
The most overt and visible way in which the Royal Navy put itself on public display was through 
events of naval pageantry. Pageantry increasingly afforded the greatest opportunity for the 
Royal Navy to popularize its aims and position itself within the increasingly militaristic imperial 
culture of Britain.15 As Anne Summers argued in her seminal study on popular militarism, it: 
was, perhaps, an integral part of the liberal political culture of the country; it 
was also integral to much of Anglican and Nonconformist Christianity. For these 
reasons it became a popular cause, and a peculiarly British one.16 
This period witnessed the development of a number of para-military organizations, which 
espoused Christian beliefs, such as the Salvation Army and youth movements like the Scouts 
and The Boys’ Brigade.17 Similarly, Mackenzie has argued there was a crossover between war 
and religion with ‘The language of war entering into hymns, tracts, and sermons’.18 
Furthermore, Mackenzie and David Cannadine have argued that Britain’s imperial culture 
increased dramatically from 1877 when Queen Victoria was made Empress of India, which led 
to a substantial growth in the number of imperial celebrations being conducted.19 As Mackenzie 
eloquently argued, ‘imperialism made spectacular theatre, with the monarchy its gorgeous 
opulent centrepiece’.20 The manner in which pageantry enabled the navy to do this was twofold: 
firstly it allowed it to position itself within the constructed imperial image perceived by the 
                                            
12 Although this image continued and was often played up to by sailors. See Chapter One for a greater discussion of this 
point. See for instance RNM 1976/65/1: Diary of William Williams. 
13 Conley, From Jack, p. 3 
14 Conley, From Jack, p. 126; See also Figure 1; Appendix 1.1. 
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accepted. For an insight into British militarism generally see Anne Summers, ‘Militarism in Britain before the Great War’, 
History Workshop Journal, 1976; pp. 104-123. 
16 Summers, ‘Militarism’, p. 105 
17 For further information see John Springhall, Youth, empire and society: British youth movements, 1883-1940, 
(London: Croom Helm, 1977).  
18 John M. Mackenzie, Propaganda and Empire: The manipulation of British public opinion, 1880-1960, (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2003 [first edition 1984]); p. 5 
19 Mackenzie, Propaganda, p. 5; David Cannadine, ‘The Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual: The British 
Monarchy and the “Invention of Tradition”, c.1820-1977’, in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (ed.), The Invention of 
Tradition, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013 [first edition 1983]); pp. 101-164, p. 108 
20 Mackenzie, Propaganda, p. 5 
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public, and secondly it reinforced its power to both British society and the world. Together this 
allowed the navy to become, in the words of Rüger, ‘a powerful cultural symbol’.21  
Naval pageantry was not a new creation, suddenly developed and accepted by the British 
people, yet it was not firmly-established tradition either. Whilst the Admiralty, the press and 
many social commentators tried to give the impression it was firmly established tradition, ‘only 
very few observers pointed out that there was no such tradition’.22 Although certain aspects of 
naval pageantry were established customs developed over time, this period witnessed the 
application of “invented traditions” which created carefully orchestrated pageantry designed to 
make the most impact, and display the navy on both the national and international stage.23 
“Invented tradition” is a concept propounded by Eric Hobsbawm, Terence Ranger and David 
Cannadine in the 1980s.24 The main principle of this is the use of idealized ceremony as a 
means of establishing hegemony.25 This principle has been previously applied to the study of 
commemorations such as jubilees, particularly by Cannadine and Elizabeth Hammerton, and 
Rüger has used this construct as a means of studying naval pageantry.26  
The scale by which naval pageantry increased demonstrates its fundamental importance and 
growing popularity. Rüger produced an interesting statistic stating: ‘if one compares the 114 
years between 1773 and 1887 with the 28 years between 1887 and 1914, this was an increase 
in frequency [of events of naval pageantry] of 714 per cent’.27 Therefore, as previously 
mentioned, it is difficult to understand how the role of something as culturally significant as 
the Royal Navy has been ignored for so long.28 This chapter will now firstly consider the two 
key forms of naval pageantry, ship launches and fleet reviews as these were the most overt 
form of imperialistic ritual the navy adopted, and will then turn its attention to overseas 
pageantry prior to the Great War.  
Ship Launches 
One of the most important ship launches that took place during this period was the launch of 
HMS Dreadnought in 1906, which demonstrated British engineering and naval power to the 
world. As Robert J. Blyth has argued, ‘there can be little doubt that Dreadnought, as the first 
of this new class of weapon, made a singular impression… around the world’.29 Launched from 
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the slipways less than a year after being laid down, the ceremony ‘was intricately 
choreographed to extract the greatest impact from the event. The crowd, the press, the 
fledgling medium of cinema and the Royal family were all exploited in different ways to amplify 
the spectacle’.30 The death of Queen Alexandra’s father prevented some of the more grandiose 
pageantry being undertaken on the day of the launch but the level of planning reveals that the 
navy was determined to put Dreadnought firmly on public display.31 Grand displays of idealized 
imperialism such as this played a vital role in the development of British imperial culture prior 
to the First World War. 
The act of launching a warship down the slipways was understandably an important aspect of 
the public’s perception of the Royal Navy. As Mark Connelly has argued, they ‘were enormously 
significant for local pride’ whilst at the same time ‘linking the local to the national and 
imperial’.32 As such, launches provided fertile ground for the development of ritual specifically 
aimed at imparting imperial themes to the public and impressing upon them the sheer 
monstrous power of the Royal Navy. The ritual of a ship launch had its roots in the late 
eighteenth century, and it was this which arguably strengthened the navy’s ability to use it as 
a means of impressing upon the public the power and imperial themes that the Royal Navy 
embodied.33  
The tradition of launching warships from the slipways began due to dockyard pressures during 
the Seven Years’ War.34 Prior to 1770, warships were typically built in dock and floated out 
upon completion with small launching ceremonies conducted aboard.35 Silvia Rogers has argued 
that launching from the slipways assisted in altering the focus of the ceremony ‘from the ship 
itself to the shore’, and paved the way for more public-focused ceremonies to be conducted.36 
By moving the ceremony on to the shore, it allowed a far greater number of people to be 
involved in the launch and enabled the ritualization of the ceremony. This arguably made it an 
easier task for launch ceremonies to take on greater significance and became truly public 
events. Similarly Margarette Lincoln noted that despite the existing ritual of ship launches, 
‘significant changes’ were taking place.37 One key change was the manner of “christening” the 
ship.38 Whereas previously patrons had drunk to the “success” of the ship aboard the vessel 
once it had been floated out, this now took place from the safety of the quayside where a bottle 
was thrown to smash on the bow.39 Although one nineteenth-century commentator wrote that 
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the patron would still drink to the “success” of the ship before re-corking the bottle and hurling 
it at the bows.40  
Thus by the late eighteenth century, ship launching ceremonies were transported from ship to 
shore and, as the level of ceremony increased, began to receive increased coverage in the 
press.41 Therefore, before the period considered by this chapter, ship launches had been 
steadily changing and attracting increased public attention. In her study of launches as public 
spectacle, Lincoln argued that by the late eighteenth century a ‘ship launch was an exciting 
event, capable of bringing all social classes together’.42 In particular, she opined that ‘the navy, 
like the army, was becoming exciting as a spectacle, as a source of media events, displays and 
entertainment’.43 To support this assertion Lincoln commented upon the launch of HMS Queen 
Charlotte in 1810 for which a ‘temporary grandstand’ had to be built and, due to the number 
of people attending, ‘guards had been stationed around the dockyard to control the crowd’.44  
In addition, a nineteenth century observer, Edward Fraser, produced a comparative account of 
the launch of two warships called HMS Bellerophon, one launched in 1786 and the other in 
1907.45 Fraser’s description of the launch in 1786 demonstrates that even in the eighteenth 
century events of naval pageantry were very public:  
Rural England in those days, within reach of a ship launch, particularly a man-of-
war launch, was always ready for a jaunt to the scene and a display of joviality in 
honour of the occasion.46  
According to Fraser, a variety of transportation was available ‘to carry eager spectators on the 
appointed day’ and the public would travel from within a radius of approximately 12 miles.47 
Fraser suggested that these launches were a ‘great occasion for the neighbourhood’ and 
therefore evoked a great deal of local pride.48 Although he does not elaborate and examine 
divisions of pride in detail, it is likely that he would have shared the views of many 
contemporaries recognizing expressions of both local and national pride as one.49   
The technological advances of the nineteenth century allowed geographical boundaries to be 
reduced still further and enabled these events to become far more national in outlook. In 
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particular, this was aided by the creation and then expansion of the railways. Furthermore, as 
launches became increasingly commercialized, railway companies recognized the public 
appetite for ship launches and other events of naval pageantry, and introduced cheap day 
excursions.50 Similarly there were special steamers provided by tourist companies, such as 
Thomas Cook, which catered for the public and could carry them closer to the “action”. 
Consequently, there was scope for a much greater and more varied social demographic 
attendance at ship launches (and also fleet reviews) during the late nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries.51 
Therefore, the changes to naval pageantry during the eighteenth century had placed the navy 
in an excellent position and enabled increasingly imperialistic ritualization of naval pageantry. 
However, Rüger has recognized that during the nineteenth century there were ‘three major 
changes’ which fundamentally altered the way warships were launched and helped to foster a 
greater sense of imperial splendour.52 These were: women becoming patrons of launching 
ceremonies, royalty taking an active role and patronage at launches, and the introduction of a 
religious service as a key part of the ceremony.53 Firstly, the introduction of women as the 
patron at the launch ceremony was of particular importance in an established patriarchal 
society with ‘rigid gender roles’.54 As Fraser noted of the eighteenth century ship launch, men 
‘invariably’ performed the ceremony, usually ‘some personage of note, some official or local 
celebrity’.55 The first recorded ship launched by a female patron was in 1803 and The Prince 
Regent is credited with this change.56 Between 1811 and 1818 female patrons ‘became the 
rule’.57 The introduction of women to the ceremony was important as it reinforced the ideal 
image of women as maternal, and caused launch ceremonies to gain ‘new momentum and 
generated greater public attraction’.58  
Addressing Rüger’s second point, although there are records of monarchs being present since 
Henry VIII, they ‘never played an active role’ in the launch ceremony itself.59 Lincoln suggested 
that the royal family began to be more involved during the mid-eighteenth century and a 
number of lesser royals launched ships from the 1770s.60 However, Rüger argued that the 
precedent set by Queen Victoria when she launched the Royal Albert in 1854 was ‘crucial’.61 
Therefore, as the first British monarch to launch a warship, Queen Victoria’s involvement was 
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undeniably important for expanding naval pageantry and popularizing of the spectacle.62 The 
press recognized the importance of the monarch’s role and for example The Times reported in 
1907 how ‘The presence of Royalty’ added to the crowds, which has been supported by 
Mackenzie.63 The steady increase in events of naval pageantry from the mid-1870s therefore 
mirrors the Queen’s increasingly ceremonial role within British culture.  
Finally, the introduction of a religious service at the launching ceremony was a specific creation 
of the 1870s drawn up between Queen Victoria, the Admiralty and the Church.64 In January 
1875 the Army and Navy Gazette proclaimed that ‘the launches of Her Majesty’s ships are to 
be no longer a mere secular ceremony’.65 This ordained the specific format of the launch and 
intrinsically linked a Christian ethos with the navy and the Empire. Again, this was a further 
extension of muscular Christianity which formed a cornerstone of imperial thinking and British 
militarism.66 By making a Christian ceremony a significant part of the launch, it affirmed the 
moral rights and duties of the Empire to its subjects.  
In addition to these points, further ceremonial aspects were added to increase the theatricality 
of the spectacle but, more importantly, also demonstrate strong links with the Dominions and 
display a united Empire. For instance, a further aspect of the “christening” that was improved 
upon was the ceremonial importance of the bottle used. This was noted by contemporaries 
such as Fraser who recorded that it became common to decorate it with flowers and ribbons.67 
This decoration served no practical purpose and often cushioned the bottle against the bows, 
hindering the exercise.68 However, these decorations could be used to portray emblems of 
imperial unity. For example, the Illustrated London News described the bottle used by Queen 
Victoria in 1854 as: ‘decorated at either end with the rose, shamrock and thistle’ thereby adding 
an image of unity to the launching ceremony.69  
Similarly, the origin of the bottle used is important. There was a calculated shift from using 
Port wine, from Portugal, to wine produced by British dominions, in an attempt to increase 
imperial unity.70 This was noted by contemporary newspapers, such as the Evening News 
(Portsmouth), which on one occasion remarked on the gift of wine by Australia: ‘[it was] one 
of those little incidents that go so far to show what a bond or real union there is between the 
Mother Country and her Colonies’.71 Whether imperial unity was stronger than the excellent 
marketing opportunity this presented for the wine companies is another matter, however this 
commercialism enabled an increase in imperial ties. Furthermore, the importance of naming 
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ships after places to increase loyalty and imperial sentiment has been recognized by Daniel 
Owen Spence. For instance, Spence noted that this tradition began with the launch of the 
cruiser HMS Good Hope in February 1901.72 This was important because Good Hope was 
‘originally christened Africa, [and] the change in name was a public show of gratitude to 
Britain’s Cape colonies’ due to the Boer War.73 In addition, Spence has argued that ‘The 
dedication of new vessels to key parts of the empire was an attempt to strengthen the ties of 
sentiment by aligning colonial identity with that of the Royal Navy’.74 Furthermore, ships were 
also given names that linked them to the four nations of Great Britain, and thus conjoined 
imperial, local and national sentiment.75 Therefore, by carefully selecting names, the Royal 
Navy was further able to attempt to foster imperial sentiment throughout the colonies.  
However, despite this period being one of increased imperialism within British society, not all 
ship launches were grand theatrical displays capable of drawing large crowds of people 
together. Reporting on the launch of HMS Pandora in 1900, the Evening News (Portsmouth) 
described the challenges that came with trying to make a launch exciting for the public:   
Whether it is a small cruiser or a big battle-ship, the ceremony of floating a ship 
out of dock is a dull, tame affair when compared with the excitement attending a 
launch from the building slip. Taking a ship out of dock is, in fact, such an everyday 
occurrence that some ingenuity is required to give it anything like the semblance 
of a ceremony.76 
It is not clear why Pandora was launched in this fashion rather than from a slipway with more 
pageantry. The Evening News (Portsmouth) suggests that this sort of launch was not atypical, 
otherwise it might have made more of the oddity of the launch. Yet, as discussed above, it is 
likely that this was not such a common occurrence by the turn of the century especially as the 
ships became bigger by the 1900s and required being built on the slipways. Nevertheless, it is 
strange given the timing of the launch – the middle of the Boer War – that the vessel did not 
attract more attention. It is also revealing that the Evening News (Portsmouth) described the 
warship as being ‘a kind of “stand by” on which the workmen could be employed when not 
required elsewhere’.77 This suggests that Pandora was not a ship which could attract much 
attention and one that the navy was not concerned with publicizing. Indeed, she belonged to 
the ill-fated Pelorus Class which served overseas rather than with the main battle fleets and 
were deemed poorly designed and outdated following their launch.78 However, in other respects 
the ceremony followed the usual procedure with a female patron conducting the naming 
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ceremony and a short religious service followed by the singing of the national anthem as the 
patron released the ship from the dock basin.79  
Importantly, this episode demonstrates the difficulty posed in trying to make spectacles of all 
ship launches. For instance, the Evening News (Portsmouth) reveals it was not well attended, 
noting ‘the cheers of the few spectators’ present at the launch.80 This suggests that putting the 
navy on the public stage brought with it the challenge of trying to create pageantry out of 
nothing, and above all make it interesting, and this was not always possible. Roger Thomas 
has argued that ship launches were ‘the site of pre-planned expectancies’, and that those 
present would very likely have seen other ship launches which had followed the same 
procedures.81 Consequently, repeatedly seeing similar events had the potential to be a dull 
experience unless the vessel was particularly important or of a new class, and suggests an 
element of launch fatigue affecting the public. Yet Thomas also suggested that ‘people were 
thrilled and affected by the predictable aspects of the ceremony, though each occasion had its 
own spontaneous moments’.82 Therefore, the case of the Pandora may simply demonstrate that 
naval pageantry needed to be publicized.  
Nevertheless, despite the unremarkable launch of HMS Pandora, in the main ship launches 
were popular and appealed to a wide age range and level of society. For instance, Brad Beaven 
has noted that school attendance in Portsmouth ‘would dramatically fall’ due to ‘events such 
as ship launches, regattas or visits from dignitaries’, as children were also caught up in the 
‘industrial and social life’ of the town.83 In addition, school log books also record children being 
absent without leave when warships returned to port.84 In particular, the return of HMS 
Powerful with the Naval Brigade from Ladysmith resulted in 116 boys being absent from Albert 
Road School.85 Thus these returning ships had the potential to draw large crowds who wanted 
to experience the excitement of these occasions, increased by the heroic exploits of the naval 
brigade in the war in South Africa, but also to see friends and family return.  
However, a key reason why launching a ship down the slipway was far more popular with the 
public was that it had the potential to be both dangerous and thrilling. As Rodgers has argued, 
the element of uncertainty and danger over what the ship might do at a launch was one of the 
chief draws.86 Launches were dangerous affairs and during the eighteenth century both Lincoln 
and Rodgers noted that attendance at launch ceremonies was often poor and not well publicized 
‘partly because the likelihood of accidents made large crowds undesirable’.87 This danger-factor 
continued into the nineteenth century and the inherent dangers were demonstrated at the 
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launch of HMS Albion in 1898 where an incident marred the proceedings and resulted in the 
deaths of 50 spectators.88 Thus Rüger argued: ‘this sense of risk, excitement and visual 
fascination was at the heart of what made naval theatre so “seductive and intoxicating”’.89  
However, as the importance of launches grew by the second half of the nineteenth century, 
improving health and safety at the dockyards was paramount; repeated accidents would 
generate bad press and be counter-productive to imperial propaganda in the long run. For 
instance, on the launch of HMS Formidable in 1898 the Hampshire Telegraph, noted the 
improvements made at the dockyards to allow spectators a better and safer view of the launch-
ways: ‘the little dock at the north corner has been so far filled in as to provide considerable 
additional space for the accommodation of spectators’.90 Further examples include the added 
safety precautions around the christening bottle which was no longer simply hurled at the bows 
of the vessel being launched. An incident whereby one female patron accidently released the 
bottle into the crowd where it promptly hit an observer on the head demonstrated that safety 
measures were needed.91 Instead the bottle was secured to a rope in order to bring some 
control to breaking it.92  
Yet, despite the increase in health and safety measures, the public continued to be reminded 
of the possible dangers at a ship launch. For example the Evening News (Portsmouth), reporting 
on the launch of a new warship in 1891, reminded its readers of an accident in 1825 at the 
launch of Princess Charlotte, the largest ship of that time built in Portsmouth. The basin gates 
were forced inwards due to pressure and overcrowding resulting in the collapse of the plank 
bridges over the basin gates and causing the deaths of sixteen people.93 Similarly whilst 
remarking on the ‘exceptional’ double launch of HMS Royal Arthur and Royal Sovereign in 1891, 
the Evening News (Portsmouth) recalled the launch of HMS Marlborough in 1855 which ‘on 
being released, heeled over to starboard, and stuck on the ways right over the Royal platform, 
an accident which so startled Her Majesty that she has never been present at a similar function 
until now’.94 The press liked to remind readers of previous ship launches for two reasons: firstly 
it provided an opportunity to demonstrate the long-standing tradition of launch ceremonies; 
secondly it continued to act as a draw, reminding the public that launches could be dangerous 
and thrilling. That the Queen had been put off until now was excellent publicity. Therefore, 
intrigue at how a ship would behave on being launched continued to attract the public to the 
launching ceremony. For example, the launch of HMS Kent in 1901 was postponed for a day 
due to bad weather and the Evening News (Portsmouth) reported that the ‘postponement of a 
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launch is such a rare event that public curiosity had been aroused as to how the Kent would 
behave herself, so that there was a large crowd of spectators’.95 
However, despite being the chief target, it was not just members of the public and dockyard 
workers who attended launch ceremonies. Another innovation, which added ‘to the growing 
theatricality of these occasions’, was the Admiralty’s decision that naval officers and sailors 
should regularly attend ship launches; their attendance being recognized as necessary to create 
the image of a smart, united navy.96 This continued to reinforce their position as part of imperial 
symbolism and popular culture. Therefore, it is not surprising that this period witnessed the 
popularity of the middle and upper classes dressing their children in sailor suits. In addition, 
the Admiralty issued orders to ensure that ‘ships and installations were routinely “dressed” on 
launch days’ to add to the spectacle.97 This was first introduced in 1912 for the launch of HMS 
Iron Duke.98 The Times reported ‘the harbour presented a gay appearance, the warships being 
dressed overall’.99 Thomas has suggested that this was due to the launch coinciding with 
‘intense rivalry’ between Great Britain and Imperial Germany, which ‘was reaching a feverish 
climax’ by 1912.100 Both of these orders caused more sailors to be involved in ship launches 
either directly or indirectly as both part of the spectacle and as spectators. For instance, again 
at the launch of Iron Duke, there was a guard of honour comprising bluejackets from the naval 
barracks.101 Thomas also argued the importance of this in that ‘imperial and navalist ideology 
was expressed predominantly in visual terms, in the lines of assembled sailors and marines’.102 
The press estimated that the crowds were approximately 60,000 and therefore the scale of the 
ceremony was clear to see.103 
Thus sailors were becoming more involved in naval pageantry during this period and this 
chapter will now explore this more fully. However, gathering sailor testimony on specific 
launches is challenging due to a number of variables. The first is the location of the launch, 
and diaries are needed which cover the dates of launches and from sailors who were stationed 
in that particular port. The key issue is that many diaries held in archive collections are from 
sailors serving overseas who wanted to record their memories and experiences. Whether this 
is because more diaries were kept by sailors overseas generally or have just survived as 
curiosities is unknown. On the other hand, as will be demonstrated below, more diaries are 
extant which describe fleet reviews. This is because they involved a much greater number of 
ships and men from the different British fleets, and thus more sailors were actually taking part. 
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Therefore, whilst sailor testimony discussing ship launches exists, it is more limited. 
Furthermore, published memoirs are also relatively silent on this subject.104  
However, one sailor who diligently kept a private diary during his time in the service, Edwin 
Fletcher, allows some examination of this point.105 Fletcher was based for a lengthy period at 
Whale Island in Portsmouth and thus was present at the launch of HMS Bellerophon (a 
Dreadnought Class Battleship) by ‘Princess Henry of Battenbourg [sic]’.106 Fletcher’s diary entry 
is brief but he noted that ‘she took the water lovely’.107 In comparison, The Times is full of 
detail and talks of it being the largest ship to date launched at the Royal Dockyard.108 As 
expected there was an ‘enormous crowd’ and ‘as she glided down the well-greased ways, 
plunged into the water, the band playing “God Save the King” and “Rule Britannia”’.109 
Considering the grandness of launch ceremonies, Fletcher’s brevity might suggest he was 
uninterested. However, what is interesting is that Fletcher was not concerned with the ritual, 
the crowds who were present, or the organization of the day; Fletcher chose to record the ship 
itself as it took to the water.  
In slight contrast, Geoffrey Chandler provides the point of view of a young midshipman and 
was present at the launch of HMS Orion (a Super Dreadnought). He recorded:  
The marchioness christened the ship in the usual manner and cut the rope. The Orion 
immediately commenced her journey down the slip. The band played Rule Britannia and 
God Save the King and a crowd of 30,000 cheered. The ship seemed to slide down very 
fast, in fact it was reported that she attained a speed of 12 knots.110 
Whilst a more detailed description, this account lacks the heartfelt down-to-earth clarity of 
Fletcher’s but nevertheless shows interest and excitement in the launch itself. Chandler also 
referred to newspaper reports of the launch for further details, such as the speed at which the 
vessel moved down the slipway. This suggests that Chandler had a good level of interest in the 
event and a desire to record the memory in detail.  
The brevity of sailor’s accounts could suggest that ship launches had become routine to them 
as naval pageantry increasingly became part of their daily lives, and thus not particularly 
interesting unless something specific occurred. However, it is sensible to reconsider Thomas’ 
suggestion that despite the routine, the spontaneity of the imperial message could create 
excitement and interest. Although Thomas was examining the effect of ship launches on the 
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general public, sailors should not be excluded as they were also participants. The testimony of 
Fletcher, and also Chandler, does not suggest that they were ambivalent to these events. 
Rather, what both accounts demonstrate is that sailors were interested in new additions to the 
fleet but took from it what they wanted. Above all as both McKee and Lavery have argued, 
there existed a keen bond between sailors and warships.111 Simply because sailors such as 
Fletcher did not embrace the imperial imagery of it did not mean that it did not resonate on 
other levels such as appreciation and pride in the ship.  
Therefore, launching ceremonies could be particularly poignant moments. This suggests that 
watching or taking part in acts of pageantry would trigger some emotion in addition to feelings 
of imperial pride generated by the spectacle. Furthermore, the history of the ships in which 
they commissioned was important to sailors, and upon joining a ship their diaries often gave a 
brief history setting out where it was launched and by whom. Whilst this may have been just 
factual information recorded as an aide memoir, it is suggestive of something deeper. In 
particular, sailors would sometimes draw ornate decorations around the opening pages where 
they had written down this information, combining an image of the ship or its emblem.112 This 
suggests a deep-seated loyalty and affection towards the ship, and furthermore that such 
feelings were part of a collective sailor culture.   
Fleet reviews 
The second salient component of naval pageantry was the fleet review. These were significantly 
altered from their original format during this period, becoming jingoistic, stupendous rituals 
where loyalty to the Crown and Empire was proclaimed. For instance, Punch conjured up a vivid 
image of the review in 1897:  
“Over!” cried Mr Punch, removing his sailor cap and mopping his manly brow, 
moist with sea-spray, and the perspiration produced by many Jubilee toasts 
and much loyal shouting.113 
This extract shows the stalwart Mr Punch wearing a sailor cap, linking him clearly with the navy; 
his “manly brow” demonstrating the masculinity of the British sailor; and “much loyal shouting” 
which was the duty of all spectators, proclaiming their belief in the Empire. Whilst ship launches 
served primarily to introduce new technological advances to the public, fleet reviews provided 
the ultimate opportunity for imperial imagery on a colossal scale where the key focus was on 
demonstrating power and prestige to the public and propagating imperial sentiment. 
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Originally reviews had, in the full sense of the word, constituted an inspection of warships and 
their crews; an inspection of materiel and personnel.114 This formed the basis for early royal 
fleet reviews, in particular the reviews conducted by George III in 1773 and 1781.115 Although, 
as late as 1814 the Prince Regent and the Duke of Clarence visited the flagship, HMS 
Impregnable, for an inspection during the review.116 The vital change was that after 1850 no 
British monarch boarded a warship for the purpose of carrying out an inspection.117 Now, instead 
of boarding warships and inspecting the ship’s crew, the fleet was assembled and organized 
into distinct lines such as the “gridiron”, described by Rüger as ‘an elaborate maritime ballet’; 
the royal yacht entered the lines of battleships and upon entry a royal salute was fired; sailors 
lined the ships’ sides in order to cheer the monarch as the yacht passed each vessel.118 This 
acclamation was now the key aim of fleet reviews.119 When the review was “completed” the 
monarch issued a general salute to the fleet along the lines of: ‘“His majesty is greatly pleased 
with the efficient condition of the Home fleet”’.120 The royal salute was entirely standard and 
effectively meaningless: it was a ‘rhetorical gesture’, however it was important for the theatrical 
illusion.121 The display was at once one of national power, displaying the prestige of Britain as 
the leading global power, and as a cultural ‘symbol that celebrated monarchy, empire and the 
nation’.122 
By comparison, fleet reviews prior to 1850 had been overtly political on the part of the monarch, 
as demonstrated by George III and his use of ‘gratuity’ payments to sailors following the Battle 
of Barfleur.123 On one occasion he paid as much as 10s to each sailor.124 The Times also noted 
that he gave money to the poor of Portsea and Gosport.125 This was an opportunity for the 
monarch to promote loyalty amongst the navy and the port town.126 However, by the second 
half of the nineteenth century the political power of the monarchy was decreasing. As historians 
such as Hobsbawm opined, this is the reason why invented tradition became such an important 
aspect of British society in order ‘to display [the monarch’s] continuing relevance and power’.127 
But, as Cannadine rightly pointed out, this was only possible due to the increased popularity of 
the monarchy that eclipsed the indifferent or more often negative public attitude that had 
existed since George III.128 Queen Victoria’s role as a ceremonial figure was carefully re-
constructed to increase her popularity and position her as the ceremonial figurehead of the 
Empire. Fleet reviews became an essential part of public ritual, more so than at ship launches 
because they allowed a far grander spectacle; this was where the monarch was on display to 
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the nation and to the world. This was particularly so by the Edwardian era where Edward VII 
was popularly known as ‘the sailor king’.129 
The repositioning of the monarchy and the recognition of the importance of public ritual by the 
second half of the nineteenth century, and its potential power, was therefore vital to the success 
of naval pageantry. In contrast, at a review in 1814 the Prince Regent and his guests, the 
Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia, ‘arrived… much to the disappointment of the many 
thousands who had gone out to welcome them, after dark’.130 The public was not the target of 
this review as they would later become and so the authorities displayed an ambivalent attitude 
towards them, they were simply spectators to what was a deeply political exercise. They would 
accommodate them but the potential propaganda opportunity was not recognized. Although 
the following day at the review ceremony the monarchs did receive a salute from the fleet and 
cheers from the sailors and crowds assembled, a precursor to later reviews, this was not the 
public spectacle it had become by the beginning of the twentieth century.131 In the years leading 
up to the First World War the level of planning, and the concerted effort that was made in order 
to make fleet reviews and ship launches such a spectacle, is readily apparent, and the Admiralty 
took a firm hand in this. For example, after 1911 if royalty or VIPs were to be present then 
dockyards were required to submit plans and estimates of costs for the event in order to get 
permission to proceed.132 As has already been mentioned above, from 1912 onwards ships 
were dressed and sailors ordered to be present.  
As the public became the ‘real subject of these rituals’, it poses the question of whether there 
was consensus around naval pageantry.133 Again Rüger went some way to bringing 
consideration of “consensus” into the naval sphere, and questioned whether these events 
demonstrate fervent royalist sentiment.134 National and local newspapers noted the large 
crowds who turned out to witness fleet reviews and ship launches and described scenes of 
joyous celebration.135 As one contemporary, Percival Hislam, noted, ‘there are few spectacles 
that delight the average landsman more than an assembly of warships’.136 But, although 
tempting to take at face value, large crowds do not necessarily imply consensus. It should be 
noted that crowd control mechanisms were put in place and the presence of the military and 
the police force made the opportunity to protest minimal.137 Although there were spontaneous 
gestures of loyalty which were honest, the working classes may simply have enjoyed it as a 
grand day out with plenty of opportunity for excitement and distraction.138 
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Therefore, Rüger has argued that ‘conflict was hidden, consensus staged’.139 In addition there 
was the interaction between the state and the public, and the growth of consumerism which 
competed with the state’s efforts to inculcate its ideology.140 For instance, the growth of civic 
power in Portsmouth began to challenge the Admiralty, who could not exercise complete 
control, and even though it disliked civilian intrusion, recognized it had to accept it. This is 
further reinforced by Elizabeth Hammerton and David Cannadine who examined conflict and 
consensus but caveated their argument by stating that considering the ceremony itself is not 
enough: the planning, local politics, all these things in the run up, including the day needed to 
be taken into account. Therefore, as Cannadine and Hammerton’s study of Queen Victoria’s 
Jubilee celebrations demonstrated, it is perhaps best to look at this as ‘conflict and consensus 
co-existing’.141  
This sets the basis for considering the dual role of sailors in these review ceremonies. Unlike 
the public, they did not have the luxury of choice and had no option but to obey orders. Yet, 
as well as being participants, sailors were also spectators to these events. For example, whilst 
stationed at HMS Excellent, the Gunnery School, Edwin Fletcher was present for the review in 
honour of the King’s birthday on 28th June 1907. Fletcher recorded: ‘all ships dressed various 
fashions and fired a Royal Salute of 21 guns at noon’.142 Furthermore, Fletcher had an active 
role in the celebrations as he was one of a number of sailors who paraded from the docks to 
Southsea Common during the morning.143 Yet, he recorded nothing about taking part in the 
parade. Similarly to his account of the launch of HMS Bellerophon, he does not record the 
spectacle he witnessed.  Although usually reticent, it is worth noting that the King was not 
present for these celebrations as he was in London for the Trooping of the Colours, and it is 
possible that Fletcher’s was less interested because of the King’s absence.144 
Again, Fletcher was similarly reticent about the fleet review during the Imperial Press 
Conference in 1909. This was the first such press conference designed to create greater 
knowledge and collaboration between the British and Dominion press and thus cement imperial 
ties.145 Amongst a variety of specially organized imperially-themed displays, it included a grand 
display of the Royal Navy off Spithead. However, the diary entry for the event is brief. He 
wrote: ‘They came round at 3.30pm in the tug… They then went on the Dreadnought and 
witnessed an attack on that ship’.146 He recorded no further observations of the event. Yet this 
was a large and well-publicized incident of naval pageantry. National papers such as The Times 
had been working hard to publicize the event throughout the previous year. In early 1908 The 
Times had stated that the Royal Navy’s involvement would be a major part of the press 
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conference, stating that the delegates ‘will be given an opportunity of inspecting a great naval 
base, and seeing some of the most recent additions to the fleet’.147 Following the review, a 
reporter for The Times compared it to all the reviews he had seen since Queen Victoria’s Jubilee 
review in 1887 and boldly stated that he had ‘never seen a more impressive spectacle’.148 This 
was a large-scale and important event of naval pageantry watched by the reporters of the 
world’s press.  
Furthermore, it is worth considering that HMS Dreadnought was still a relatively new and 
technologically advanced ship in 1909, and it is perhaps curious that the event elicited no 
expression of pride or other sentiment from Fletcher. In comparison, a young midshipman 
named James Colville noted only a year later: ‘I suppose it is safe to say that no ship, not even 
the “Victory”, will have such wide world fame as the “Dreadnought”’.149 Likewise Fletcher was 
brief in his recollection of the Empire Day celebrations in 1907 when the Prince of Wales visited 
the fleet. He simply noted: ‘The Prince went back to Admiralty House about 6pm last night and 
left for London about 9am, Ships being dressed all over and undressed half an hour after he 
left’.150 That Fletcher specifically mentioned the short space of time between dressing and 
undressing the ships suggests that he was making a subtle reference to the effort being a waste 
of their time.  
Fletcher regularly demonstrated that he was not interested in the intimate details of naval 
pageantry. Although he recorded many examples of naval pageantry he either witnessed or 
participated in, he is more talkative about day-to-day routine and his own grumbles.151 For 
example on one occasion he recorded, ‘After dinner we “passed out” of “Drill” but I believe we 
done none to grand at that’.152 In comparison, officer diaries are usually more detailed both in 
their descriptions and in their experiences. For instance, James Colville was impressed by what 
he saw at the review on 24 June 1910, writing in his diary: ‘It was a pretty day and the ships 
dressed and the smoke of the salute made a very fine sight’.153 To Colville this was a display 
of prestige in which he took evident pride. Furthermore, on attending another review he gives 
a light-hearted account of his experience, noting when the royal yacht arrived and a 21 gun 
salute was fired, ‘there was one 4” [gun] fired just over my head and it nearly slew me’.154 
Nevertheless, Fletcher’s repeated brevity does not render his recollections unimportant. 
Although he recorded naval pageantry in the same off-hand way he jotted down many of his 
daily activities, it is important simply because he went to the trouble of recording it. Therefore, 
on some level there existed an interest in the events and he considered it noteworthy and this 
supports the argument that it was an accepted part of sailor culture.  
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However, both Fletcher’s and Colville’s diaries stand in marked contrast to that of Robert 
Percival, a stoker. Whilst technically a distinct and separate group from sailors, stokers provide 
an interesting point of comparison. They also lived on the lower deck and, perhaps more 
importantly, often bore the brunt of the hardship of naval pageantry but without the respected 
public image of sailors.155 Percival was very candid regarding his thoughts and negative 
experiences of the Royal Navy.156 For instance, regarding the manner in which fleet reviews 
were reported in the press he made the following comment: ‘the great thing about Naval 
manoeuvers is that the press and people ashore know far more about them than the actual 
people taking part’.157 In addition, he believed the admirals had no idea what they were doing 
‘and consequently keep the ships’ companies in the dark!’.158  
However, by 1900 accusing the Admiralty of lack of organization was not justifiable: a great 
deal of planning was put into all events of naval pageantry.159 It was in the Admiralty’s interest 
to make sure that naval manoeuvres were carried out as carefully as possible; this was a navy 
on the world stage. Therefore, this account is revealing of Percival’s own agenda. True, the 
press were undeniably well-informed about naval pageantry so that they could publicize 
events.160 Nevertheless, his suggestion that the press knew more about what was happening 
than those taking part is telling of how little faith he had in the officer elite of the Royal Navy. 
Whilst men of the lower deck might not have been given explicit instructions regarding the 
running order for the day, it is sensible to recognize that officers were and had this not been 
the case more accidents would have occurred during these events. When the eyes of the world 
was upon them this could not have been allowed to happen. In addition, as pageantry within 
the navy increased, sailors would have familiarized themselves with how events were to be 
conducted and have known what to expect. 
It is also interesting to note that Percival lambasts the naval authorities in quite such elegant 
fashion. As previously mentioned, Percival is a stoker, part of the relatively new influx of naval 
personnel who had not joined the service during boyhood; stokers ‘were recruited almost 
exclusively over the age of eighteen’.161 The key consequence of this was that these men 
usually came from a much wider age and geographic background and were, therefore, less 
likely to accept the navy’s discipline and customs which was instilled in those brought up in the 
bosom of the navy.162 For instance, Percival made no secret of the fact he joined the navy for 
pecuniary reasons rather than any deep-seated longing to serve with the Senior Service, stating 
he was ‘driven by Economic pressure [and] was forced to adopt it as a means of livelihood’.163 
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This attitude is further displayed in numerous scathing remarks concerning naval customs, in 
particular those that impede his own comforts.164 Percival was evidently a reasonably well-
educated man and had a specific agenda with his writing.165  
As a stoker, Percival would have been below deck and not a spectator. However, sailors 
manning the deck rails were not guaranteed to see much of the review either, although this 
work was obviously less demanding. For instance, Midshipman John Southby’s diary 
demonstrates the spacial difficulties caused by the large number of ships present at fleet 
reviews.  Southby noted that at the coronation review of 1911 the monarch was only visible by 
means of a telescope; this was not an instrument that everyone on board would have had 
access to.166 There were 10 lines of warships in 1911 and it took the royal yacht 2 hours to go 
around the fleet.167 The vast distance between sailors and the focal point is made even clearer 
by another Midshipman, James Colville, who commented on the review in 1910 and, in 
particular, on what sailors’ saw of the royal yacht as it inspected the fleet. Colville noted:  
the cheering was mostly excellent from the ships… but the whole 2nd Flotilla 
had to cheer together. When the time came the yacht was almost out of sight 
from us and the men had nothing to cheer for and they didn’t let themselves 
go.168  
Whilst this demonstrates an organizational flaw in how the review was conducted, it also shows 
that sailors would not simply cheer on demand. This suggests that they were capable of thinking 
for themselves and would only do certain things if they recognized there was a point to it. This 
supports the recent arguments of Isaac Land, who by studying nationalism and British sailors 
has suggested that sailors had their own ‘agency’.169 As the following chapters will demonstrate, 
sailors were conscious of their own thoughts but often curtailed by the strict discipline of the 
navy and it was when there was an impasse between the two that serious issues occurred.  
Another important aspect of naval pageantry that all ranks commented on was the mock battle, 
which sometimes formed part of the review. This provided an additional opportunity for the 
Royal Navy to demonstrate its awesome firepower to the assembled masses. Sham fights were 
not a modern creation and, as the contemporary John Leyland noted, the Royal Navy had used 
them as early as 1778 at a Royal Review at Spithead, to entertain the public whilst 
demonstrating superior firepower.170 Nevertheless, despite their popularity, mock battles ‘had 
little practical value in terms of training and… scarcely gave an accurate picture of the fleet’s 
condition’.171 Officers also commonly ‘made fun’ of mock battles and for instance Admiral Sir 
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Louis Hamilton referred to them as ‘show exercises’.172 This is supported by Midshipman Edward 
Blake who was present at the mock battle organized for the Imperial Press Conference 
delegates in 1909. Blake recorded it was ‘a fine spectacle, but practically, of course, absurd’.173 
As already noted above, Fletcher – who witnessed the same attack - made no substantive 
comment.174 However, James Colville rather enjoyed taking part and recorded that ‘it was 
rather a fine sight, seeing a big fleet like that come together’.175  
Again, this contrasts strongly with Percival who was nothing short of damning about mock 
battles. He wrote that on steaming around during a mock battle, the popular image of ‘brave, 
fearless men with… nerves of steel’ should be forgotten, and that men were ‘generally nervous 
wrecks and the courage they possess is generally of the Dutch order’.176 As a stoker, a mock 
battle would have meant additional work for no perceivable benefit other than the amusement 
of those ashore. However, if one compares this with the testimony of a stoker serving during 
the Battle of Jutland there is a marked difference with a variety of emotions becoming apparent. 
Jack Cotterell noted ‘as the guns went off you could feel the ships go down and rise up, which 
would shake the dust out of the crevices, creating clouds of smoke’.177 He further noted how 
the stokers ‘helped in the magazine with the shells. We wouldn’t normally do that, but as the 
battle went on we all pulled together’.178 Comparing a mock battle with real one is fraught with 
difficulties, not least because the life-threatening seriousness of a real battle has the power to 
change all preconceived ideas. However, it suggests that genuine action may have incited 
patriotism and bravery unlike anything created during a mock battle and this will be considered 
further in Chapters Three and Four. Nevertheless, considering evidence from other stokers and 
engine room artificers suggests that Percival was generally more vitriolic.179  
Overseas Pageantry  
A further aspect of naval pageantry that needs to be considered is that which took place 
overseas. This theme has not been examined by Rüger and yet with the global reach of the 
British Empire, events of naval pageantry did not only occur in home waters. Bernard Porter 
made the comment that for foreigners, ‘Britain was defined by her empire… This was because 
the face Britain usually presented to them, as foreigners, was her imperial one’.180 Leaving 
aside other elements of Porter’s argument, this is a valid point. Abroad in the Empire images 
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of imperialism were regularly used for political and social control.181 Consequently, as a readily 
identifiable symbol, naval pageantry on varying scales occurred across the Empire in order to 
assert British power and strength to the people under its control.  
As such, in his recent study Daniel Owen Spence argued that: 
Beyond Britain, the Royal Navy was a crucial cultural adhesive for binding the 
empire’s young settler societies together with the mother country. Wherever a 
British naval base or warship was present, the service occupied a prominent 
position in the social life of the colony and in disseminating British imperial 
culture.182 
There were a great many activities that demanded acts of naval pageantry and served to 
disseminate British imperial imagery to the colonies. The majority of these were particularly 
ordinary and nothing more than day-to-day activities such as gun salutes for the monarch’s 
birthday or greeting a British or foreign admiral and celebrations of Empire Day or events 
specific to the colony. However, the demonstration of power to the colonies that these activities 
stimulated should not be under-estimated. Gun salutes in particular reinforced the colossal 
strength of British warships to the indigenous inhabitants of the colonies.183 For instance one 
sailor, Harry Price, noted on one occasion: ‘The noise now became deafening as over forty men 
of war began to salute’.184 Thus, for sailors serving overseas, naval pageantry was a regular 
aspect of life abroad and the final part of this chapter will briefly consider sailors’ experience of 
this pageantry prior to the Great War, and examine their involvement and its effect upon them. 
In particular, the political situation of the Boer War (which will be considered further in the 
following chapter) necessitated increased events of naval pageantry ‘that reinforced the bonds 
between the Royal Navy and the colonies’.185 Consequently, South Africa was included as part 
of the Royal Tour of the Duke and Duchess of Cornwall in 1901. In itself this was a great event 
of naval pageantry and Spence has argued that this ‘was the most extensive royal tour 
attempted at this time’ and important because the navy played a significant role.186 This has 
also been suggested by Phillip Buckner who argued that ‘one of the key reasons why the tour 
took place at all was because of the war in South Africa’.187 Both Joseph Chamberlain and Sir 
Alfred Milner believed that the royal visit “would encourage the loyal party in S. Africa” and 
pushed the idea with the monarchy.188 Thus as Buckner has argued, as the war became 
unpopular and enthusiasm waned, the tour ‘took on much greater significance’.189 Similarly 
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Spence has posited that the struggle of the British Empire to defeat the Boers required a 
concerted effort and the Royal Tour was to ‘stir up jingoism, [and] project a unified imperial 
front’.190  
The tour involved the Duke and Duchess of Cornwall traversing the Empire aboard HMS Ophir 
and visiting key cities throughout the colonies. Due to the ongoing war in South Africa, both 
Durban and Capetown were high on the agenda. In particular, the Manchester Courier and 
Lancashire General Advertiser reported: ‘The visit is undertaken at the express desire of their 
Royal Highnesses, who fully appreciate the sacrifice made by the King’s loyal subjects at those 
ports [Durban and Capetown]’.191 However, in his biography of George V published in 1936 
after the death of the King, W. J. Makin said of the visit: ‘Of all the Dominions visited by the 
future King George on that first official Empire tour, it may be said that South Africa was to 
prove the most difficult problem of all’.192 The political sensitivities of the conflict meant that 
the visit was far more complicated and required a grand display in order to encourage 
patriotism. Therefore, this was a visit that demanded a significant level of participation on 
behalf of the sailors in order to gain the most publicity for the Empire from the visit. In 
particular, these visits brought the royals into contact not only with colonial subjects but also 
those sailors who accompanied them and sailors stationed overseas.  
One sailor serving aboard the royal yacht HMS Ophir, Petty Officer Harry Price, provides a 
detailed account of the pageantry that took place during the royal visit to South Africa.193 Upon 
the arrival of the royal party at Simonstown, Price recorded: 
As they where [sic] pulled ashore all the ships saluted, the noise of the guns 
echoing and re echoing amongst the lofty hills, which surrounded the town; As 
their “Royal Highnesses” landed an interesting affair was, that they where [sic] 
drawn in their carriage by bluejackets, instead of horses, all the way to the 
station.194 
Also present were a number of ships belonging to the Cape Squadron and Price noted that they 
were there ‘to take part in the ceremonies’.195 This included HMS Barracouta, upon which 
William Williams was serving. Williams’ diary also describes the naval pageantry for the royals, 
although he does not mention the “interesting affair” of bluejackets pulling the royals’ carriage 
as described by Price. However, Williams noted the effort that they had gone to in dressing all 
the ships ready to receive the Duke and Duchess.196 Nevertheless, he remained enthusiastic 
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about the visit and proudly recorded that ‘the Bluejackets and marines lining the sides of each 
ship presented a fine spectacle’.197  
In addition, Williams provided an insight into his feelings towards the monarchy and the Empire, 
and clearly expressed feelings of patriotism. Furthermore, he demonstrated his interpretation 
of the interactions between the colony and the monarchy. Williams saw a good proportion of 
the celebrations at Simonstown during the royal tour and described going ashore that day ‘to 
view the decorations which made one feel proud of the good feeling that existed between this 
colony and our future King and Queen’.198 The decorations during the tour’s visit to South Africa 
were certainly impressive. For instance, as Buckner has noted, in Pietermaritburg ‘over 8000 
flags were distributed to school children and another 25000 used to decorate the streets’.199 
Buckner also suggested that despite bad weather disrupting the proceedings, ‘it did little to 
dampen the enthusiasm of the vast crowds – estimated at 50000 people who lined the harbour 
and the streets’.200 Therefore, Williams’ diary suggests that he thought the visit was a success 
and took great pride in the wider imperial celebrations and the navy’s role within this. In 
particular, he suggests a genuine appreciation of how the Duke and Duchess were welcomed 
in the colony. A similar account was given by A. C. East who accompanied the royals to India 
in 1911 for the King’s coronation. East wrote that the visit to India was ‘a most fitting one as 
it was the first time a white King and Queen had been crowned in India’.201  
Therefore, the royal tour’s visit to South Africa should be viewed with a degree of success and 
Buckner has argued in support of this, noting: 
The Natal Mercury believed that the visit ‘has been successful beyond 
anticipation’ and ‘will ever be remembered as an historic landmark’. The Duke 
and Duchess, it declared, have won ‘the love and loyal esteem of the Colonists 
of Natal’ and the tour would have lasting value in ‘making the Colonists realise 
more than ever they have done before their position as citizens of the great 
Empire, centred around the Throne of Great Britain and the Empire’.202 
Nevertheless, Williams’ diary suggests that it was successful and that he believed the colonial 
appreciation was sincere, and that there was a large degree of enthusiasm and excitement 
towards the royals. As such, he enjoyed what he viewed as the colony’s display of loyalty to 
the monarchy and to the Empire, and that he believed such displays were right and proper. 
However, whether sailors were fully aware of the deeper political importance of this display of 
loyalty is open to debate. As this thesis will argue, sailors were not apolitical and would pick up 
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on any atmosphere in the places they visited.203 To suggest that they were incapable of this 
does them a disservice. 
Similarly Harry Price also gave an account of the interactions with locals and noted that as part 
of the celebrations, the ships of the Cape squadron were open to visitors. He wrote that:  
a large number of native chiefs, sent by “His Royal Highness, the Duke”, went 
on board the “Monarch”, and there witnessed the firing of the big guns, 
outrigger charges, submarine mines etc; and they went away, I reckon, more 
impressed than ever, with the great nation, under whose protection they 
lived.204 
Yet this is not something he witnessed first-hand; his idea and interpretation is based upon his 
expectation. It is unlikely that the immense technological power of the navy, and by extension 
the Empire, was lost on the indigenous population.205 Whether it increased their loyalty to the 
Empire is a different matter, yet it is not the paramount point of this account. What is important 
is that Price clearly assumed this was the likely outcome, and this demonstrates his own 
relationship to imperialism, colonials, and his interpretation of their relationship.   
Such engagement in events of pageantry by colonials and indigenous inhabitants was viewed 
unquestioningly by sailors such as Williams and Price as unfaltering patriotism and support for 
the Empire. Price recorded a number of similar accounts during the tour. For instance as the 
tour arrived in Malta he wrote that there were:  
banners and flags by the hundreds flying in the breeze, beautiful triumphal 
arches, pavements thronged with a loyal picturesque an enthusiastic crowd, 
the roadway lined with soldiers in khaki and Bluejackets in straw hats.206 
Summing up the visit he wrote: ‘it was a splendid welcome and showed that the Maltese are 
quite happy under the Union Jack’.207  
This image of loyal colonials is further strengthened by the lack of any reported anti-imperial 
sentiment. In particular, given the war in South Africa an element of this might have been 
expected. However, it is evident that a great deal of effort went into controlling the royal visit 
and preventing any outbursts of anti-imperial sentiment which could have threatened the 
British mission in South Africa. For instance, it had been arranged that ‘suspicious characters 
would be arrested and kept “in custody on some charge or other” until after the visit’.208 
Therefore, the level of anti-imperial sentiment in the colony was being firmly controlled. Yet, 
being stationed in South Africa, Williams would have had a greater understanding of the political 
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situation and that he does not suggest or allude to any disloyalty suggests he did not believe 
there were any significant issues.209 On the other hand, Price wrote that ‘we have seen so very 
little of the shore’ and therefore his descriptions are primarily based upon what he did see 
coupled with his expectations.210 Furthermore, he did not rate the experience in South Africa 
as highly as other colonies visited by the Royal Tour, particularly Australia. He stated that ‘in 
leaving “South Africa” none of the feelings like we experienced when leaving “Australia” 
affected us’.211  
However, again sailors demonstrate that ceremonial occasions of pageantry were not always 
enjoyable experiences. For instance, Able Seaman Dicks was serving in the East Indies at the 
time of the coronation of King George V in 1911. The Governor of Ceylon, as his majesty’s 
representative, marked the occasion of the coronation with a grand ceremony. Dicks was 
present at the celebrations and he, and a contingent from his ship, were ordered to line the 
streets for the procession. Dicks remarked, ‘there was nothing to do only stand to attention 
until 11 o’clock. It was no cop being as the remainder of the ship’s company were standing 
off’.212 Dicks was evidently jealous of the freedom of his fellow crewmates to enjoy the 
celebrations and clearly would be far rather be enjoying himself than being part of the 
pageantry. Again, sailors were liable to grumble and it is important to recognize that Dicks’ 
account does not suggest anything more serious than this.213 Rather, it reinforces the point 
that sailors interpreted things for themselves, and did not simply absorb their imperial duties.  
Yet sailors clearly took pride in the grand spectacle that these events of pageantry occasioned. 
For example, as he approached Malta with the Royal Tour, Price wrote:  
we perceived a number of craft approaching, which proved to be destroyers 
painted white; and they made a splendid spectacle as they bounded over the 
dark blue waters, thundering out a royal salute with their 12pdr.214  
Similarly A. C. East was with the warships escorting the royal yacht in 1911 and evidently 
enjoyed himself, writing of their visit to India: ‘All Bombay brilliantly illuminated as well as the 
ships in harbour, the spectacle was very grand indeed’.215 East clearly enjoyed the spectacle 
that the harbour and ships made, and was proud. This was also demonstrated by Williams who 
observed a ceremonial march through the port of Simonstown and reveals pride in both the 
appearance of the sailors and the reception that they received. He declared: ‘without 
exaggeration I must admit the Bluejackets were the most popular and in the march past the 
cheers and ovation was tremendous’.216 Therefore, Williams evidenced a clear feeling of pride 
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towards the sailors created by these occasions which also suggests that he felt proud to be 
counted amongst them. Likewise, even Percival demonstrated similar thought, in contrast to 
his usual tone. After witnessing some soldiers perform a march past at Gibraltar he recorded: 
‘In a moment there came to us a vision of the Empire. From East to West in half a dozen British 
stations… those lean, brown English faces… were grinning their saucy, good humoured cynical 
English grin’.217  
The coronation of Edward VII in 1901 was a further event that elicited pageantry overseas, and 
this chapter has already noted Edwin Fletcher’s experiences in Portsmouth. Williams also noted 
that the navy was to play a role in the pageantry in Simonstown. He wrote in his diary: 
Turning back to our day work we find ourselves busily preparing for the 
Coronation in the way of decorations and illuminations but after work leave was 
freely given to those desired it… we received the sad news of His Majesty’s 
illness which came as a shock as no news had yet been received of the King’s 
illness. This postponed a greater part of the displays on shore as well as on 
board.218 
Therefore, despite the effort that such naval pageantry put them to, Williams was evidently 
saddened to hear that the King was unwell and as such the Coronation would be delayed. 
Whether this reflected concern simply because Williams was patriotic or because it meant that 
the excitement, which was to be expected as part of the celebrations, would be cancelled is 
open to question. It is not possible to easily gauge this and it is likely that both elements played 
a role. Williams did record that it had nonetheless been announced that a day of holiday would 
be granted, and this perhaps demonstrates that even on a subconscious level both elements 
existed.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has built upon recent trends within socio-cultural studies which have considered 
the wider interactions between the Royal Navy, its sailors and imperialism, particularly the 
imagery of sailors and the navy as representations of imperial power. In particular, it has 
developed and advanced the themes drawn by Jan Rüger between the navy, pageantry and 
British imperial culture by examining the construct of naval pageantry and sailors’ experience 
of imperial culture through it. By examining these “forgotten” participants through the use of 
unpublished sailor diaries, it has demonstrated that pageantry was a key means by which they 
experienced imperialism, and important in shaping their image and identity as this aligned with 
public perceptions during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. Furthermore, by 
extending the examination to pageantry overseas, it has demonstrated the relationship sailors 
had with the colonies and, more importantly, how imperialism shaped their expectations and 
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understanding of the world around them. The Empire gave sailors a shared sense of community 
and a means to process their identity.  
Yet, sailors’ testimony also demonstrates that they were equally proud of their role, and proud 
of the reputation and public image of the service, as well as exhibiting local and national pride. 
The interrelationship between these themes is difficult to untangle and concepts of pride and 
patriotism must also be viewed as distinct factors; however, together they were all bound-up 
with some level of latent pride in the Empire and the monarchy. Therefore, it is argued that 
imperialism was a key aspect of sailor life and consequently an important part of their culture, 
heightened by their interactions with monarchy, cultural imperialism, and the colonies through 
naval pageantry. However, there was a level of independence within this. Sailors would grumble 
and there were aspects of their daily lives which were tedious, demanding, and often deemed 
pointless. Thus analysing lower-deck testimony reveals the complexity of sailors and that, 
although working in a deeply regimented environment, they exhibited a level of independence, 
even if their opportunities for exercising it were often limited.  
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Chapter Three 
Bluejackets in Britain’s late imperial wars: imperially-
minded soldiers of the Empire? 
 
Sailors are the best comrades in rough times; nothing puts them out; I suppose 
because the ship is their home, and a run ashore is always in any circumstances 
a holiday to them.1 
 
By the late nineteenth century the Royal Navy’s position of power and prestige was firmly 
established in Britain, and the world. As discussed in Chapter Two, the Royal Navy was 
becoming the embodiment of British imperial power: ‘a cultural symbol’.2 In particular, this was 
accentuated during wartime where imagery of sailors was increasingly portrayed in imperialistic 
terms to the public. Because of its small standing army, additional duties came under the aegis 
of the Royal Navy, and therefore British sailors were expected to do their duty in matters of 
imperial defence. Thus British sailors saw action as frontline troops in many of the imperial 
campaigns during the second half of the nineteenth century, such as in the Crimea, the Gordon 
Relief Expedition in Egypt, the Boer War, and the Boxer Rebellion in China.3 This chapter 
examines their cultural portrayal alongside their own experiences with particular consideration 
of those who served in the Boer War, a conflict that continues to excite historical interest in 
regard to the imperial sentiment debate and has been called the ‘litmus test for popular 
imperialism’ by Brad Beaven.4 The Boer War arguably had a significant impact on Britain and 
provides an illuminating case study. The paramount reason for this focus is to develop the key 
themes of this thesis: putting sailors into the imperial discourse, and to examine the wider 
implications of their involvement in Britain’s imperial wars; to determine how they related to 
the empire they were fighting for. In doing so it will firstly put sailors back into the socio-
cultural discourse of the war, from which they have been omitted; and secondly demonstrate 
both the public and personal representations of the British sailor, allowing for deconstruction 
of their experiences. In doing so it will examine how, through war, imperialistic themes such 
as patriotism and duty remained key elements of sailor culture. 
In recent years, the historiography of the Boer War has changed with a shift away from military 
and political studies. Revisionist approaches have focused on the advent of the citizen soldier 
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and the public’s interaction with imperialism through popular culture. In particular, the work of 
Stephen M. Miller who has investigated these volunteers and examined their experiences using 
diaries, letter and other personal papers.5 Miller successfully countered the economic 
arguments of volunteerism put forward by Richard Price in his classic defence of the working 
class.6 However, Miller’s methodology has been questioned by Beaven, who is cautious of 
Millar’s use of autobiographies and his failure to consider individuality sufficiently.7 
Nevertheless, these studies have been a welcome addition to existing approaches such as those 
by Denis Judd, Peter Warwick, and Thomas Pakenham, whose primary focus during the 1970s 
and 1980s was on the military situation: the reasons for the outbreak of the war; the impact 
of the war on the British army and the British public; the reforms that were put in place before 
the First World War broke out, and the parallels between the two conflicts.8  
However, despite this continued interest, the role played by British sailors and the naval 
brigades has remained of little interest to scholars. For instance, although Keith Jeffrey noted 
that in its imperial wars Britain proved that it did have ‘the ships, the men and the money too’, 
his study has almost no mention of “the ships” or the men that served in them, and their 
activities during the war.9 Indeed, there is a paucity of studies specifically about the naval 
brigades, and the two most widely available were written by amateur historians: one a retired 
naval officer and the other a journalist.10 This is somewhat surprising given the public acclaim 
the brigades received at the time. For instance, the crew of HMS Powerful were feted upon 
their return from the war in both Portsmouth and London. The involvement of the navy and 
the brigades were well reported in the newspapers, and evidently interesting topics to 
contemporaries. Furthermore, there were numerous publications from those who had served 
with or seen the Naval Brigades in action, such as those by George Crowe and T. T. Jeans.11 
Thus it is evident that contemporaries recognized sailors’ contributions to the war. Instead, the 
focus on citizen soldiers, such as by Miller, has been aimed at determining the popular mood. 
This begs the question as to whether it has therefore been assumed that sailors were imperially-
minded servants of empire because they chose the navy as a career. Yet despite this they 
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volunteered to serve ashore in the naval brigades during the war, beyond the remit of their 
usual day-to-day lives.  
Sailors as soldiers of the Empire: the naval brigades in the public eye 
As mentioned above, there was nothing new in the formation of naval brigades in South Africa 
in 1899; it was part of a conscious strengthening of British forces in the Cape as tensions 
worsened and war looked inevitable. Sailors represent an interesting case as, unlike their 
counterparts in the army, it was not their primary function to serve on land and fight prolonged 
land wars. Although the men who made up the main naval brigades (which comprised the 
crews of HMS Terrible and HMS Powerful) were on “active service” and pursuing their imperial 
duties, these were men who were suddenly thrown into a land-based war which may have 
taken them out of their comfort zone.12 The excogitation of sailor testimony allows for a better 
understanding of sailors’ personal thoughts to demonstrate this. In order to analyse this 
further, this chapter will briefly consider the public perception of sailors’ roles in the conflict to 
allow a greater understanding of their image and how they fitted within imperial culture.  
It is important to note that the Boer War was widely reported and in great detail compared 
with previous imperial engagements. This was in part, as Simon Popple has stated, due to 
technological changes and ‘culminated in the almost instantaneous transmission of news and 
opinion’.13 Popple neatly summarized it thus: 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, imperial conflict was a 
predominantly retrospective cultural imagining, a time-lagged secondhand 
series of events often dislocated from a predominantly non-metropolitan 
audience. By its end, the communications revolution had diminished the 
temporal and spatial separation of people and events in the far-flung reaches 
of the British Empire.14 
Therefore, this was a war which generated a good deal of interest and demand for war news, 
and this was recognized and exploited by the press. Cheap daily papers meant the war could 
be followed by everyone and there was growing demand from the public hungry for news.15 
By the conclusion of the war, the Royal Navy and its sailors were held out to the general public 
as having had a vital role in the securing of the British victory, and throughout the conflict the 
press had praised their achievements. This was continued in contemporary literature, for 
instance, in his introduction to T. T. Jeans’ work, Commander Chas N. Robinson said: 
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It is the story of how, at a time when their comrades of the land service were 
in dire need of help, the seamen hastened to place their ships’ guns on 
improvised carriages, took them ashore, and in the nick of time enabled our 
military forces to cope on equal terms with the Boer artillery.16 
Similarly Agnes Weston, another contemporary who had the ability to reach a wide public 
audience, wrote in My Life Among the Bluejackets: 
How many deeds of heroism have been chronicled about our Naval Brigade in 
the terrible South African war, how they marched shoulder to shoulder with our 
soldiers, how the Royal Marines earned the title at Graspan of the “bravest of 
the brave”, and Jack that of the “Saviour of the Empire” at Ladysmith.17 
As discussed in the previous two chapters, during the nineteenth century the public image of 
the sailor was being consciously moulded into a brave, strong, defender of the Empire. In the 
course of her study on masculinity and imperialism in the Royal Navy, Mary A. Conley has 
argued that the navy ‘escaped much derision’ unlike the army which was heavily criticized for 
its incompetency and inability to beat “a bunch of farmers”.18 Conley supports this by 
suggesting that the defeats suffered by the British Army facilitated health commentators to 
encourage men to volunteer for service with the navy as the army’s reputation was 
‘tarnished’.19 The Boer War was a conflict that shook Britain’s imperial prestige, and historians 
have long been cognizant of the impact that the defeats inflicted upon Britain’s image. For 
instance, Judd argued that: ‘the Boer War of 1899-1902 symbolized Britain’s towering imperial 
status and at the same time exposed potentially crippling weaknesses in her military 
machine’.20  
In support of this, it is evident that many contemporaries were under no illusion about the 
navy’s ability to be of assistance to the British Army in South Africa, and vocal naval 
commentators took the opportunity to drum up support for the navy. For instance, Archibald 
Hurd, one of the foremost proponents of the navy at the time, described sailors as the 
‘handyman’ of the Empire.21 More recently, Conley has recognized the importance of the 
arguments put forward by Hurd, noting that ‘the naval man has proved himself as an imperial 
soldier’ able to fight on both land and at sea.22 Specifically, however, Conley is not drawn into 
evaluating Hurd’s belief; she simply noted the importance of contemporary opinion. Yet, this 
view is not shared by Arthur Bleby who was rather more negative in his appraisal: 
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It cannot be said that the seamen of the Naval Brigades were well trained in 
land warfare… The standard of marksmanship was not high. Those that had not 
passed through Whale Island were even less accomplished.23 
As a retired officer specifically focusing on sailors’ training, it is possible that Bleby is nearer 
the mark insofar as the naval brigade’s abilities ashore. Nevertheless, Frank Ottaway, a young 
rating at the turn of the century, referred to himself as ‘one of our “Handy Men”’ suggesting 
that sailors were adopting the epithet with some pride.24 
These “handy men” were engaged in many of the key battles during the early months of the 
conflict.25 Their presence at Ladysmith was to be of particular importance, becoming famous in 
the heady imperialist atmosphere in Britain, especially due to the 117 day siege they had to 
endure, and the horrific conditions they experienced.26 However, it was the manner and timing 
of the naval brigade’s arrival at Ladysmith that was seized upon by the press and bolstered the 
bluejackets’ heroic image. Arriving in the midst of battle, they immediately sprang into action 
and entered the fray. This was taken up with enthusiasm not only by the national papers but 
also by the local press in Britain who quickly picked up on the brigade arriving at the opportune 
moment. In particular, the local press organizations of Portsmouth, as the home of the navy, 
proudly boasted of the naval brigade’s exploits. For example, the Evening News (Portsmouth) 
reported with the following headlines: ‘Naval Brigade to the Rescue’, ‘“Long Tom” Silenced’, 
and the ‘Sailors Magnificent Shots’.27 Over the following weeks similar headlines were 
commonplace such as ‘Sailors save the situation’, and ‘How the Naval Guns Saved Ladysmith’.28 
Similarly the tone of the national papers can be examined through their representatives at 
Ladysmith during the siege, who later published their recollections of siege-life for their 
respective papers. Their anecdotal evidence of the naval brigade further contributes to this 
heroic image and painted the naval brigade as the saviours of the town, whose arrival boosted 
morale. H. H. S. Pearse and G. W. Steevens both noted the demoralizing effect of enemy shell 
fire whilst they lacked the ability to respond.29 Pearse stated: ‘let men try to disguise the fact 
as they may, it gets on the nerves of the most courageous among us’.30 Likewise Steevens 
wrote: ‘yet, if they never hit a man, this handful of sailors have been the saving of Ladysmith’.31 
Although they were writing for an audience who wanted to hear this, the arrival of the naval 
guns meant that the British could reach the Boers which had, until that moment, been 
impossible to do. The importance of this is demonstrated by Bleby who has argued that: ‘the 
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26 Bleby, Victorian, p. 135 
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unexpected intervention of the Naval Brigade and the silencing of the Long Tom checked the 
Boer advance and raised the morale of the British forces’.32  
Thus whether they made a significant tactical impact is less important. It is Conley’s point 
regarding the sailors’ image that holds far greater poignancy: the naval brigades returned from 
the war as heroes before the long guerrilla war began, allowing for an untarnished heroic image 
to be created. This also lends support to Rüger’s argument for the development of the navy as 
a key British cultural icon.33 To give some sense of context, the naval brigades featured in a 
variety of popular entertainment such as the play entitled The Absent-minded Beggar, or for 
Queen and Country written by Arthur Shirley.34 There was also the popular Alfred West’s Our 
Navy, shown nationally but with a run at The Victoria Hall in Southsea and proudly reported by 
the Evening News (Portsmouth) with reference to the guns at Ladysmith alongside ‘our gallant 
Jack Tars’.35 The importance of the transmission of news events into music halls and other 
outlets has been highlighted by Popple, and the link with imperialism has also been reinforced 
by Miller, who has argued that themes of ‘“Tommy Atkins”, “Jack Tar,” and the empire’  was 
not a coincidence.36 Therefore, the attention given to the bluejackets represents the increasing 
popularity and position of sailors and the navy in Britain as they formed part of a combined 
imperialistic and civic celebration, bringing together the cultural and imperial spheres in 
celebration of British power.37 A discernible example of this is demonstrated by Beaven who 
compared the naval brigade’s return from the Indian Mutiny with their return from the Boer 
War about 50 years later. There was a dramatic difference in the popular enthusiasm towards 
the naval brigade on the latter occasion and they received a hero’s welcome with a grand civic 
reception.38 The returning sailors paraded their guns through the streets of Portsmouth and 
London in an orchestrated display of imperial power to enthusiastic crowds, reinforcing their 
place in the popular imperialistic sentiment of the time.39  
Devoted servants of Empire? Sailors and enthusiasm for war 
Since sailors were being portrayed as an important element of the imperial image, it is vital to 
consider how they viewed their actions, and how this corresponds with the manner in which 
they were portrayed to the British public. This will be considered in two ways: firstly in sailors’ 
attitudes to fighting, and secondly the level of their engagement with imperialism. There is 
little evidence to suggest that, on an individual level at least, sailors overtly viewed their actions 
as heroic, or widely embraced the heroic image being propounded by the press. British sailors 
were typically self-effacing and were more likely to record a grumble in detail than eulogize 
their own actions and put themselves forward as being heroes of the Empire.40  However, when 
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38 Beaven, Visions, p. 70 
39 Bleby, Victorian, p. 184 
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discussing their actions collectively, sailors were more likely to view their achievements with 
pride. For instance, Joseph Withercombe noted that if anyone doubted the brigade’s ability to 
uphold the navy’s reputation then they had only to look at ‘what work our men did at Modder 
River, Graspan and many other places’.41  
It would be understandable, a priori, that sailors had little idea of what they would encounter 
fighting ashore. Such ideas are predicated on the primarily peaceful role of the Royal Navy 
during the Victorian and Edwardian eras, without any naval battles being fought at sea such as 
those which had dominated the eighteenth century.42 Recent studies of war have also 
suggested the importance of imperialist novelists such as G. A. Henty and the inculcation of 
British youths, meaning that men did not appreciate the actualities of war.43 Whilst the impact 
of this inculcation on British culture is a debate in itself, it is one that cannot be assigned 
wholescale to men serving in the Royal Navy.44 There were a number of British sailors in South 
Africa who had seen service previously in other imperial campaigns.45 For example, Bleby noted 
the presence of Fleet Paymaster Kay, who served at Ladysmith and ‘was a veteran, serving in 
his fourth Naval Brigade’.46 Furthermore, the close fraternity of the mess deck meant that it is 
likely that older sailors shared their experiences with the younger hands who would, therefore, 
not be wholly ignorant of all battle experiences.47 
Further countering this hypothesis, the consideration of testimony from sailors preparing to go 
ashore suggests that they were under no illusion as to what they would be facing. Joseph 
Withercombe observed the following as the men of HMS Powerful made preparations for 
disembarking the naval brigade:  
Pale but resolute faces were observed amongst those… of the Powerful for who 
at the thought of battle would or could feel unmoved. Even amongst the 400 
troops which we were carrying (many of whom had seen active service on the 
Indian Frontier there was to be seen the same pale complexion telling the same 
tale that the thoughts of the future were not in the least comforting [sic].48 
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48 RNM 1989/252: Diary of Joseph Withercombe; Emphasis by the author. 
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Whilst “resolute” denotes a sense of duty and determination, this extract demonstrates that 
this was not a picture of whole-hearted war enthusiasm. Rather, this suggests men ready to 
do their duty but acutely aware of the dangers they faced.  
Yet, some sailors were evidently eager to volunteer for active service ashore.49 However, 
whether this reflects imperial beliefs or a desire for adventure deserves consideration. One 
such sailor was Arthur Knight: an older sailor serving aboard HMS Powerful. Knight desperately 
wanted to be part of the naval brigade being formed. He recorded that his application was 
originally denied due to his age, his Captain saying ‘No Knight you will be one of the last told 
off as you are so close to your pension and a married man’.50 However, Knight was not so easily 
deterred and after applying to another officer for assistance in persuading the Captain was told 
‘if I could get ready in half an hour I should land with the Captain and act as ADC’.51  Knight 
then had to scramble to get ready and join the brigade ashore. In an excited tone he wrote: ‘I 
had to find my hammock, get the gear out of my bag, get my khaki suit, put buttons in it, take 
up a pair of boots, fill my bandoliers, make my will out, make out half pay, and write a letter 
to my wife’.52  
This episode reveals several interesting points. Firstly, it demonstrates the clear desire of a 
sailor to be part of the naval brigade. However, the reasons behind this are less clear: was it 
blind patriotism and eagerness to do their duty, or merely because it was their job and they 
knew it was expected of them? The latter argument is supported by Christopher McKee who 
has argued a similar line, and warned not to disregard ‘the perceived cultural demands of 
Edwardian masculinity’.53 Conley discussed this further highlighting the case of Jack Cornwell’s 
death at Jutland during the First World War, and noted the perceived importance of chivalry in 
warfare and the desire to die for the Empire.54 Evidently men were not blind to the dangers, as 
Withercombe’s testimony demonstrates, but it is a factor that should not be underestimated 
and must be considered alongside other factors such as loyalty to the service, to friends, and 
individuals’ perceptions of masculinity. Secondly, it reveals either a paternalistic side to the 
ship’s captain in wanting to protect older seamen or a desire to take only younger, fitter, men 
ashore. Paternalism was the mark of a good officer, and it was set out that they should be 
caring towards the men under their command.55 Both Withercombe and Knight describe in 
detail the officers they served under in the naval brigades, describing the good and the bad 
amongst them.56 Sailors would quickly form their own opinions of officers they served under 
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50 RNM 2012/37/4: Diary of Arthur Sidney Knight 
51 RNM 2012/37/4: Diary of Arthur Sidney Knight 
52 RNM 2012/37/4: Diary of Arthur Sidney Knight 
53 McKee, Sober Men, p. 126; See also Joanne Begiato, ‘Tears and the manly sailor in England, c. 1760–1860’, Journal 
for Maritime Research, 17, 2, 2015; pp. 117-133. 
54 Conley, From Jack, p. 165 
55 See for example Ellen Gill, ‘“Children of the Service”: paternalism, patronage and friendship in the Georgian Navy’, 
Journal for Maritime Research, 15, 2, 2013; pp. 149-165, p. 152; As late as 1944 the Officer Handbook set out guidelines 
for how officers should behave and treat their men. See Brian Lavery, The Royal Navy Officer’s Pocket Handbook, 1944, 
(London: Conway, 2006). 
56 RNM 1989/252: Diary of Joseph Withercombe; RNM 2012/37/4: Diary of Arthur Sidney Knight 
62 
 
and decide which sort they were.57 Nevertheless, both are likely to have been influencing factors 
for the captain as he put together the naval brigade, wanting loyal and healthy younger men 
who did not have dependents at home.  
Now that he had permission, Knight was excited to be going ashore and gave a vivid description 
of their departure: 
the scene on board [was] indescribable and much better imagined than 
described what with the guns, ammunition, provisions, dirty stokers fresh from 
the stokehole, men trying to fit into khaki, soldier fashion, men filling bandoliers, 
others rolling up their chums blanket with all their gear in it. Add to this the 
filthy deck, coal dust and raining hard into the bargain and you have the scene 
on board HMS Powerful… never to be forgotten.58 
Although this reveals the unpleasant and rushed conditions in which they had to get ready, it 
also presents something that could easily have come from an imperialist adventure story by 
Henty.  
Knight continued in this vein and as they left the ship behind noted: ‘we had now started for 
the front and not a man was there among us but who was eager to get at the throats of the 
enemy to avenge Majuba Hill’.59 Majuba Hill was the site of a decisive loss for British troops, 
including a naval brigade, during the First Boer War and this remark suggests Knight and 
possibly others were influenced by this.60 Indeed, Bridgland has argued that the memory of 
Majuba Hill ‘had a very special significance’.61 It is understandable that old memories and 
tensions might have risen to the surface in the weeks leading up to the declaration of war, and 
it was certainly a theme discussed prominently in the press and amongst politicians.62 On the 
other hand, many were keen to deny such suggestions. For example, Lord Stanley MP 
countered this, declaring it was not ‘revenge for Mujaba’.63 Nevertheless, an article in The 
Advocate of Peace similarly suggested that:  
As the naval transports, carrying the army of relief, leave the shores of England 
for the distant field of conflict, “Remember Mujaba!” is the hoarse cry of revenge 
that speeds them on their way.64 
By making reference to it here, Knight is clearly suggestive of his desire to get revenge on the 
Boers for the previous defeat. Although his views cannot be taken as indicative of his fellow 
sailors’ views, it suggests that such thoughts were present. Newspapers were certainly 
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presenting this view as were more vitriolic public speakers at home, therefore there is scope 
for this to have become lower-deck sentiment.65 Whether this was encouraged by the officers 
is also worthy of consideration. For instance, A. E. Marchant, an officer with the Royal Marines, 
made a reference to this in his contribution to T. T. Jean’s account of the war, as too did George 
Crowe who composed a song especially for HMS Terrible’s crossing the line ceremony with the 
verse:  
If your men should land to fight, for England, home and beauty,  
Their Captain, I am sure, expects, that they will do their duty,  
And emulate past naval deeds, and not return until –  
Like Britain’s sons, they’ve fought their guns, and avenged Mujaba Hill.66  
However, it is important to note that other sailors were not openly making reference to this 
desire for revenge.67 Furthermore, it is unclear whether sailors were seeking revenge for the 
Empire or for the lost naval brigade.  
Nevertheless, despite Knight’s initial enthusiasm, his diary records a sharp wake-up call to the 
brutalities of war as he arrived on the battle front ‘to the tune of shot and shell from all 
quarters’.68 In stark contrast to earlier entries, Knight noted: it ‘was a fearful sad sight that 
met our eyes as soon as we got out of the train’.69 Knight’s account stands in contrast to 
descriptions in the press which were trying to make light of the situation and maintain morale. 
Although the reality was not what he expected, Knight commented on what the press were 
calling the ‘General Retirement’.70 Dispelling any sense of the calmness suggested by “General 
Retirement”, Knight wrote: ‘all of our troops were what the papers said retiring but what Jack 
and Tommy puts into a harder and more serious word retreating’.71 As Knight recorded: ‘the 
crowd of retreating soldiers was so dense we had to fairly grope our way through them on the 
way up to the front’.72 
Although Knight’s enthusiasm may have been short lived, there was a degree of envy amongst 
sailors who were not in the brigades, which suggests that Knight was not alone in being eager 
to serve on the frontline. For instance, William Williams was another sailor at the Cape but did 
not get the chance to serve with the naval brigades, and thus provides an interesting 
counterpoint. Williams was initially occupied with the unloading of supplies from the ships in 
the harbour. He recorded:  
looking back to our shipmates on shore we find them busily engaged escorting 
envoys, guarding prisoners… As for ourselves we were engaged in lumbering 
                                            
65 Naval officers also put forward this view. See A. E. Marchant, ‘Chapter I’, in Jeans (ed.), Naval Brigades, pp. 1-10; 
pp. 1-2 
66 Marchant, ‘Chapter I’, p. 2; Crowe, HMS Terrible, p. 41; Bridgland, Field Gun Jack, p. 4; Crowe was the Master-at-
Arms aboard HMS Terrible.  
67 This point is lacking in the diaries of other sailors in the sample considered by this thesis. 
68 RNM 2012/37/4: Diary of Arthur Sidney Knight 
69 RNM 2012/37/4: Diary of Arthur Sidney Knight 
70 Evening News (Portsmouth), 31 October 1899; The Times, 19 December 1899; The Times, 17 January 1900 
71 RNM 2012/37/4: Diary of Arthur Sidney Knight 
72 RNM 2012/37/4: Diary of Arthur Sidney Knight 
64 
 
cargo from ship to shore thus gradually becoming merchant seamen and getting 
the hump of the life which is none too bright.73 
He later undertook other roles such as police work and guarding prisoners but even this did not 
meet with much enthusiasm: ‘I must state that we are more soldiers than sailors only they do 
the fighting and we the work but we much prefer the former’.74 Williams evidently wanted to 
do more than the role allotted to him and he regularly recorded rumours of an impending attack 
by the Boers for which they were mustered yet came to nothing. He wrote: ‘An attack was 
expected but that was all. But I can admit that if they had a come they would have had a very 
warm reception’.75 Bleby has also noted that sailors serving ashore outside of the naval 
brigades felt unhappy about their tasks. He examined the case of a sailor who had spent a day 
helping to construct a road and remarked ‘how about the blooming sappers now?’.76 
Furthermore, Bridgland has argued that sailors serving in the brigades ‘were enjoying a 
welcome diversion from shipboard life’ without the usual spit and polish routine and was thus 
an exciting opportunity.77  
Consideration of the view from officers supports the enthusiasm of Knight and Williams. For 
instance, Marchant noted the disappointment of the men when they were ordered to retire: 
‘[t]his disappointment was awful to us, as we quite thought that all our chances of being in 
action had gone’.78 Although this was the view presented to the public, it appears that few 
bluejackets openly countered it. The diaries suggest that there existed a general degree of 
enthusiasm amongst sailors, firstly to serve ashore in the brigades and secondly even when 
battle was joined there was a desire to do their duty.  
However, this does not mean that all sailors were eager to fight. This is demonstrated by Joseph 
Withercombe, who wrote in detail about the lead-up to the war. In particular, he recorded that 
all thoughts ‘of spending xmas with loved ones were tarnished and many expected the same 
fate as those who never return to tell the tale from the field of glory’.79 This demonstrates that 
some sailors would rather have been at home with their families.80 Nevertheless, his use of 
“field of glory” is suggestive and excogitation of his diary reveals that Withercombe was prone 
to using poetic language. This repetition could mean an underlying belief in the phrases he 
used and suggests that he picked up this language from British imperial culture.81 Nevertheless, 
Withercombe further demonstrates a less-than-enthusiastic-attitude to the war. For instance, 
he recorded a statement from the captain with evident relief: 
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the Boers had refused to fight & President Kruger had accepted British demands 
to the extreme. What a load of anxiety seemed to have been lifted off each 
mind.82  
This was then followed by: ‘The brighter hopes raised were dashed to the ground again’ when 
they reached Cape Town and heard more up-to-date news.83 
Withercombe’s most heart-wrenching memory was of a tragic account of a young marine who 
committed suicide by jumping overboard. He recorded:  
it was a sad termination to his young career; he was the only support of a 
widowed mother; better had he met his death on the battle field a thousand 
times by Boer bullets than to have taken his own life.84  
This episode neatly summarizes the incredible fear and pressure put upon British sailors in the 
course of their imperial duties. As Withercombe continued, the event ‘for a short time tended 
to alleviate our minds from the terrible conflict which we fully expected to follow’.85 
Withercombe evidently frowned on the actual act of suicide, stating that it would have been 
better if he had died “on the battle field”.86 This could stem from the general religious view that 
suicide was a sin but it could also demonstrate the close fraternity that existed on the lower 
deck, where you went where your fellows went, and obeyed orders. As McKee noted: ‘the 
unwritten rule was that sailors were to be strong and uncomplaining’.87  
This death was also mentioned in a letter published in the Evening News (Portsmouth) from a 
sailor to his parents. The sailor initially stated that ‘everybody was terribly excited, as all 
thought we had got to go up to the front’.88 But just before they reached Durban where they 
were to disembark ‘we heard the shout up on deck “Man overboard”’.89 There is no mention of 
suicide and all attention is paid to the futile search of looking for the Marine in heavy seas.90 
That this was an act of suicide may have been omitted from the letter as the sailor did not wish 
to worry his parents. Then again it may have been edited by the editor of the paper to fit the 
imperialistic atmosphere and image of the brave bluejackets the local press were creating.  
Thus, the diaries suggest that not all sailors were eager for action, which lends strength to the 
argument that they were aware of the dangers they faced ashore and were not blinded by 
imperialistic heroics. Yet, the diaries also suggest that there was a strong sense of duty 
amongst sailors who wanted to “do their bit”, suggesting it was a strong part of their image 
and culture. Furthermore, in addition to simply following orders, they were drawn into the 
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excitement of the war by the naval brigades. Nevertheless, few demonstrate the unswerving 
patriotic image presented by Agnes Weston, who gave an account of a Royal Marine who said 
‘I am very anxious to go to the seat of war and fight manfully for my Queen and country’.91 
Therefore, although the image presented to the public was of a unified imperial-minded navy, 
the reality was far more complicated. 
More than a tool: an icon of British imperial power - bluejackets and their guns 
An important aspect of the imperial image of sailors projected during the war was of the 
bluejackets and their guns. The naval guns formed a distinct part of the grand imperialistic 
displays that took place when the brigades returned to Britain.92 Furthermore, analysis of 
contemporary accounts suggests that the guns themselves were of interest to the general 
public. Lengthy descriptions of their improvised transport from the ships to the front form key 
points of both contemporary publications by Jeans and Crowe.93 Although the readership of 
these may well have been more likely drawn from the middle classes, the press also reported 
on the guns and demonstrates public interest.94 Therefore, this chapter suggests that the 
relationship was more than simply one that a man has with the tools of his trade. It suggests 
that the image of the guns was intertwined with sailors’ sense of honour, and established 
masculinity. In other words, the guns were not simply weapons by which sailors helped to 
enforce British imperial power. Rather, naval guns represented the confluence of sailor pride 
and a wider sense of imperial duty: as an icon of power, a tool, and as a humanized comrade. 
Understanding sailors’ relationship with their guns is therefore relatively complex, and further 
demonstrates the difficulty of placing sailors within the socio-cultural imperial sphere.  
The background for this stems from the intense loyalty that existed within sailor culture: firstly, 
to the ship and secondly to the rest of the crew; secondly, it rests on the power of naval 
imagery within British culture.95 Ships were at once a sailor’s home and a source of immense 
pride to belong to, and also icons of British imperial power which drew them from the military 
into the public sphere.96 But it was not simply ships that were icons. Sailors were also icons 
and, as this chapter suggests, naval guns were also capable of being icons. Whilst this could 
be accused of stretching Rüger’s work on cultural imagery, it is nevertheless an interesting 
proposal. Naval guns were a further symbol of power that augmented the sailors’ image, and 
served to further embed their position within British imperial culture; they were a further 
extension of imperial imagery that was seized upon by the popular press, and thus important 
to the consideration of sailors within British imperial culture.  
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Furthermore, sailors had a distinctly personal relationship with their guns. This can be seen in 
the level of personalization of the guns by the bluejackets. In particular, it was common for the 
crews to name their guns, thus humanizing them.97 The significance of this has been realized 
by Charles Kauffman who opined that when men kill ‘they often place responsibility for their 
acts on their weapons by giving the weapon a name which explains and justifies violence and 
distances the actor from the act.98 By being able to, in Kauffman’s words, ‘mediate the act of 
killing’, sailors were transplanting their actions on to their guns.99 This also included the guns 
of the enemy and the besieged at Ladysmith named the Boer’s Long Tom ‘Silent Susan’ as it 
was ‘regarded as quite a gentlemanly monster’ due to the visible puff of smoke that warned of 
an approaching shell.100 Whilst this may indeed have been a significant coping mechanism, this 
chapter also places emphasis on the importance of the names chosen for the guns as an 
expression of imperial sentiment. For example, the naval brigade’s guns at Ladysmith were 
called Lady Anne and Princess Victoria. When Princess Victoria was named, Pearse noted: 
‘Captain Lambton christened his new pet… but the bluejackets called it by another name, to 
indicate their faith in its destructive effect’.101 Pearse does not mention what this name was but 
Steevens wrote that it was commonly called ‘Bloody Mary’.102 Another contemporary, Clement 
H. Stott, further noted that the ‘names were appropriate and suggestive’.103 Whilst officers 
might have been more likely to openly demonstrate overtly imperialistic beliefs, it also 
demonstrates the down-to-earth candour of sailors who chose a more suitable name, 
recognizing the destructive firepower of the gun.  
However, this chapter suggests that the personalization of the guns was not just to “mediate” 
but was also a conscious act of affection and pride in ownership. An example of this is 
demonstrated by Joseph Withercombe who referred to a gun they were forced to abandon 
outside Ladysmith as ‘our lost comrade’.104 The sailors had debated what was to be done: 
‘British pluck says not [to abandon her] whilst she is of service, so we accepted the only 
alternative and disabled her to the enemy’s use’.105 Consideration of an officer’s account reveals 
similar sentiments. Marchant recorded the sadness at the order to abandon the guns: ‘to return 
without their guns was an exceedingly great blow to our men’.106 Marchant also recounted a 
story overheard between a rating and an officer in the Royal Garrison Artillery: ‘seeing as how 
we can’t take ‘em back ourselves, we don’t want ‘em to fall into the hands of nobody else’.107 
Similarly, an account from another officer, C. C. Sheen, also suggests that the chief reason 
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behind the bluejackets’ unwillingness to leave their guns behind was because they were viewed 
with particular pride. Sheen noted that when the men of HMS Powerful left Ladysmith they 
handed over their guns to the Royal Garrison Artillery ‘with many a fond word of farewell from 
their crews, so sad were they at parting with them’.108  
It is not clear from Withercombe, Marchant or Sheen whether sailors believed that the loss of 
their equipment brought dishonour upon them. Withercombe’s diary gives no further indication 
other than the disappointment in having to leave the gun and the determination to disable it 
first.109 However, given the carefully crafted Victorian image of the masculine sailor, the threat 
to their masculinity is a possibility. Therefore, the loss of their guns could have been 
emasculating to some extent, similar to a defeat in battle. In an environment where the press 
was busy re-enforcing the belief that Britannia ruled the waves, and British sailors “were the 
salt of the earth”, this has some currency.110 In addition, as well as defending their masculinity, 
sailors were also defending their position on an individual level amongst their crewmates and 
also the name of their ship in the public eye. As Conley has noted, sailors increasingly ‘saw 
themselves as professional’, and aware of their contribution to the country.111 They were 
therefore quick to counter any criticism that dispelled this image.112  
Nevertheless, it should also be questioned whether there existed a degree of fear of punishment 
for the loss of their guns. This would appear logical in a service where discipline remained 
exceptionally strict and somewhat archaic.113 For example, the loss of a ship was a court martial 
offence, and although the two are not comparable it does highlight the threat of punishment 
that would no doubt have occurred to sailors.114 However, sailor diaries adduce nothing to 
suggest that they feared being charged with dereliction of duty. Yet, it is plausible that there 
would have been concern at having to abandon the guns, and the repercussions this might 
have on sailors, both from their superiors and also on their reputations amongst their 
contemporaries. However, this cannot be seen simply through a prism of their imperial image; 
this chapter has demonstrated that there are complex issues, both individual and collective as 
well as national.  
Brothers in arms: men with a common bond of imperial duty?  
Serving ashore in naval brigades brought sailors into close proximity with soldiers and, given 
the focus on this chapter on sailors as soldiers of empire, it is therefore important to be 
cognizant of the relationship between the two forces as they undertook the same imperial 
mission. Although there has been a long history of sailors and soldiers working alongside each 
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other, the increased literacy by the time of the Boer War allows for a good degree of 
examination from sailors and soldiers’ viewpoints.115 In order to better examine this topic, some 
pertinent remarks from army sources have been considered to gauge relations and see if they 
shared a common bond of imperial duty.  
It is apparent from looking at sailor diaries that during the war relations with soldiers were 
often cordial. This is in contrast to their typical relations where disagreements could break out 
regularly when they were in close proximity for lengthy periods. This was an historic problem 
and, as Eric Gruber noted in his study of the Anglo-Dutch Wars, relations were ‘poor’.116 
However, Williams noted that they became ‘fast friends’ with some of the regiments.117 
Similarly, Withercombe was aboard HMS Powerful, which transported 400 soldiers from India, 
and recorded: ‘hearty cheers were exchanged which assured one of the good feeling and well 
wishes existing between “Our Land and Sea Forces” especially when we have a foe to 
subdue’.118 This suggests a conscious allusion to their joint imperial duty. However, 
Withercombe is one of the few diarists who specifically referred to their shared imperial task. 
Nevertheless, the diaries demonstrate that a healthy respect existed between the two forces. 
For example, Withercombe supports Williams and later said admiringly of the soldiers he 
witnessed in action at Ladysmith: ‘Tommy Atkins can manoeuvre an enemy in the field better 
than the Boer imagined’.119 He also noted: ‘a general retirement [is] the only order a soldier 
attempts to disobey at times’.120 Whilst hyperbolic, this is a clear reference to the perceived 
bravery and masculinity of British soldiers.  
It is also evident that a good deal of sympathy existed towards British soldiers following their 
experiences in battle. For instance, Thomas Mear was present at the Battles of Belmont and 
Graspan, and recorded the ‘terrible slaughter’ he witnessed.121 He continued, ‘the Bearer 
Company goes into the Boer lines to bring out our sick and wounded, some pitiful sights to 
see’.122 Furthermore, Knight demonstrates similar expressive sentiment:  
What is to my thinking the most sad sight one can witness the Indian Dhooley 
Lancers each Dhooley containing what was but a few hours before a strong 
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hearty man in the flush of health strength and spirits but now what? A mangled 
mass of humanity.123 
This is not simply a remark on “heavy losses” or a “terrible scene” but a candid account of what 
Knight witnessed and an indication of how the experience affected him.  
Further evidence for cordial relations and respect between sailors and soldiers is demonstrated 
by the social activities engaged in whilst ashore. One popular leisure pursuit was football with, 
as Williams noted, ‘the game being freely indulged in’.124 However, he added: ‘I must admit 
the soldiers were much better at the game than we were’.125 Although aimed at improving 
morale, interactions such as this were well appreciated by the sailors nonetheless. On another 
occasion, Thomas Mear recorded: ‘Lord Kitchener gives the company 12 bottles of whiskey for 
a sing song and says that he wants to hear some rattling good choruses with his compliments, 
and we have a rare turn out’.126 Although the gift of whisky might have lessened any tensions, 
it is likely that had relations been poor this sort of interaction would have been avoided by 
commanders in an attempt to keep disturbances to a minimum.  
However, elements of rivalry continued and there is evidence to suggest that sailors were proud 
when they could do things that soldiers could not. In particular, the naval brigade serving with 
the relief columns made a name for themselves for their ability to control their oxen teams and 
traverse the rather difficult terrain.127 When their abilities were recognized was certainly a 
matter of pride amongst the sailors. For instance, Williams recorded in his diary:  
assisting in the unloading of these monster vessels which had on board several 
thousand mules some of them had never been broken in but the Bluejackets 
managed them much to the astonishment of the soldiers who at times looked 
on amazed.128 
Nevertheless, the diaries do not suggest any feelings of apparent superiority over their sister 
service. This might be supposed given the predominant position of the Royal Navy in British 
culture but it is evident that for the most part sailors were well aware of the hardships endured 
by soldiers and shared a common bond with them in this respect. However, Bridgland has 
suggested that sailors were desirous of equal footing in battle with the army and that because 
the naval brigade was not shelled at Modder River it ‘apparently caused Jack Tar to take 
offence’.129 
Yet there were occasions when relations between sailors and soldiers became more strained. 
These occurrences were relatively few and far between and for the most part this was typically 
demonstrated when sailors came up against army authorities, whom they viewed as having no 
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authority over them. In particular, there are numerous accounts of sailors running into trouble 
with the Provost Marshals in the relief columns and this will be considered in more detail below. 
One poignant example, however, is given by Knight, who was generally on good terms with 
soldiers whilst at Ladysmith. Knight recorded: ‘I myself had not tasted food for 28 hours and 
the worst of it was the Infantry stole our water while we were mounting the guns, but never 
mind it is past & gone now’.130 Despite saying “never mind” he evidently cared enough to record 
the incident in a lengthy letter to his brother, which he wrote during the course of the siege 
and perhaps served a cathartic purpose.131 However, there are no records of any serious 
disturbances between sailors and soldiers on the frontline either in diaries or other reports.132 
One further point worth noting is the use of khaki uniforms in the naval brigades. This was a 
new development during the Boer War whereas previously naval uniform had been worn by 
those in the brigades and this could have had the effect of creating a homogenous group of 
sailor-soldiers.133 However, the adoption of khaki did not sit well with sailors. On the one hand 
Tony Bridgland has argued it was deeply uncomfortable in comparison to their own uniform 
and thus a source of irritation.134 However, there were deeper reasons for discontent. For 
instance, Williams remarked on taking part in a field day where ‘we were continually being 
asked what regiment we belonged to; this being very annoying’.135 As discussed in Chapter 
One, a sailor’s uniform was an important part of his identity and part of sailor culture; as McKee 
noted, ‘ratings took real pride in wearing the naval uniform’.136 Sailors purchased it themselves 
and altered it to their own style: the psychological importance of this should not be 
underestimated. Bleby noted that sailors readily sewed their own badges on the new uniforms 
which undoubtedly gave some sense of independence, although whether this was simply a 
continuation of their usual care-free attitude to their uniform or a conscious act of visibly 
differentiating themselves is harder to fathom.137 Consequently this remark by Williams is 
telling: it was not simple annoyance at being repeatedly asked to which regiment he belonged, 
but stemmed from the temporary loss of his own identity. Therefore, despite eagerness from 
some quarters to fight ashore, they were not soldiers. Sailors resented that which took away 
their established identity or caused it to be impaired.  
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The imperial stereotype: Jack Tar, cheerful under pressure!  
This thesis has recognized that the image of the sailor as an heroic stalwart of the Empire was 
well-established by the end of the nineteenth century.138 Brave, strong, and doing their duty 
with a smile was the carefully crafted persona presented to the public. This chapter now 
considers the stereotype further by examining in-depth the portrayal of sailors as cheerful, 
despite privations at the front, drawing on their own reflections in comparison to how they were 
represented by the press. Due to the series of embarrassing defeats inflicted upon Britain, it is 
understandable that the press made a concerted effort to portray sailors as cheerful fellows 
who “just got on with the job at hand”. For instance, the Evening News (Portsmouth) reported: 
‘They are splendidly brave in the face of a heavy fire, and seem to bear a charmed life’.139 The 
Evening News (Portsmouth) continued: the Bluejackets are the ‘most popular men in camp… 
they have been a revelation to our men’.140 Indeed, sailors became important for propaganda 
purposes and this was picked up by war correspondents such as Steevens and Pearse. Steevens 
wrote of them: 
under the big canvas of the ward-room, with its table piled with stuff to read. 
Trust the sailor to make himself at home. As we passed through the camp the 
bluejackets rose to a man and lined up trimly on either side. Trust the sailor to 
keep his self-respect, even in five weeks’ beleaguered Ladysmith.141  
However, Bleby casts doubt on the cheerful, homely image put forward by Steevens and 
Pearse, dispelling the propaganda and in particular noting that reading material was actually 
scarce in Ladysmith.142 Nevertheless, Bleby conceded that the naval brigades’ stores were well-
stocked and that they subsequently enjoyed a better level of comfort to many others present 
in Ladysmith for a longer period, and thus morale may have remained higher.143 Likewise 
Bridgland noted that as the siege wore on and rationing and sickness took its toll, the men’s 
patience ‘was becoming a little frayed’.144 Similarly Pearse eulogized the bluejackets, and 
reasserted the stereotype: ‘everybody in besieged Ladysmith appreciates the bluejackets, who 
are always cheery, always ready for duty, and whose good shooting has done so much’.145 
Furthermore, Steevens also played upon the popular image and referred to their stint in 
Ladysmith as ‘their holiday’.146 He recorded sailors commenting ‘“of course, we enjoy it,” they 
say, almost apologising for saving us; “we so seldom get a chance”’.147  
Sailor testimony on the other hand dispels this propaganda and reveals a more realistic image. 
For example,  this “holiday” is countered by the diary of Withercombe who began his story on 
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their leaving Hong Kong and recorded that the crew of HMS Powerful were ‘chiefly men who 
had been over 3 years on the China Station although many could count 4 summers out there’.148 
These were men who had spent several years overseas only to be diverted to a warzone on 
their way home. Withercombe is portraying a crew eager to be home and with their families 
and wrote that ‘All previous orders were countermanded… The general opinion was the 
Government were aware of this fact [that Powerful might be needed in South Africa] before we 
left Hong Kong’.149 Nevertheless, there is no record of any resistance and suggests that even 
though they were unhappy at the orders there were no thoughts of disobeying them. 
Clearly the writings of war-correspondents deserve caution and the case presented by sailors 
is understandably more muted. Nevertheless, sailors were not necessarily negative. Having 
landed ashore from HMS Powerful, Arthur Knight recorded ‘a bit of a fuss’ as he and the others 
in the naval brigade boarded their train to the front; in typical British fashion for 
understatement.150 They were travelling in coal trucks: ‘but the men treat it as a joke and said 
the coal trucks were quite equal to some of the carriages on the L.C.D.R. in England’.151 On the 
other hand, Withercombe’s record of the same journey was less humorous, commenting on the 
coal trucks as ‘the only means of conveyance the railway authorities could provide… without 
even removing their trade marks’.152 Therefore, Withercombe felt annoyance at this transport 
where the trucks had likely been hastily commandeered and were not suited to the purpose. 
However, a further example of their cheery attitude and disregard for the rules is shown by 
repeated clashes with army officials. In particular, sailors’ uncanny knack of bypassing official 
channels of supply. Bleby noted sailors’ abilities in this regard and recognized that there were 
many reported incidents between the Provost Marshall and the men of the naval brigade 
describing it as becoming a ‘vendetta’.153 Sailors saw themselves as separate from the military 
police and beyond the initial remit of the Provost Marshall. Furthermore, this is supported by 
their desire to preserve their own identity as much as possible.  
Bleby further commented on their notoriety, examining the accounts of army officers, one of 
whom wrote: 
The guileless bluejackets (the stokers – good luck to them! – were the most 
successful criminals) seldom returned without one [sheep]. Their invariable 
explanation was that “it had followed them into camp”’.154  
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The tone of this officer’s observation suggests he felt a degree of respect for the bluejackets’ 
actions. Consideration of Mear’s diary reveals that the practice of helping themselves was not 
simply officers reporting stories. Mear recorded he ‘pinched ½ dozen ducks at Kronstant’.155 It 
is also important to be cognizant of the fact that Mear was a stretcher bearer – a group 
comprised primarily of stokers, although he was not one himself.156 Williams also recorded 
being aware of the practice.157 However, Bleby has argued that the ‘quick eyes and light fingers’ 
of the naval brigade was a well-known phenomenon.158 Indeed, because of one naval brigade 
passing through an abandoned Boer Laager the catchphrase ‘I picked that up in the Laager’ 
quickly caught on amongst sailors to determine ‘“acquisitions” of a certain type’.159   
Nevertheless, despite how the bluejackets were displayed to the British public and their own 
recollections, it is evident that they were not immune to the common hardships encountered 
by men serving on the frontline. As the war dragged on and deprivations increased, the 
bluejackets became more frank. Mear did not hesitate to record his continuing complaints.  On 
15th October 1900 he noted: ‘Birthday. Can’t get a wet…’.160 A birthday was an occasion where 
sailors would be allowed an extra rum ration and so not being able to get a drink at all would 
have gone against naval tradition, and thus caused further annoyance.161 Further, on 20th 
December he wrote ‘we are not allowed to buy anything from the farmers as the officers wants 
it all (we are waiting for a move)’.162 The social situation within the navy was long-established 
and this further reinforces the ‘they were officers and we were not’ aspect of life on the lower 
deck.163 Later at Klip Drift, Mear recorded that they had to dig holes in which to shelter from 
the rain as they had no form of cover and spent three days soaking.164 Two months later the 
experience was remarkably similar: 
wet through, no sleep, and no food, we started out on the march, with ½ lb of 
biscuit and ½ pint of coffee to do 14 miles to Brands-Valla, on starvation diet.165 
It is not clear whether Mear is attempting levity with his final quip of “on starvation diet” but it 
is evident that he is feeling disheartened by the whole affair. Despite the lack of supplies they 
were allowed a half ration of rum on the Queen’s Birthday, a treat likely to be welcomed by 
many sailors. With supplies in short supply, it is unlikely that there would have been much 
alcohol available. However, Mear’s testimony suggests that even this did not raise their spirits. 
Mear wrote they received the rum ‘that was owing to us, no excitement in camp’.166 Therefore, 
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he is suggesting that the general attitude amongst the men was one of unhappiness, rather 
than any imperialistic celebrations for the Queen’s birthday and not even the allowance of rum 
improved the situation or heightened imperial sentiment.  
Bleby on the other hand has suggested that despite privations at Ladysmith, there was still an 
air of defiance and that, although unhappy, sailors knew their duty. On 9th November 1899 the 
naval guns opened fire in what was described by commentators as ‘a curiously impressive 
incident’ which ‘astonished many of us in camp’.167 
When twenty-one rounds had been counted everybody knew it was a Royal 
Salute, in celebration of the Prince of Wales’s birthday. Then loud cheers, begun 
as a right by the bluejackets, representing the senior service, ran round.168 
The decision to conduct this gun salute will have come from officers cognizant of the 
propaganda purpose. It was clearly designed to show continued unity and defiance, and the 
reason it was recorded by commentators is self-evident.169 However, it should be noted that 
marking Royal birthdays was a matter of procedure in the Royal Navy and something with 
which the bluejackets would have been familiar.170 Regrettably both Withercombe and Knight’s 
diaries cease a few days before this event took place.171 Paper was at a premium during the 
siege and it may be that they were unable to obtain enough to keep writing or wished to 
conserve what they had.172 In addition, Bridgland suggested that as the war took its toll the 
act of writing cheerful thoughts became ‘more difficult’.173 
A further revealing point about the impact of the hardships sailors faced is demonstrated by 
Mear who records two accounts of being penalized for bad conduct: ‘Gets fined 5s for fighting’ 
and ‘got fined for swearing in the ranks’.174 He does not embellish the details and it is not 
known what caused him to perpetrate these misdemeanours but it comes at a time of heavy 
hardship with lack of food and equipment where he undoubtedly felt at a low ebb and morale 
was low. This does not necessarily relate to disloyalty to the service and the Empire but may 
have related to attempts to vent his frustration. The importance of being able to do this through 
grumbling has been considered elsewhere in this thesis but it is pertinent to mention Knight 
who raises this point in a letter home to his brother.175 Knight stated: ‘Well old man, I have 
had a sailors’ privilege, a good grumble, so will knock off’.176 Similarly Williams wrote: ‘I had 
found out that a Naval lot is not a very happy one’.177 However he later added, ‘But these 
thoughts came to me at a time when I was against the service. I had anything but a pleasant 
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time up to then’.178 This grumbling demonstrates that in addition to many other factors, comfort 
was of vital importance to sailors. As long as they had supplies and the comforts they were 
used to, they were relatively happy to get on with things.179 A further point of interest is 
recorded by Williams and supports this view. He wrote that due to the outbreak of ‘bubonic 
plague’ ashore, the captain opened ‘a wet canteen aboard’ which was understandably popular 
with the crew.180 However, there was almost a disaster when the cutter delivering the beer 
barrels nearly sank. Williams happily recorded: ‘but you may be sure that the beer was not 
lost.’181 
Furthermore, examining their grumbling is revealing of what sailors deemed important. For 
example, Knight bemoans the fact that ‘malt is unobtainable’ and that ‘Whisky last sold for 
eleven pounds a bottle’.182 His underlining adding strength to the comment. In addition, in a 
letter to his brother written over a number of weeks, he hints at the worsening conditions. He 
describes the rationing and the diet of horsemeat to which they were forced to resort. However, 
Knight does at least allow himself the joke ‘they (the horses) are all knackers as all the decent 
ones are running about in our tummies’.183 Humour was an important outlet and similarly 
Withercombe, in discussing transporting the naval guns across country, recorded: ‘hauling the 
guns up the hills or what we would term mountains’.184 Here he is evidently trying to make 
light of their hardships but also make a point at the same time. Yet these accounts are not out 
of character with British sailors and demonstrates how grumbling and humour were combined 
as a means of coping with a difficult way of life, and not necessarily anything more.  
Importantly, due to the wide reporting of the war by the press, negative comments were also 
published, especially as the British suffered further defeats. For example the Evening News 
(Portsmouth) published one such article under the headline ‘Bitter British Grumbling’: ‘There is 
a strong feeling here against the dilatoriness of the Imperial Government, which, knowing what 
was coming, failed to place an adequate force in South Africa’.185 This concurs with Arthur 
Knight who, in a letter home to his brother, wrote of the War Office being ‘rotten to the core’ 
and accusing them of ‘criminal neglect’ for leaving them so long in ‘this degrading position’.186 
Yet there is no sense of mutiny from any of these sailors. Mear even discusses the mutinies of 
some army units but makes no allusion to any sort of action occurring within the naval 
brigades.187 Williams did however record a large increase in the desertion rate and blames the 
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war for this. Nevertheless, it was still common at this time for sailors to desert when the 
opportunity presented itself.188 As Williams noted in his diary, ‘all work and no play makes Jack 
a dull boy’.189 Bridgland has also commented on the boredom endured by sailors during the 
war who were stuck with menial tasks to do day after day.190 
A further means of considering the cheerful-under-pressure stereotype is by looking at how 
sailors dealt with injury and death.  This can be considered from several positions. Firstly, by 
considering the death of Lieutenant Egerton at Ladysmith, which was deemed particularly 
newsworthy as an heroic death in the service of the country and of the Empire. Egerton’s injury 
and eventual death at Ladysmith was well-reported in the Press. Both local and national papers 
reproduced the official bulletin: ‘Lieut. Egerton… dangerously wounded this morning by a shell, 
left knee, right foot. Life not in danger at present’.191 In the days following his death, further 
reports are evident showing the projection of Egerton as the embodiment of British masculinity 
and a martyr for the Empire. The Times reported: 
It is extremely sad to learn that the dangerous wounds received by Lieutenant 
Egerton… necessitated in the amputation of both the gallant officer’s legs. The 
brilliant service rendered by the contingent which owes its proficiency to 
Lieutenant Egerton’s training will accentuate the public sympathy with him in 
his honourable misfortune.192 
This was then followed by:  
Lieutenant Frederick Greville Egerton has died from the effect of his wounds 
sustained in action at Ladysmith on Monday… [his] promotion to the rank of 
commander in her Majesty’s Fleet for special service with the force in South 
Africa, to date from November 3, was officially announced on Saturday.193  
In a further account The Times, reporting on a dinner where John Broderick MP was speaking, 
noted: ‘the whole country grieved for that life prematurely cut short.’194 
However, the incident of Egerton’s death is especially interesting because Arthur Knight was 
present when he was wounded and recorded what happened, allowing a level of comparative 
analysis between both public and private account. For example, Pearse the war correspondent 
claimed to be present as Egerton was removed to the hospital, and wrote: ‘“My cricketing days 
are over now,” he said, with a plucky attempt to make light of his agony’.195 Knight recorded 
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this almost verbatim in his diary, although he suggested the words were addressed to him: ‘Ah 
Knight, I am afraid my cricketing days are over’.196 How much of this account was fabricated 
is not the issue here; what is important is that the event was recorded first in a sailor diary 
and then published by Pearse and in both cases suggests support for the sailor’s plucky image.  
No doubt Knight profited from the story on the mess deck, and he could have sought to 
capitalize on his involvement in the action.197 Yet he gives a detailed account in both his diary 
and letters from besieged Ladysmith, suggesting an in-depth knowledge of the event. Knight 
wrote:  
I heard the first cry for help I had heard in the war and turning round my eyes 
met a fearful sight. Poor Lt Egerton had his left leg blown right off from about 
21 inches above the knee with a great wound 2 or 3 inches above the right knee 
and the sole of his right foot cut nearly off and hanging by the toes.198  
Egerton asked where he was wounded and Knight replied: ‘below the knee not thinking it would 
do him any good to tell him the extent of his injuries’.199 
Sailor diaries also reveal the less newsworthy accounts and anecdotes of sailors’ gallantry which 
lend support to the stereotype. For example, after an encounter with some wounded 
bluejackets, William Williams remarked:  
one could not help feeling proud of how they bore their sickness. One fellow 
who had been shot four times cooly remarked on being asked how he was 
progressing said he felt alright only it was his pipe they had broke was troubling 
him the most.200 
Williams wrote that this was ‘one of many such stories’ he heard and whilst this suggests 
generalization, the frankness of most diarists brought on during the war suggests that Williams 
did genuinely feel “proud”.201  However, this did not detract from the sad necessity of dealing 
with the dead and the wounded, and Williams recalled that loading the wounded on to troop 
ships was a ‘painful duty’.202 Similarly around this time Williams was wrecked off the South 
African coast whilst aboard HMS Sybille and his diary reveals neither heroics nor valour but 
instead a harrowing ordeal. The crew were forced to secure themselves in the rigging and wait 
to be rescued. Williams wrote: ‘The most pitiful sight was our dead shipmate being knocked 
about by the wreckage’.203 Although sailors would make light of accidents and deaths aboard, 
ship wrecking, like battle, was a particularly traumatic experience.  
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Nevertheless, as demonstrated by Mear, despite the public image and evident adoption of it at 
times, sailors were not blinded by their imperial duty. In sharp contrast to his earlier 
enthusiasm, and most likely influenced by his experiences at Ladysmith, Knight wrote to his 
brother: ‘I am looking forward to the end of the war and coming home’.204 He also wrote of the 
things he wanted to do when he returned home and the places he wanted to visit with his 
family.205 Under siege there was limited scope to send the letter, although officers might have 
been able to afford a runner to brave the journey to deliver the missive, this was beyond the 
pocket of sailors.206 Therefore, it may be that the letter’s cathartic quality was more important 
at this time and it perhaps provides a clearer insight into what Knight was actually feeling than 
he was willing to confide in his diary.  
Expressions of imperialism and patriotism in South Africa – the experience of the 
bluejackets 
Whereas this chapter has previously paid particular attention to the stereotypical image of 
sailors and examined their diaries to give an indication of the validity of this, this final section 
will investigate sailors’ expressions of patriotism and also how they responded to expressions 
of imperial sentiment abroad. In particular, it will consider the belief in British superiority and 
how this fitted within sailor culture. In his classic study, Henry Baynham argued that sailors’ 
attitudes in the 1880s and 1890s:  
was one of confident superiority. When they were off some foreign coast – South 
America, Africa or the Southern Sea Isles – they… add as an aside how glad 
they are to be British.207    
An example of this perceived superiority is clearly demonstrated by Arthur Knight, who made 
a revealing comment as he travelled to the front line.208 He displayed his scorn of the Dutch 
Boer enemy, combined with an amusing joke, in a comment regarding the gifts given to the 
naval brigade from the crowds waiting to see them pass. Amongst food and other gifts they 
were given ‘beer & spirits’ and Knight recorded ‘not that the N.B. required Dutch courage, they 
had too much English to find room for Dutch’.209 Joke aside, this is a specific comparison 
between English and Dutch, and shows a belief that English courage is superior.210 This is 
important as Mackenzie has argued that racial beliefs were part of the greater imperialistic 
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culture prevalent in Britain at this time.211 Porter on the other hand has noted that xenophobia 
was common but many just valued their country above others.212 Thus, it could be posited that 
this was fighting talk, and undoubtedly some of this aspect is present, but given the deep-
rooted nationalistic and xenophobic beliefs ingrained in Britain at this time it is likely that Knight 
is portraying some element of underlying beliefs.   
Other slightly more innocuous forms of expressing British superiority (both national and racial) 
are also evident amongst sailors.213 For example, Williams recorded various meetings with 
other nations in port in South Africa. In particular, sport formed a key form of idealized friendly 
competition. Williams noted: ‘Several fine boat races indulged in whilst here between 
Portuguese, French, German and ourselves and I am pleased to say on an average we came 
off victorious’.214 Although friendly in tone, Williams’ pride could be synonymous with latent 
feelings of superiority over other European races. In a further entry he remarked: ‘an exciting 
boat race between our ship and the Portuguese warship. The race from start to finish was in 
our favour we keeping the lead all the way’.215 
However, Williams gives a clearer indication of his feelings in a further comment which, aside 
from highlighting the unpopularity of the Boer War abroad, demonstrates his belief in British 
superiority over the Portuguese: 
The Portuguese struck me as being strange that this nation “Portugal” should 
have demonstrations at Lisbon in favour of war with England and act so 
insolently to our flag in South Africa, when everything connected with them 
seems so insignificant it is quite laughable to see…216 
Williams’ sense of superiority is evident in his final words. However, whether this was based on 
deep-rooted patriotism, pride in the service, or aspects of both, is open to interpretation. This 
thesis argues that all these factors were present within sailor culture, and thus they could exist 
simultaneously whilst having slightly different meanings at different times.217 The complexity 
of these issues is further highlighted by feelings of respect that could exist towards the enemy. 
Sailor testimony reveals a degree of respect for the Dutch Boers. Whenever Williams landed 
ashore with a party to investigate some rumour of attack, he would record that the locals 
‘treated us very kindly’.218 He also gladly recorded: ‘a Dutch family promised us they would 
look after it [the grave of their drowned friend]’.219 Similarly, the Boers also fired Christmas 
puddings into besieged Ladysmith with their compliments, demonstrating that respect went 
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both ways.220 Furthermore, Daniel Owen Spence noted that the Boers’ respected the abilities 
of the naval brigade. One Boer allegedly said: ‘I think there will be much blood spilt before they 
surrender as Mr Englishman and his damned sailors fight hard’.221 Thus despite feelings of 
superiority, there existed a sense of mutual respect.  
Nevertheless, sailors were not oblivious to the imperialistic sentiment they experienced and 
spoke openly of patriotism they encountered, and were thus a part of, as they made their way 
to the front. Withercombe, for example, noted: ‘full speed ahead to Ladysmith cheered by the 
British colonials many thousands of whom were refugees singing patriotic songs such as an 
Englishman loves to revel in’, suggesting he enjoyed himself and the treatment they 
received.222 Similarly Knight described huge crowds lining the railway tracks to see them pass 
on their way towards Ladysmith.223 Thomas Mear also recorded displays of patriotism when he 
was part of a march past for Lord Roberts at Johannesberg: ‘great excitement of the people in 
town never seen such sights before the Union Jacks flying everywhere’.224  
In the early days of the war before the British suffered serious losses there was indeed much 
cause for celebration, in what was expected to be a short war. The Evening News (Portsmouth) 
reported of the popular celebrations at Cape Town following initial victories:  
 There is the wildest enthusiasm here to-night. Crowds are parading the streets, 
cheering and singing. Men seem almost delirious. Occasionally “God save the 
Queen” is sung, and everyone joins in with patriotic fervour, all hats being 
raised.225  
This mood was similarly reflected in the national press and other local newspapers, which 
reported on the ‘Great enthusiasm displayed by the inhabitants’.226 A particularly articulate 
account was recorded by Withercombe: 
The grandest specimen of patriotism witnessed by our men on this eventful 
night and which was a simple effort on the part of its originators as it appeared 
to themselves but it proved mightier than the greatest effort put forth by any 
British subject showing how loyal their hearts were when from of the gentler 
sex held the “Flag that braved a thousand years the battle and the breeze”, 
whilst others held aloft blazing torches was this not the strongest appeal which 
could possibly be made. It seemed to speak individually and very few the hearts 
were who responded not to that call. Could these women know today that their 
gallant actions had contributed to the war more than the world is aware of.227 
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That sailors spoke about events of patriotism with such enthusiasm suggests they felt a degree 
of affinity towards it. They would otherwise have omitted it entirely or recorded it more briefly.  
However, as the war dragged on and hardships took their toll, Mear noted a different attitude: 
‘all the white people in Jacobsdal were afraid of the troops especially the women, all the places 
is full of wounded, both British and Boers’.228 This betrays the age-old problem of soldiers and 
war. The presence of large numbers of war-weary foreign men undoubtedly was of concern to 
towns full of women.229 However, it is understandable to see a reversal in popular expression 
of enthusiasm as the war dragged on and increasingly effected them.230 Suggestions of 
ungentlemanly behaviour would have proved detrimental to morale both abroad and at home, 
and were less likely to be published by the press despite the evident publishing of criticism.231  
This account of Jacobsdal demonstrates that popular expressions of patriotism invariably go 
hand in hand with victory rather than defeat; when one is winning and faces less hardships, 
one is more likely to be patriotic and celebratory.232 This is evident in both the brief 
consideration of the general public and also the more in-depth consideration of sailors. It does 
not necessarily follow that either the public or the sailors lose their patriotic sentiment, but 
they will often have less reason to celebrate it and more reason to fear what is happening 
around them. When this danger has passed, feelings of patriotism and imperial sentiment may 
once more be displayed, in hand with other issues such as relief at survival and general 
emotions of victory.  
Thus, having spent 117 days besieged at Ladysmith enduring severe deprivations, Knight did 
not record many details of the lifting of the siege. In noticeably weak handwriting he wrote: 
‘first part of relief column arrived in Ladysmith town gone mad, too ill to write more’.233 His 
words “town gone mad” have to remain open to interpretation but the similarly besieged war 
correspondents noted that ‘Ladysmith gave itself away with wild enthusiasm at the sight of 
troops so long expected’.234 However, Denis Judd noted that ‘the citizens did not greet the 
relieving forces… with wild enthusiasm’.235 Instead he argued it was ‘a dutiful welcome’ due to 
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the poor condition the inhabitants were in by this time.236 Although Judd specifically referred 
to the citizens, this stands in stark contrast to Knight and Pearse. Rather, Judd suggested that 
the welcome was made because it was expected. However, he does raise the valid point that 
the inhabitants were too far gone to be in a celebratory mood, and Knight’s testimony supports 
this. Therefore, despite General White’s patriotic declaration, ‘I thank God we have kept the 
flag flying’, the extent of patriotic celebration is questionable, and the celebration that did take 
place cannot be viewed solely in terms of imperial sentiment.237 
However, the surrender of the Boer army several months later was met with joyous celebration 
and many sailors recorded the event with enthusiasm. In particular, Williams wrote:  
On Sunday May 21st at midnight we received the welcome news of Peace amidst 
loud cheers. The next day the Captain held Church service and made a fine 
patriotic speech. The ship was gaily dressed at noon and loud hearty cheers was 
given in honour of the news for no one was more pleased to hear of it than the 
Barracouta’s ship’s company.238 
The line “no one was more pleased” than his ship’s company is understandable hyperbole; it is 
typical language of celebration. What is more interesting is Williams’ reference to the captain’s 
“fine patriotic speech”. This suggests that Williams was receptive to it and enjoyed its patriotic 
message.  
Nevertheless, it is clear that events such as the one described by Williams cannot simply be 
viewed as celebration of national victory. These celebrations did have patriotic overtones, which 
some could ignore and others could celebrate. But they also represented an end to the conflict 
and everything this meant to those sailors who had fought. Their duty was done and, more 
importantly, they had survived. The diaries considered here do not comment specifically on 
this but the end of the war meant the ability to go home and see their families, as has been 
noted by Knight and Withercombe.239  
Conclusion 
This chapter has drawn upon recent developments in the socio-cultural historiography of the 
Boer War, in addition to the limited studies on the role of the naval brigades, in order to consider 
the experience of British sailors during the conflict. Although encompassing all naval sailors 
serving in South Africa during the war, in particular it has examined the bluejackets who 
volunteered for the naval brigades and fought ashore alongside the army. The late nineteenth 
century was a period of heightened imperial imagery and, spurred on by the press who built 
upon their success during the conflict, the public image of British sailors became increasingly 
imperialistic. Described as “handy men” and “servants of empire”, this view was central to 
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Victorian and Edwardian imperial imagery and notions of masculinity. This chapter has 
considered this in depth and argued that this was an important part of sailor culture and an 
image that they embraced.  
However, considering sailors at war allows analysis of their imperialistic public image versus 
the reality of their experience and it has broken new ground in its investigation of sailors 
themselves: examining how they viewed their actions, dealt with the hardships they faced, and 
also their own expressions of imperial sentiment. In examining these themes against the 
backdrop of their public image, it has demonstrated that during the Boer War, sailors exhibited 
a range of imperialistic beliefs and sentiments. Furthermore, there existed a sense of 
superiority and pride based upon Britain’s position on the world stage. Yet, more importantly, 
it has also shown that the situation was far more complex than this. Although many sailors 
were eager to fight ashore in the brigades this was not simply a display of blind imperial duty, 
and stands contrary to the Victorian and Edwardian sense of noble sacrifice. Many of those who 
volunteered were cognizant of the dangers they would face ashore but were nevertheless 
prepared to do what was expected of them, whilst others recognized it as an opportunity to 
explore the country, have an adventure and also as a break from the monotony of day-to-day 
life aboard ship. Generalizing their feelings as simply imperialistic risks concealing the nuanced 
character of British sailors. Consequently, this chapter has highlighted the importance of pride 
and patriotism alongside imperialism. In particular, the difficulty in determining between loyalty 
to nation, ship and crewmates, and has posited that all were present factors, and a part of 
sailor culture. Within this culture, these sentiments could be appropriated as circumstance 
dictated but imperial sentiment and personal desires could remain independent of one another. 
What this has shown is that duty remained a mainstay of this culture, capable of holding other 
elements together. 
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Chapter Four 
Killing, Dying and Duty: British sailors in the First 
World War 
 
At this grave moment in our national history I send to you, and through you to 
the officers and men of the Fleets of which you have assumed command, the 
assurance of my confidence that under your direction they will revive and 
renew the old glories of the Royal Navy, and prove once again the sure shield 
of Britain and of her Empire in the hour of trial.1 
 
The Royal Navy entered the First World War as the pre-eminent military force of the British 
Empire and, due to its dominant position in British culture, the public was geared towards the 
idea an early clash with the German fleet and a resounding British victory.2 The reality was far 
different, with the primary sphere of conflict being instead the land war in Europe resulting in 
the stalemate of trench warfare and terrible loss of life. The imagery of these horrors has left 
an indelible mark upon British popular memory. As such, public interest in this topic continues 
to grow and the recent centenary of the Great War has provided an outlet for additional studies. 
Feeding and facilitating this public interest are numerous local initiatives, such as digitization 
projects of soldiers’ letters and diaries.3 However, whilst commendable, the majority of studies 
remain soldier-centric rather than sailor-centric. Furthermore, many socio-cultural studies of 
the war such as those undertaken by Adrian Gregory, Gerard DeGroot and David Silbey hardly 
mention the Royal Navy, focusing primarily on the army and British culture during the conflict.4 
The reason for this interest, understandably, lies in the catastrophic scale of deaths suffered 
by what was an army of volunteers from amongst the British public, and what this reveals 
about British culture. Yet this overlooks the role of the Royal Navy in the defeat of Germany 
and its allies, and has much to offer socio-cultural studies given its cultural significance prior 
to the conflict.   
This chapter redresses this and considers the experience of sailors during the Great War.5 In 
particular, it examines sailors at the outbreak of war and their response to this, everyday life 
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at sea, killing and dealing with death, and their interaction with soldiers. Again, as discussed 
in Chapter Three, sailors were in a unique position because they were not volunteers and thus 
have avoided serious consideration by socio-cultural historians.6 However, sailors had a key 
relationship with British imperialism, with it forming a distinct element of their culture, and by 
considering these themes, this chapter situates sailors within the wider imperial and First World 
War studies. Furthermore, although the largest military force in Britain when war was declared, 
the Admiralty also mobilized the men of the Royal Fleet Reserve and naval pensioners, and as 
manpower was needed on an unprecedented scale, the war opened up the Royal Navy as never 
before to volunteers without a naval background.7 Apart from stokers, those who served in the 
navy were, as a general rule, men who had entered the navy at a young age and therefore this 
gives an opportunity to consider how sailors responded to this additional challenge to their own 
perceived identity.  
British sailors on the outbreak of war 
Writing in the 1970s, Henry Baynham argued: ‘As far as the causes of the war were concerned 
few sailors had anything significant to say. There was certainly no particular hostility against 
the Germans’.8 Consideration of diaries from the lower deck lends some credence to this 
statement. Politics rarely found its way on to the pages of sailors’ diaries and McKee has noted 
that the subject was often banned on the lower deck, which may account for their reticence on 
the subject.9 In contrast, officers’ diaries demonstrate a greater engagement with the political 
situation. For instance, Midshipman James Colville documented well the arms race with 
Germany prior to the Great War and his views upon this perceived threat.10 Yet, as Rüger has 
argued, the growing threat of Germany, particularly its naval power, was a cause for anxiety 
amongst the British public.11 In addition, the popularization of invasion stories during the early 
twentieth century publicized German militarism, making them “the enemy”, and the arms race 
between the two countries became a source of British national pride.12 “We want eight and we 
won’t wait” was the popular cry regarding naval shipbuilding.13 Therefore, whether the lower 
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2013); p. 23; The Times, 3 August 1914; Contrary to popular thought, the Royal Navy had always been against unskilled 
men serving aboard its ships. Even during the Eighteenth Century when the pressgang was used regularly, the men who 
had been targeted were already skilled sailors. See also Denver Brunsman, The Evil Necessity: British naval impressment 
in the eighteenth-century Atlantic world, (London: University of Virginia Press, 2013). 
8 Henry Baynham, Men from the Dreadnoughts, (London: Hutchinson, 1976), p. 213; Studying the politicization of sailors 
in detail is beyond the scope of this study, suffice it to demonstrate the position of sailors on the eve of war. For further 
information see Anthony Carew, The Lower Deck of the Royal Navy 1900-39: Invergordon in perspective, (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1981). In fact, there existed a degree of friendliness between British and German sailors. 
This is discussed further in Chapters Five and Six.  
9 Christopher McKee, Sober Men and True: Sailor Lives in the Royal Navy, 1900-1945, (London: Harvard University 
Press, 2002); p. 98; One exception being Stoker Robert Percival. For further information, see RNM 1988/294: Memoirs 
of Robert Percival. 
10 See for example RNM 1997/43/1: Diary of James Colville. 
11 Rüger, Great Naval, p. 1 
12 For an example of the invasion story genre see George Chesney, The Battle of Dorking, (London: Grant Richards, 
1914). 
13 T. G. Otte, ‘Grey Ambassador: The Dreadnought and British Foreign Policy’ in Robert J. Blyth, Andrew Lambert and 
Jan Rüger (ed.), The Dreadnought and the Edwardian Age, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011); pp. 51-78, p. 63 
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deck was so far divorced from popular opinion given the cultural positioning of the navy at this 
time is debatable, and this thesis will argue that this created a heightened sense of pressure 
on sailors to conform to their public image once war had been declared. An article in The Times 
on 6th August 1914 made this image clear: 
The process of military mobilization, of which there were glimpses at many 
important centres, did not divert the minds of Englishmen from the fleets which 
have sailed out of view. The anxiety for news was natural, but the public must 
be prepared for a possibly long period of silence regarding the more vital naval 
aspects of the war.14 
This excerpt suggests that the British public’s thoughts were with the navy. In particular, The 
Times warned that ‘the public must not be too ready to credit wild rumours’ and that reported 
rumours of action in the North Sea were as yet unfounded.15 This warning implies that it was 
believed such rumours could quickly take root and spread because the British public believed, 
in the early months, that the navy would be the prominent military force.16 
Therefore, sailors’ views when war was declared are rather more complex than Baynham 
postulated. As Anthony Carew has demonstrated, sailors were not apolitical and politicization 
of the lower deck had actually increased in the run-up to the First World War. However, this 
was chiefly in terms of better conditions and wages rather than European politics and the 
exclusion of this from their diaries may have been for their own protection in case the diaries 
were read by prying eyes.17 More importantly, this suggests that a number of factors were at 
work, in particular that on an everyday basis, unless prompted by events, sailors had more 
important things on their mind than rivalry with the Germans. 
However, whilst sailors may not have been overtly anti-German, this did not exclude them from 
the bellicose atmosphere in Britain after war was declared.18 Instead, this chapter argues that 
sailors exhibited patriotic and imperial sentiment in line with a proportion of the British public. 
This advances the debate and moves beyond the studies of historians such as McKee and 
Lavery who, although referring to the outbreak of the war, have not investigated in detail 
sailors’ attitudes in connection with wider historical debates. Although Lavery has discussed 
enthusiasm in a general manner, for instance younger age requirements influencing boys to 
volunteer for the navy over the army, this attention is brief.19 Similarly, although Carew has 
recognized the significance of war enthusiasm and noted that ‘the lower deck, like most other 
sections of the community, were caught up in the wave of enthusiasm that swept the country’, 
                                            
14 The Times, 6 August 1914 
15 The Times, 6 August 1914; The Times, 7 August 1914 
16 Daly, Portsmouth’s, p. 29 
17 Carew, Lower Deck, p. 72 
18 See for example Gregory, The Last.  
19 Lavery, Able, p. 199; Lavery refers to Stan Smith who joined as a boy but makes it clear that he had preferred the 
army and only joined the navy because of the lower age restriction. Whilst this shows enthusiasm to be involved in the 
war, it does not suggest deep-seated desire to serve it the navy. However, in the early days of the war, the navy 
promised quick action and to those fearful it would all be over before they had a chance this must have been a powerful 
incentive. See Stan Smith, Sea of Memories, (Tunbridge Wells, 1985); pp. 9-13 quoted in Lavery, Able, p. 199  
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he did not expand upon this point.20 Examination of lower-deck diaries suggests that there was 
a level of complexity to sailors’ war enthusiasm. In particular, whether enthusiasm meant 
support for the Empire and stemmed from imperial sentiment, feelings of moral duty, 
adventurism, or elements of all. 
Consideration of press reports demonstrates that newspapers were naturally keen to build upon 
the public image of the sailor and portray an image of enthusiasm amongst British seamen. 
For instance, an article in the Daily Mail described demonstrations at Piccadilly Circus and 
showed sailors participating in imperialistic displays of war enthusiasm: 
A bluejacket began to climb up the pedestal of the statue. Amid thundering 
cheers, the police looked on admiringly, the sailor scaled right up to the figure 
of the winged cupid… The sailor placed his Union Jack in cupid’s hand, and 
immediately other flags were passed up to him.21 
Unsurprisingly, a large number of the newspaper reports focusing specifically on sailors paid 
greater attention to Reservists rather than regular ratings. On the one hand, Reservists would 
have been far more visible to the public than regulars, the majority of whom were already at 
sea or at their naval bases.22 In addition, however, Reservists also had a greater link to the 
civilian world and thus, like volunteer soldiers, would have been a group to which the majority 
of the public could relate. For instance, the Daily Mail ran personal stories and in one case 
reported on a Reservist who was called up on his wedding day.23 The Hampshire Telegraph 
meanwhile recorded the scene at London Euston where the Reservists were arriving to take 
the train to Portsmouth: ‘at the great London railway terminus there were almost 
unprecedented scenes of patriotism’.24  
Reports such as these were designed to encourage enthusiasm and shape the popular mood, 
and sailor diaries lend support to this enthusiasm. For example, Walter Dennis recorded the 
feelings of the crew aboard HMS Vengeance when their Captain read the King’s announcement 
on the declaration of war: ‘the reading of this message was received by everyone with 
enthusiastic cheers’.25 Other diaries show similar enthusiasm. For instance, a sailor named 
Wood noted as his ship put to sea after war was declared that they were ‘cheered by Dido and 
Ganges II’.26 This suggests that war enthusiasm was present amongst sailors, particularly the 
younger recruits who were aboard Ganges II.27 Similar patriotic sentiment was displayed by 
another sailor, Thomas Hinshaw, who wrote: ‘War declared against Germany. God Save the 
                                            
20 Carew, Lower Deck, p. 72 
21 Daily Mail, 6 August 1914 
22 The Fleet had been on alert to mobilize since the Review in June 1914. 
23 Daily Mail, 4 August 1914 
24 Hampshire Telegraph, 7 August 1914 
25 Diary of Walter Dennis; Diary digitized by McMaster University, Ontario Canada and available at 
http://pw20c.mcmaster.ca 
26 RNM 1984/467: Diary of Wood; Able Seaman Clinker Knocker also referred to the cheers from the boys aboard Ganges 
II. See Clinker Knocker, Aye, Aye, Sir, (London: Rich & Cowan, 1938), p. 139. 
27 HMS Ganges II was a training ship and HMS Dido was at this time a depot ship. 
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King’.28 However, as this thesis argues, sailors were also independent thinkers and Dennis 
demonstrated how different feelings could come together with his next observation: ‘CPO Smith 
speaking on behalf of the Lower Deck, expressed our confidence in our captain, which, 
personally I think was quite unnecessary’.29 This suggests that Dennis considered such 
sentiment uncalled for and that it pandered to the officers.  
However, Lavery rightly noted that not all sailors were caught up in war fever. One sailor, 
named Clinker Knocker, recorded seeing a ‘tearful sailor who was due to be discharged the 
next day [day after war was declared] and knew it would be postponed’.30 Similarly, William 
Jenkins declared he was recalled after what he described as ‘twelve months of bliss’ since he 
had left the navy.31 In addition, other sailors greeted the announcement with their usual 
reticence. For example, although otherwise enthusiastic, upon hearing of the declaration of war 
Wood simply noted ‘war declared midnight’.32 Newspapers also provide some further insight 
into sailors’ attitudes on the outbreak of war, and the Daily Mail reported of a group of 
Reservists: ‘all the men seemed anxious to know at once where they had to go, but one 
declared, “I don’t care where I have to go as I am on pay”’.33 This does not present an image 
of brave patriotic men ready for adventure and to protect the Empire but rather a more realistic 
view of the range of different reasons motivating individuals. 
Nevertheless, existing studies examining the British public and the Great War suggest that 
patriotism was an important element of war enthusiasm. Specifically, George Robb and Andrew 
August have both argued that the British working class were patriotic and generally exhibited 
war enthusiasm. Similarly, David Silbey has supported this and argued it is important to 
understand that the working class were capable of their own decisions. Meanwhile Brad Beaven 
has recently added to this, arguing the ‘importance of localism’ as well as national patriotism.34 
Thus sailors were not excluded from patriotism towards the Empire. For instance, at the start 
of his war diary, William Brooman composed a patriotic poem about sailors and the duty they 
undertake, which combined their public and personal image: 
 These brave protectors of the State 
Our Empire guard from jealous hate,  
We rest at night, in peaceful sleep 
While they patrol & watch the deep… 
                                            
28 RNM 2014/31: Diary of Thomas Hinshaw; Emphasis by the author.  
29 See also Chapter Two which has considered sailors and their own independency on ceremonial occasions; Diary of 
Walter Dennis 
30 Knocker, Aye, Aye quoted in Lavery, Able, p. 188; There is a level of uncertainty over the veracity of Knocker as a 
source. See Chapter One where this is discussed in more detail.  
31 IMW: W A Jenkins 03/14/1 quoted in Lavery, Able, p. 185 
32 RNM 1984/467: Diary of Wood 
33 Daily Mail, 3 August 1914 
34 Brad Beaven, Visions of empire: Patriotism, popular culture and the city, 1870-1939, (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2012); pp. 92-95 
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We never heard, we never shall 
Jack forgot his duty, or a pal 
And should our country stand in need,  
We are sure that Jack will always lead.35 
Meanwhile others, such as Edwin Fletcher, record Empire Day being celebrated aboard during 
the war.36 The testimony considered above suggests that sailors were imperialistic, but that it 
was multi-faceted and competed with other elements of sailor culture. 
Relations between active service and hostilities only ratings, and soldiers 
The introduction of volunteers, known as “Hostilities Only” ratings (HOs) and Reservists to the 
navy was not without problems.37 Overall, approximately 74,000 men and boys joined the 
Royal Navy as HOs during the course of the war, which was a fairly substantial number in terms 
of naval recruitment.38 However, this was a service where many joined at a young age and 
lived a good portion of their lives by long-standing naval customs. Consequently, relations were 
not necessarily easy between HOs and active-service ratings. In addition, James Daly has 
suggested that those from Reservist backgrounds were not always viewed as ‘proper sailors’.39 
This point is particularly important as pride in the service and its efficiency was a fundamental 
part of the sailor character and a key aspect of sailor culture, which at times could be equally 
as important as feelings towards the Empire. This was evidently an issue, and newspapers 
sought to allay public fears by portraying them as the embodiment of Jack Tar. For instance, 
one reporter noted that HOs were ‘wiry, hard-looking sailors… their Jack Tar garments quite at 
home on their forms’.40 However, this did not hold much ground with sailors who instead 
thought they failed to match their own professional standards.41  
Similarly, Lavery suggested that they did not mix well with other ratings and he argued there 
existed a distinct separation between them stating: ‘HO men… tended to be seated at the 
opposite end of the mess table from the regulars’.42 Furthermore, these men were sometimes 
                                            
35 RNM 2013/100/1: Diary of William Brooman; For the complete poem see Appendix 1.6. 
36 RNM1980/115: Diary of Edwin Fletcher 
37 Although this practice was more common in the Second World War, it was an important part of the wartime Royal 
Navy and is worthy of consideration here, especially their interaction with active-service ratings. Although Lavery has 
examined HOs during the Second World War there is yet to be a detailed study of volunteers for the Royal Navy during 
the First World War. See Brian Lavery, Hostilities Only: Training the Wartime Royal Navy, (London: National Maritime 
Museum, 2004). The Times commented on support from the Empire and that a group of Australian yachtsmen were 
turned down due to the Royal Navy having sufficient numbers; The Times, 9 October, 1914. However, William Gates 
who wrote for the Evening News (Portsmouth) and also compiled the official history of the town during the Great War 
had been critical in 1914 for the lack of men willing to enlist in the army. Beaven has commented on this in comparison 
to Gates’ later work but it is unclear whether Portsmouth men (Portsmouth being an area of typical recruitment) would 
have been more enthusiastic about joining the RN. See Beaven, Visions, p. 115. 
38 Lavery, Able, p. 204 
39 Daly, Portsmouth’s, p. 75 
40 Daily Mail, 3 August 1914 
41 That HOs did not adhere to the strict rules and traditions of the navy caused a number of issues but one sailor, Edward 
Pullen, also suggests that it allowed disreputable people into the service and noted that cases of theft increased with 
the introduction of HOs. IWM 692: Edward Pullen 
42 Lavery, Able, p. 206 
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known by the derogatory term ‘Cuthberts’, which gives some indication of how they were 
regarded by the regulars.43 Both Lavery and Carew note the use of this term, with some sailors 
believing that HOs were shirkers of more unpleasant duties.44 Carew gives a particular insight 
into the impact of HOs on sailor life, citing a key reason for discord as being the ‘structure of 
pay and pensions’.45 It transpired that some HOs were paid higher wages than regulars and 
some ‘were fortunate enough to be receiving full or half-pay from their civilian employer as 
well’.46 Pay and service conditions had long been at the heart of lower-deck grievances and the 
fact that HOs were possibly earning more must have rankled.47 Therefore, it is likely that a 
combination of factors including perceived better pay, not being career sailors, and lacking the 
ingrained loyalty to the service, ship and crew had an impact.  
On the other hand, diaries make few direct references to any disharmony between active-
service ratings and HOs. There are a number of possible reasons for this: firstly, as with politics, 
this was something that was not committed to paper (and possibly sensible in order to maintain 
secrecy aboard); secondly it may demonstrate how unimportant HOs were to regular ratings, 
that they did not consider them a worthy topic in their diaries; and thirdly that the diaries held 
in collections are from ships without large HO compliments. The latter is unlikely as following 
the declaration of war many ships’ crews were compiled of a mixture of Royal Naval Reserve 
(RNR), Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (RNVR) and Royal Fleet Reserve (RFR) men and boys 
under training, and many vessels came into contact with HOs.48 One sailor who did comment 
was Walter Dennis, and he noted an increase in gun practice as the ‘Royal Fleet Reserve men… 
of course require a certain amount of drill, firing etc. to bring them up to the efficient state 
they were in before joining the Fleet Reserve’.49 This does not suggest any particular hostility 
to RFR men, rather he is accepting of their need to retrain. However, the following year he 
made this comment upon encountering HMS Tiger and HMS Indomitable:  
Communications with these ships are to be made slow on account of their 
untrained signalmen… These are the two ships first seen last Saturday [and] 
have been the cause of much discussion on the Lower Deck.50 
Note here that Dennis is talking of “untrained” signalmen rather than Reservists who might 
simply have become a little rusty since they left active service. Exactly what the content of this 
“discussion” was did not get recorded by Dennis. However, Lavery noted that Tiger was a 
                                            
43 ‘A name coined by “Poy”, the cartoonist of the Evening News (Portsmouth), during World War I for the fit men of 
military age, especially in Government offices, who were not called for military service, or who positively avoided it. 
These civilians were depicted as frightened-looking rabbits’. Brewer’s Dictionary of Phrase & Fable, Fourteenth Edition, 
(London: Cassell, 1991 [first edition 1870]), p. 299 
44 Lavery, Able, p. 206; Carew, Lower Deck, p. 76 
45 Carew, Lower Deck, p. 72 
46 Carew, Lower Deck, p. 73 
47 For example see Letters to the Editor of The Times discussing pay; The Times, 28 December 1918; The Times, 31 
December 1918. 
48 Lavery, Able, p. 188 
49 Diary of Walter Dennis 
50 Diary of Walter Dennis 
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hurriedly manned ship which also included a number of recovered deserters.51 The situation 
was evidently a problem and Admiral Beatty complained that for a ship with at least a quarter 
of men untrained, ‘the same efficiency could not be expected from the Tiger as from the other 
ships’.52 Consequently, it is possible that other ships in the fleet were aware of this, hence the 
subtle remark by Dennis.  
However, interactions between regulars and HOs was considered by Baynham and he noted a 
number of interesting accounts of the discord between regulars and HOs. In particular, he 
discussed the Royal Marine and Naval Brigade contingents serving on the Western Front.53 
Baynham suggested that by ‘the later stages these groups were hardly distinguishable from 
the Army’ and as such naval customs ‘went for very little’.54 This may have further contributed 
to poor relations as naval culture was eroded. The Times reported in 1916 that ‘there is a world 
of difference between the trim order… kept within the narrow limits of a ship and the 
improvisation of affairs in the trenches’.55 One of Baynham’s informants, a Royal Marine, 
recalled, ‘the lax discipline’ and recounted a story of a stand-off between a lance corporal and 
a colour sergeant, the latter of whom jumped the queue in the mess believing it to be his 
prerogative.56 The colour sergeant ‘was told in no uncertain language to get back in the blankity 
queue or else he would get none’.57  
On the other hand, one HO Able Seaman, Trystram Edwards, suggested that despite the influx 
of volunteers, this was not the case aboard ship. Edwards believed that the navy was unlike 
the army in this respect where volunteers ‘cleaved to its traditions’.58 As a published memoir 
written by a public-school educated volunteer this should be treated with caution, however it 
is likely that aboard ship, where there were officers and men brought up in naval tradition, it 
was harder for HOs to dispense with established practices.59 Complaints from sailors aboard 
larger warships, for example, hint at rigid rules remaining in place.60 In addition, McKee 
recognized that feelings could go both ways and noted the views of one HO on joining a ship.61 
This HO summarized the situation thus: ‘a poor crowd of active-service ratings who, I’m afraid, 
turned me against naval life and I [was]… morally and physically disgusted with the majority 
of them’.62  
                                            
51 Lavery, Able, p. 198; See also Jim Crossley who discusses the poor training and shooting of Tiger and other ships at 
Dogger Bank. Jim Crossley, Voices From Jutland: A Centenary Commemoration, (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2016); pp. 
54-55  
52 Navy Records Society, The Beatty Papers, Vol 128; pp. 260-261 quoted in Lavery, Able, p. 198 
53 Interaction with soldiers will be considered separately below.  
54 Baynham, Men, p. 223 
55 The Times, 6 January 1916; Note this is discussing sailors visiting soldiers rather than naval divisions but demonstrates 
the differences between life at the front and at sea succinctly.  
56 Baynham, Men, p. 223 
57 Baynham, Men, p. 223 
58 A. Trystram Edwards, Three Rows of Tape, (London: William Heinemann, 1929), p. 4; See also Lavery, Able, pp. 206-
207. 
59 Although Edwards suggests that even though the balance of HOs to regulars had shifted by the end of the war, this 
did not happen. Lavery, Able, p. 207 
60 RNM 1980/115: Diary of Edwin Fletcher; Baynham, Men, p. 217 
61 McKee, Sober Men, p. 2 
62 McKee, Sober Men, p. 2 
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These personnel challenges caused by the war also extended to relations between the different 
services as well. For example, one sailor noted that a sergeant in the marines had to resort to 
enforcing his will at rifle point after first being laughed at by some soldiers and then accused 
of ‘skulking behind the armour of ships’.63 This assertion was detrimental to the sailor’s 
masculine character and a key part of their image. Inter-service relations will be considered in 
more detail below but even newspapers such as The Times were reporting that ‘Tommy has 
the harder time of it’, and therefore it is understandable that sailors might have had a difficult 
relationship with them.64 Yet, by necessity the Great War caused a good deal of interaction 
between sailors and soldiers, as the navy often served as transport and support ships for the 
army.65 In addition, sailors and soldiers shared a common bond, united against the enemy. 
Both had to endure the terrible strain of combat and it appears that, despite the jokes of 
wartime cartoons, sailors had a great deal of respect for their counterparts.66 The Times quoted 
sailors as saying soldiers were ‘splendid fellows’ and that their skills were ‘the admiration of 
the sailor’.67 Furthermore, when they encountered each other cheers were usually exchanged 
by both sides. For instance, Fletcher noted cheering a troopship in the Irish Sea.68  
However, this did not remove the competitiveness and long-established inter-service rivalry 
existing between the two forces.69 As Walter Dennis reveals, his shipmates were pleased with 
their 1-0 victory over the Westminster Battalion.70 Nevertheless, sailors had some level of 
understanding for what soldiers were going through. This is demonstrated by acts of kindness 
when in close proximity to one another, suggesting that sailors were cognizant of the hardships 
faced by soldiers. For example, Jack Gearing noted of transporting soldiers for the Gallipoli 
landings:  
We gave them our hammocks, made sure they ate well and gave them our 
rum. You see, we knew that where they were going would be like Hell on earth, 
so we gave them all the love we could, because they were going to need it.71 
Dennis recorded a similar show of respect to soldiers whilst HMS Vengeance was ferrying men 
to France in the August 1914: ‘I willingly gave up my hammock to him for the night as did 
nearly all our fellows to the Expeditionary Force’.72 On a more mundane level, Wood noted 
dryly: ‘it’s pouring with rain now; I pity the poor fellows on shore now’.73 Similarly, Max Arthur 
has argued that some soldiers reciprocated the understanding and respect, for example he 
noted that they recognized the bravery of teenage midshipmen who manned the boats carrying 
                                            
63 Baynham, Men, p. 224; This has previously been discussed in Chapter Three but sailors were conscious of their image 
and the desire to prove themselves will be considered further below.  
64 The Times, 6 January 1916 
65 The diary of Walter Dennis gives a good description of being a troopship in the early months of the war. 
66 See for example ‘The Blockader’, Sea Pie, June 1917; Figure 3. 
67 The Times, 6 January 1916 
68 RNM 1980/115: Diary of Edwin Fletcher 
69 Again see Chapter Three where this issue is discussed in more detail.  
70 Diary of Walter Dennis 
71 Able Seaman Jack Gearing quoted in Arthur, True Glory, p.17 
72 Diary of Walter Dennis 
73 RNM 1984/467: Diary of Wood 
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them ashore at Gallipoli.74 However, inter-service rivalry continued and the importance of 
upholding the image of the navy and not letting the side down is demonstrated by Dawson who 
recorded at Gallipoli: ‘our troops had started well, and the supporters in Navy blue did not 
mean to fail them’.75 
Cordial relations were required, and to help sailors and soldiers get a better idea of what the 
other service was doing an exchange programme was instigated.76 The Times reported a visit 
of ‘50 Navy men’ to the trenches in 1916 and declared that their visit had given them ‘a good 
survey of the work and difficulties of the soldier in the trenches’.77 In addition, Baynham 
considered the diary of Stoker Petty Officer Edward Markquick who visited soldiers serving on 
the Western Front.78 Baynham appeared to suggest that this was another means of relieving 
the monotony of life at Scapa Flow but conspicuously he made no comment on how this 
programme may have affected morale.79 Markquick described being shown various aspects of 
daily life in the trenches under the care of two officers. He was given the chance to strafe the 
German lines with a Lewis gun, and went out to a listening trench in no-mans-land where the 
young officers he was with offered to take a German trench.80 In particular, he described a 
wiring party:  
it is dangerous work and rather exciting, although it is looked on, like all other 
phases of trench life, as a huge joke, some of the party going as far as crawling 
over to the enemy’s line and stealing his wire.81 
Baynham noted that Markquick recorded the visit so that he might tell his shipmates about it 
when he returned.82 However, he also noted that Markquick appeared not to have left any 
record of what he in fact told his friends when he returned or indeed their reaction.83 Similarly, 
soldiers had the opportunity to visit ships in port and Fletcher recorded one such visit: ‘a few 
Scottish soldiers came on board in the afternoon to have a look round’.84 Whether any serious 
disagreements between sailors and soldiers took place on occasions such as this (as 
experienced by the marines and naval brigade on the Western Front) is unclear.85  
                                            
74 Arthur, True Glory, pp. 5-6 
75 RNM 1980/82: Diary of W. Dawson 
76 See also The Times, 6 January 1916 for a report on one such visit. 
77 The Times, 6 January 1916 
78 MS JOD/63: Journal of E. C. Markquick quoted in Baynham, Men, pp. 219-223 
79 Baynham, Men, p. 219 
80 MS JOD/63: Journal of E. C. Markquick quoted in Baynham, Men, p. 220 
81 MS JOD/63: Journal of E. C. Markquick quoted in Baynham, Men, p. 220 
82 Baynham, Men, p. 219 
83 Baynham, Men, p. 223 
84 RNM 1980/115: Diary of Edwin Fletcher 
85 See testimony of Sergeant Frederick Brookes quoted in Baynham, Men, p. 224; Diaries do not suggest this and a 
cursory glance at the newspapers reveals nothing although it is unlikely that negative accounts would have been 
published by the press. 
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The reality of everyday life in the navy during war 
The expected clash of British and German fleets, the anticipated “second Trafalgar”, failed to 
materialize in the months immediately after war was declared.86 Indeed the navy suffered 
several blows in the coming months: the defeat of a naval squadron at the Battle of Coronel in 
November 1914 and the German raids upon Yarmouth, Hartlepool and Scarborough which 
surprised and shocked the British public.87 Despite a number of initial small engagements, the 
Grand Fleet was primarily consigned to Scapa Flow whilst the navy put into effect a blockade 
of German shipping. This did little to satisfy the British public, brought up on a diet of naval 
superiority, and sailors also eager to fight. Therefore, as mentioned above, the sailor’s image 
as the masculine hero of the Empire was under threat. Given their public image developed 
before the war and the importance of this to their own pride and identity, this had the potential 
to cause serious problems.  
Nevertheless, whilst lacking the glory, sailor’s contributions were important and it has been 
recognized that enforcing the blockade of Germany whilst keeping the sea lanes open to British 
and allied shipping was a vital task which ensured the economic stranglehold upon Germany.88 
A vital part of the blockade was the stopping and searching of shipping on a routine basis. 
Walter Dennis served on the Channel blockade from September to November 1914 and his 
diary is reminiscent of Napoleonic blockades: intercepting ships, boarding them and putting 
prize crews aboard.89 This could often prove to be a dangerous task, as Dennis explained: ‘the 
duty on which we are at present engaged entails a lot of hard work, loss of rest and, in 
examining ships, a great deal of risk especially if the weather is at all bad’.90 Stopping and 
boarding other vessels could happen numerous times a day. Dennis noted the lowering of boats 
‘4 or 5 times between sunset and sunrise’ and that it was particularly unpleasant for lookouts 
and gun crews who may have only just turned in as all hands were required to assist.91 Sailors 
never knew what to expect when they boarded ships and it was one of the constant dangers 
that they faced. On one occasion Dennis’ ship intercepted a Dutch vessel carrying supplies and 
German reservists.92  
However, enforcing the blockade was not without its rewards. Fishing ships often gave up a 
portion of their catch to warships patrolling the Channel, and other ships’ stores were 
acquired.93 Such gratitude may have gone some way towards alleviating feelings of not doing 
their bit. For instance, Dennis recorded receiving a large catch from a French trawler which was 
‘gladly accepted, greatly appreciated’.94 According to Dennis gifts such as this were usually paid 
                                            
86 Crossley, Voices, p. 140; Daly, Portsmouth’s, p. 98; When the largescale engagement at Jutland did take place it was 
not the victory equal to Nelson’s that the British people and sailors expected.  
87 The Battle of Coronel will be considered in more detail below; Crossley, Voices, pp. 47-48 
88 Crossley, Voices, p. 1 
89 Diary of Walter Dennis; See also the Manchester Courier and Lancashire General Advertiser, 5 August 1914 which 
proudly reported the first prize of the war captured. The Western Times, 7 August 1914; Devon and Exeter Daily Gazette, 
27 August 1914 also reported captured enemy shipping, showing public interest in the taking of war prizes. 
90 Diary of Walter Dennis 
91 Diary of Walter Dennis 
92 Diary of Walter Dennis 
93 Joseph Bamber reported getting bacon, wine and other gifts; RNM 1998/43: Diary of Joseph Bamber 
94 Diary of Walter Dennis 
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for and sailors parted with ‘money, tobacco etc.’ to say thank you.95 On the other hand, it is 
evident that these gifts were not always widely distributed aboard and this brought about its 
own issues. For instance, Dennis recorded on one such occasion that the fish was ‘much liked, 
apparently, by those who got some’.96 It transpired that the fish did not make it further than 
the officers’ dining table.97 
Keeping ships adequately supplied with victuals was a problem for the Royal Navy, especially 
in those ships serving overseas. As Joseph Bamber aboard HMS Canopus recalled whilst in the 
Canary Islands: ‘getting very short of food. Practically living on one meal a day’.98 He also 
stated that there were problems in getting supplies from ashore ‘as they wanted all for 
themselves’, although he does not elaborate on who “they” were.99 It is likely that he is echoing 
Dennis’ views on officer prerogatives, but corruption amongst naval canteens was also rife and 
there were often difficulties within the canteen organization.100 His irritation with the situation 
is further demonstrated in an entry where he recounts a visit by a stoker whom he knew to the 
ship’s doctor: 
A stoker seeing the doctor with pains internally is politely informed that he has 
overloaded his stomach. Taking [into] consideration the fact that there is no 
food in the ship excepting biscuits the diagnosis must have been made by an 
overloaded imagination.101 
Making sure that men are fed and watered has always been a vital part of military life. Although 
in the early months of the war continuing enthusiasm no doubt helped keep the men in check, 
this was undoubtedly a source of grievance on the lower deck and led to the Admiralty taking 
over control of the canteens in 1917 in an attempt to centralize the way they were run and 
control the situation.102 
The sustained loss of everyday comforts was certain to lead to grumbling on the lower deck 
and as hardships took their toll, sailors were less likely to exhibit imperial sentiment and 
enthusiasm for the war.103 Consequently, attempts were made to improve conditions and 
ensure that sailors were kept active.104 One of the most serious obstacles was that the Grand 
Fleet was consigned to Scapa Flow for the duration of the war. As Michael W. Williams 
commented, ‘Scapa Flow is a very remote location with little to occupy an off-watch sailor’.105 
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Similarly, Baynham noted sailors’ remarks on the ‘endless grey days at Scapa Flow’.106 Shore 
leave was rare until later in the war and there was only one canteen ashore that served beer, 
and it closed at 8.30pm.107 As Lavery noted, going ashore was ‘hardly worth the bother’.108 
Although a relatively safe-haven for the Fleet, the danger posed by large numbers of bored 
and sometimes disillusioned sailors was not lost on the Admiralty. To put this into perspective, 
there were between 60,000 and 100,000 sailors stationed at Scapa Flow during the war.109 
Although Brown and Meehan have noted sailors found ways to cope with the monotony, it was 
a tedious time for all.110   
Recognizing the potential threat, the Admiralty and officers realized more needed to be done 
to keep their men occupied, either at work or at play. In the first instance training exercises, 
which were already a key part of daily life in the navy, were increased during wartime.111 This 
served the dual purpose of keeping sailors busy and also well-practised and ready for action. 
However, the success of these exercises is questionable and sailors suggest that on a technical 
level they were often hampered by bad weather and primitive technology, whilst the repeated 
training did little to reduce boredom and frustration. For instance, Fletcher recorded: ‘Battle 
practise. This ship fired 56 rounds. 2 hits. It was a very bad day for firing’.112 Similarly, J. E. 
Attrill recorded a typical day’s practise and how they had to stop ‘on account of the target being 
obscured through smoke’.113 Another activity that kept the men occupied was painting their 
ships, a recurring activity in lower-deck diaries.114 The importance of this has been highlighted 
by Michael W. Williams who argued that ‘cleaning ship and painting ship were frequent duties 
– a matter of safety as well as time filling’.115 Due to the size of ships this could be a particularly 
onerous job, often lasting days or even weeks and becoming more tedious as the days 
progressed.116  
However, it was not all work for sailors during the war. Although there was precious little for 
an off-duty sailor to do at Scapa Flow, entertainment in various forms was provided in an 
attempt to keep the men occupied. One way of entertaining the men was the provision of 
theatre ships, although treats such as this were limited.117 Nevertheless, they proved a 
welcome reprieve showing some of the latest films available. Fletcher certainly enjoyed them 
and recorded watching ‘the famous film: “The Battle of the Somme”. It was a most excellent 
film’.118 The film was indeed popular with a calculated 20m people seeing it in the first six 
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weeks and The Times stated that audiences: ‘were interested and thrilled to have the realities 
of war brought so vividly before them’.119 However, films such as this served several purposes. 
On the one hand they provided a welcome escape for the audience; they also gave sailors a 
better understanding of what was happening in the other service. Yet, as Nicholas Reeves has 
argued, in reality they were propaganda pieces, commissioned and shot by official propaganda 
departments, designed to show the ‘authentic’ story of the war and to promote enthusiasm for 
the war and foster feelings of pride.120  
Similarly, concert parties were a further way to relieve the monotony of life at sea.121 When 
ships were grouped together it was common to give concerts for other ships. Likewise on quiet 
days at sea sailors were also able to have short informal concerts to give them a break from 
their work. Walter Dennis recorded one such occasion: 
an impromptu concert was arranged and with the assistance of ship’s band, 
Ward Room officers’ gramophone, banjos, mandolins, and a few songs from 
the ship’s company an enjoyable half hour was passed.122  
Other opportunities were readily taken advantage of, such as a concert given ashore at Calloa 
by the British residents and provided a chance for them to show their support to the navy and 
the sailors. For instance, Stoker J. W. Payne of HMS Kent recorded that they ‘sent two pints of 
beer a man aboard’ which was met with enthusiasm.123 Opportunities such as this allowed the 
display of patriotism on behalf of the locals, and allowed sailors to share in this whilst providing 
enjoyment and a sense of appreciation for what they were doing.124 
Nevertheless, as the war dragged on and wartime conditions continued, the level of sailor 
“grumbles” increased, especially by 1917. Although this mirrors sentiment in British society 
generally and within the Army, there are a number of factors which played heavily on sailors’ 
minds. In particular, Carew has suggested that ‘war-weariness began to set in’ after the Battle 
of Jutland.125 Certainly the scale of British losses and the poor handling by the press did little 
to capitalize on the battle and it lay heavy on sailors and the British public.126 Jutland resulted 
in the greatest number of deaths of any naval engagement during the war with 6,094 British 
and Empire sailors killed.127 The loss of life and loss of ships, even in peacetime, was capable 
of casting a pall over the navy and thus Jutland was to have a sustained effect upon many 
sailors. More importantly, the debate over who won did not help matters and this was 
compounded by the press. Although the outcome is still a divisive issue, the failure of the 
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Germans to break out of the North Sea is commonly seen as at least a ‘strategic victory’ for 
Britain.128 However, as Daly has suggested, ‘public opinion and the traditions of the Royal Navy, 
somewhat unfairly, demanded more than a tactical victory’.129 Consequently, Jutland was a 
serious challenge to sailor culture.  
However, whilst correct in asserting that Jutland contributed to feelings of war-weariness, 
Carew’s approach was limited to focusing upon the economic factors influencing sailors at this 
time. Yet, there were other important factors at work and Carew overlooks the importance of 
the human element and impact upon sailors. For instance, Edwin Fletcher recorded: ‘getting 
“sad” aboard this “hook pot” now’.130 Fletcher also became far more home-centred during the 
war, something which Anthony Fletcher and Nancy Martin have argued happened to many 
servicemen as it helped them cope with their experiences.131 Fletcher was a married seaman 
with a young daughter, and his diaries reflect the hardships of long periods of separation.132 
He dutifully recorded their birthdays, his wedding anniversaries, and his language suggests 
that he was unhappy he was not able to be there to enjoy the day with them.133 Furthermore, 
whenever he did go home on leave his diary became much more energetic than his usual day 
to day recordings.134 On more than one occasion he recorded seeing the captain to request 
leave.135 Like many other sailors, by 1917 Fletcher was making use of the special trains laid on 
to transport men from Thurso to Portsmouth.136 Nevertheless, Fletcher did not openly criticize 
the service or Britain’s role in the conflict, nor did he enter into a discussion of the financial 
hardships that Carew argued were the primary grievances at this time.  
As well as leave, sporting activities provided a cost-effective diversion for sailors and sport was 
viewed as excellent for morale.137 Tony Mason and Eliza Riedi have considered the benefit of 
sport during the war and argued that the outcome of the Battle of Jutland had a significant 
effect upon this, and as a consequence Admiral Jellicoe ‘encouraged the development of sports 
facilities’ at Scapa Flow after Jutland.138 Thus whilst at Scapa Flow, Edward Fletcher recorded 
plenty of opportunity for events to be organized between ships. Boxing and football were 
popular favourites and by 1917 the men would often be permitted to go ashore for games. 
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Fletcher’s diaries suggests that this was especially common after several days of naval 
exercises or painting the ship and was eagerly welcomed.139 However, Baynham suggested the 
amenities did not sufficiently improve. He recorded Able Seaman William Hales who said: ‘they 
tried to make a football pitch but it was all bog land. We used to put in for leave ashore – 
“Fossil Hunting”!’.140 Nevertheless, Hales’ account suggests a level of humour. Pulling was also 
popular and organized regattas continued during the war years.141 For instance, the Hampshire 
Telegraph reported that ‘raft races between the various crews were frequent’.142 In particular, 
Fletcher thought these events ‘good sport’ and on 4th August 1916 recorded, ‘bit of a sea on 
but otherwise a lovely day for the job’.143 However, alongside this he noted it was two years to 
the day since the start of the conflict.144 Whether the regatta was held purposefully on that 
date to detract from any disillusionment with the war is unclear but sailors were not ignorant 
of how long the war was lasting.  
Sailors at war: killing, dying and enthusiasm for war 
As Joanna Bourke argued in her landmark study, ‘the characteristic act of men at war is not 
dying, it is killing’.145 Although this is perhaps not the immediate image of the Royal Navy 
during the First World War, more recently Michael Williams has remarked that a ship was meant 
to ‘fight’.146 Although the much anticipated “second Trafalgar” did not materialize, there were 
several notable clashes between the British and German navies.147 This chapter has previously 
argued that there was enthusiasm on the outbreak of the war, and in his study of Portsmouth 
during the Great War, James Daly has argued that sailors ‘keenly awaited battle’.148 
Furthermore, sailor diaries demonstrate that they were aware of detriment to their image and 
thus they were concerned with “doing their bit”, and also being seen to have done so. For 
instance, sailors often commented on the time they spent waiting for action, with statements 
such as: ‘business as usual’, ‘nothing doing’ and hoping for ‘the long awaited scrap’.149 This is 
suggestive both of how they thought they were viewed by the public and their own view of 
their image. For instance, a cartoon in Sea Pie entitled ‘The Blockader’ demonstrates the 
possible animosity that could exist between soldiers and sailors, who were afraid they looked 
to be having an easier war.150 In this cartoon the sailor says to the smirking soldier: ‘Orl right, 
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Cocky, if you do get most of the scrapping, you needn't swank’.151 This also extended to other 
ships and rivalry between warships that had been 
seen to have done their bit was common. For 
instance, at the Dardanelles, after seeing HMS 
Triumph heavily engaged, Dawson wrote: 
‘perhaps the Triumph can swank now’.152 
Similarly, Abbott was clearly jealous that a friend 
aboard HMS Archeron had seen multiple actions: 
‘The Archeron has been in nearly every fight at sea 
since the war broke out including the “Blucher” 
action’.153 
In addition, because of the global role of the Royal 
Navy, ships were often at remote locations around 
the globe and, as The Times noted all too clearly, 
out of sight was out of mind.154 For example, after 
patrolling home waters for almost three months 
HMS Vengeance was sent to West Africa and St 
Vincent. Aboard HMS Vengeance Dennis recorded: 
life is getting very dull and monotonous 
here now. Everyone, almost, hoping that 
we were elsewhere where there is something doing. The only consolation being 
that we are going where we’re sent and that we’ve done our bit although, to 
us, it doesn’t look much.155  
Although Dennis cannot speak for all the crew, and in fact this extract alludes to some sailors 
being happy to be out of danger, his account suggests that sailors were concerned about how 
they would be viewed at home because of the relative safety of certain foreign stations. As 
Daly has rightly argued, the British public ‘had been brought up on a diet of British naval 
supremacy’ and consequently their ‘expectations were sky high’.156 However, it also suggests 
that sailors were eager to be where the action was, not simply because of the tedium of war-
time duties but because they wanted to fight and were concerned how they would be viewed 
by others. For instance, William T. Abbott wrote: 
all there was to record day after day was that we had been ploughing up salt 
water in the Channel… and if any other person had chanced to see what was 
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written would have exclaimed – is that all you have done? I thought you went 
out to fight Germans!!157  
The sample of diarists considered by this thesis has not located any sailors who expressed overt 
happiness to be away from the fighting, although some may well have felt this in private. As 
demonstrated above and noted elsewhere in this thesis, sailors would have been aware that 
their diaries may well have been read and thus anti-war sentiment or distinct expression of 
feelings against the perceived popular mood are unlikely. Nevertheless, Abbott suggests that 
despite the dangers, sailors were eager to volunteer for tasks that gave them an opportunity 
to see action. He noted there was a call for men to join the minesweepers and wrote: ‘A risky 
job perhaps… however volunteers are not lacking’.158 He confessed to being: ‘a wee bit 
disappointed’ when his application was rejected.159 This is comparable to the desire of sailors 
to volunteer for action in the naval brigades, especially during the Boer War.160 
However, Thomas Hinshaw of HMS Canopus, suggests that a level of realism existed and that 
sailors were afraid, especially when the odds were stacked against them; eagerness to fight 
did not overcome knowledge of certain defeat. For instance, upon hearing the news of the loss 
of HMS Monmouth and HMS Good Hope at Coronel, Hinshaw recorded:  
Glasgow signal sad news, “Turn back with all speed – enemy too much for us 
‘Good Hope’ going & ‘Monmouth’ in bad way. I am retiring at 25 knots. Our 
Skipper still carries on, but other officers request him to turn back as we will 
suffer the same as the poor Good Hope and Monmouth. 161 
As Canopus made her escape and for safety adopted radio silence, the crew were on edge for 
a number of days: ‘We are all weary getting very little sleep. Never had our clothes off since 
Sunday morning’.162 As they approached the Straits of Magellan, which Hinshaw had found 
rather scenic on the outward voyage, he noted: ‘The scenery holds nothing for us this 
voyage’.163 Nevertheless, although Hinshaw was aware that Canopus was no match for the 
German ships in the area, when they were ordered to return to the Falklands to protect them, 
he accepted it was their duty and noted: ‘Its got to be done’.164 Similarly, Joseph Bamber (also 
aboard Canopus), wrote: ‘The inhabitants of FI [Falkland Islands] are all British people’.165 This 
episode suggests a human element to the stereotype of the British sailor whereby they were 
loyal to the Empire and steadfastly obeyed orders because it was their duty whilst at the same 
time being scared of what they would have to do.  
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Nevertheless, as previously noted, a level of bellicosity amongst sailors was not uncommon. 
For instance, there is an air of excitement in Dennis’ tone when he recorded his ship was finally 
ordered eastwards in February 1915. He recorded: ‘the hands were mustered on deck and 
informed that we were bound for the East (the Dardanelles I think)… and that we must expect, 
from now, hardships, hard work, and plenty of courage. This message was received by a display 
of lively satisfaction’.166 This belligerent attitude continued during the campaign and he 
grumbled at the bad weather disrupting plans for a bombardment at the Dardanelles: ‘the 
operations were again postponed, much to our annoyance’.167 Similarly, Abbott also found 
himself being ordered to the Dardanelles, noting: ‘to the delight of the whole ships company 
[the Dardanelles] is the place we are bound’.168 He followed this with: ‘Mild excitement prevails 
on board. At last we are going to fire an angry shot’.169 
In addition, diaries give no indication that sailors doubted their or the Royal Navy’s ability to 
face the Germans and defeat them.170 For example, Wood put to sea the day after war was 
declared and by 10.30am recorded that they had sighted an enemy vessel, ‘chased her [and] 
fired on her [and] she went down’.171 A few weeks later he recorded another encounter with 
enemy destroyers commenting that ‘their shooting was very bad… [and] they soon showed her 
the way to shoot and very soon put her to the bottom’.172 Likewise, Abbott eagerly recounted 
the engagement with SMS Blucher told to him by a friend who had witnessed it. The story went 
that German survivors ‘said our shellfire was so terrific that they preferred death by drowning 
than the terrible effect of Lyddite shell’.173 Furthermore, Abbott recorded: ‘All the British Fleet 
returned… and a few hours afterwards every ship was ready to answer the Country’s call’.174 
Both accounts demonstrate pride in their ship and the navy’s ability.175 British sailors’ sense of 
superiority ran deep and another sailor, C. P. Blunt, who served at Jutland was shocked by 
seeing men scrambling up the sinking ships. He noted it had not occurred to them that they 
would lose ships and recalled thinking: ‘this is all wrong’.176  
Viewed alongside the constructed image of the sailor and the Royal Navy within British society, 
it is clear that underlying pride and belief in the superiority of the Royal Navy was very much 
a part of sailors’ identity; it was at the bedrock of the sailor’s culture and one that could take 
precedence over their feelings regarding the Empire. However, sailors often demonstrated pride 
in themselves, other crew members, their ship and the service. For instance, Signalman W. 
Dawson revealed that there was a level of competitiveness between ships’ crews in their ability 
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to hit their target and inflict maximum damage: ‘each ship seemed to be vying with the next 
as to who should fire the most rounds’.177 Likewise Abbott’s diary repeatedly notes a desire to 
record his own ship’s achievements rather than those of other vessels. He wrote candidly: 
‘When I started to write my log it was not my intention to record what other ships were doing, 
it was what the Lord Nelson had done’.178 Similarly, Dennis wrote: ‘I hope & trust that before 
its conclusion, we, in the “Vengeance”, will have performed our duty during the war with credit 
to the navy and distinction to ourselves’.179 When battle had come and sailors reflected on their 
engagements they were able to take pride in what they had done for themselves, for the service 
and for the Empire as Hinshaw demonstrated: ‘Admiral Sturdee came on board to congratulate 
us for our work & said it would be long remembered by the Empire’.180  
Therefore, given the excitement and eagerness displayed by a number of sailors to take part 
in the action, it is prudent to question whether this excitement equated to enjoyment of killing. 
Again, to draw a comparison to the Army, the relationship between soldiers and killing has 
been well discussed by historians such as Joanna Bourke, Niall Ferguson, and Edgar Jones.181 
They have argued that killing became a pleasurable experience; as Jones explained: ‘letters, 
diaries and memoirs written by soldiers lie at the heart of the case for an excitement of 
killing’.182 Similarly, Ferguson has examined the letters of an officer, Julian Grenfell, who 
stated: ‘I adore war. It is like a big picnic without the objectlessness of a picnic. I've never 
been so well or so happy’.183 Ferguson argued that these feelings were ‘widespread’ and 
adduced a variety of sources from all ranks to support this.184 
On the one hand, if killing was exciting for soldiers then it is arguable that this should not be a 
unique experience, and sailors may have experienced similar feelings. Although this transplants 
one argument simply from soldiers to sailors, they were also serving their country and the 
Empire’s interests, and in addition a great number of whom were career sailors who had grown 
up with the navy’s cultural-imperial image. On the other hand, the experience of most sailors 
was markedly different.185 Sailors were removed from intimacy with their enemy, sometimes 
by a large expanse of water, and it was those in control of the guns who were ultimately 
responsible for firing at enemy targets. Nevertheless, Bourke has highlighted the importance 
of men’s pride in killing their enemy and this chapter has previously noted sailors’ feelings of 
pride in defeating their enemy.186 Again, diaries provide an interesting insight into the sailor’s 
mind. For instance, in the Dardanelles on board HMS Ark Royal (an aircraft carrier and 
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consequently not a ship conducting the bombardment), Wood was obviously interested in the 
attack on the Turkish forts. As the fleet repeatedly shelled the forts he noted it was ‘very 
amusing to see the Turks nipping out of the way’ and described it as ‘very exciting’.187 
Meanwhile, in the same campaign, but actually in the line of fire aboard HMS Vengeance, Dennis 
recorded that the bombardment was a ‘most appalling and magnificent spectacle’.188 Similarly, 
Abbott gave a particularly vivid account of his part in the bombardment:  
2nd shot followed quickly and penetrated the hole made by the first shot and 
carried through the village with the speed of an express train & by the clouds 
of dust raised one would have imagined the whole village had collapsed… What 
became of the Turks I can only guess but I don’t think there was enough left 
to make a decent sandwich.189 
Henry Welch, on the other hand, gave a franker view of being part of a battle at sea. He was 
present at the Battle of the Falkland Islands and wrote the following: 
It is hard to describe my feelings at this time. Thoughts of danger found no 
room, owing to the exciting interest of it all. No one, I think, seemed to give 
danger a thought. Every man and boy looked like a lot of schoolboys going 
away for an outing…190 
Welch’s account could be straight from the pages of the Boys Own Paper, painting an image of 
brave, excited sailors who were unperturbed by the dangers of battle. Similarly, W. Dawson 
thought himself and others ‘fortunate’ to be in battle.191 Likewise, Abbott demonstrated a keen 
sense of imperialistic fervour in his diary following the death of a young sailor ashore at 
Gallipoli, noting that the Captain said: ‘there could not be a more noble end to a British seaman 
than to be killed in “Action” fighting for his Country and to be buried at sea. I agree with him’.192 
Furthermore, the press sought to reaffirm the sailor stereotype during battle and a sailor quoted 
by The Times stated: ‘for about five hours we were at it hammer and tongs’, recalling that the 
‘noise of the firing must have been tremendous, but I don’t remember that I noticed it 
particularly at the time. I suppose I was too much engrossed in fighting my own gun’.193 
Although the press’ agenda was to support the war effort, diaries suggest that certainly a 
number of sailors did find the experience of battle exciting. Jones concurs with Bourke and 
Ferguson on this point regarding the ‘highs of battle’ and likened it to what would today be 
called ‘an “adrenalin rush”’.194 Of these accounts, although excitement at being in battle is 
clearly evident, only Abbott made specific reference to the enemy being killed. This is delivered 
in a light-hearted manner, downplaying the act of death with humour and suggests a 
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subconscious act of distancing himself from the enemy. Many sailors did not describe killing in 
detail because for the majority of any action they were below deck, unable to see, and instead 
talked in terms of hits scored and damage done as a gun team rather than individual 
observations.  
Yet the regular collection of souvenirs or curios suggests that sailors embraced the realities of 
battle. This practice was very common amongst soldiers and Simon Harrison has noted that 
‘petty looting’ occurred regularly despite being illegal.195 In particular, Harrison has opined that 
the taking of trophies was usual in societies where hunting was recognized as normal.196 
Souvenirs could range from commonplace items to far more grisly collections amongst soldiers, 
and Harrison has paid special attention to the taking of human remains, arguing that there was 
a spectrum of curios from expended bullets at one end to human remains at the other with a 
nebulous middle section of everything else.197 The practice of collecting curios can be seen as 
an important part of life during war, and they formed a visible expression of the war and a 
tangible memory of the experience. As such, Bourke suggested that they helped to bolster the 
stories of returning combatants.198 Harrison agreed with this hypothesis but added that the 
majority of souvenirs were in fact bartered with other soldiers for alcohol and other supplies 
behind the lines.199  
However, sailors are an interesting case as they had limited access to battle grounds and the 
ability to collect curios. On the other hand, they were a group of people who during peacetime 
eagerly acquired curios and mementos from their trips abroad.200 Thus there existed a certain 
level of normality in the practice of collecting tangible reminders of their experiences. No 
separate study has been specifically carried out regarding sailors and the collection of war-time 
souvenirs but sailor diaries reveal that the practice did occur in the Royal Navy. The taking of 
curios is mentioned very casually, with no shame attached, and this is reinforced by newspapers 
reporting on the practice.201 For instance, Dennis recorded seeing sailors at Gallipoli returning 
aboard ‘having plenty of curios from ashore consisting mainly of Turkish rifles, German 
ammunition etc. etc.’.202 
Sailors’ souvenirs more commonly took the form described by Wood, who noted the collection 
of shell fragments from a bomb dropped on his ship by a German pilot: ‘pieces of the bomb 
were picked up everywhere on the ship. I have one piece for a curio’.203 Other sailors support 
this, for instance Abbott wrote: ‘immediately… all hands were stumbling over one another to 
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pick up some souvenirs… anything that looked like a piece of a projectile was eagerly claimed.204 
In addition, an article in The Times further reveals that sailors who visited the trenches were 
apparently amazed to see so much scrap metal lying about until it was mentioned that it was 
simply too dangerous to go out and collect it.205 Therefore, it is argued that sailors embraced 
the practice and supports the findings of Bourke and Harrison, although the type of objects 
open to sailors were more limited and did not exist on the same dehumanized scale that has 
been noted to occur in the trenches. As with peacetime curios, they provided a tangible memory 
capable of being taken home on leave and shown to friends and families as Bourke has 
suggested.206 However, at the same time sailors were seeking reminders of their experiences 
and therefore demonstrate a level of acceptance of what they were doing and the realities of 
war. 
Nevertheless, despite the excitement recorded by sailors and a level of acceptance of the 
brutality of war, sailors were not desensitized to the horrors nor removed from the trauma 
associated with engaging the enemy. By the end of the First World War, 38,515 naval men had 
been killed.207 This was a significant number by naval reckoning, and in particular the close 
relationship between port towns and naval establishments meant that many had friends or 
families who had been in action.208 Although a number of sailors remained enthusiastic about 
their experiences in battle during the war years, similarly to soldiers, men found the experience 
horrifying and terrifying. Their descriptions of the awful scenes they witnessed stands contrary 
to the Victorian stereotype of masculinity which was embedded in the British culture prior to 
the Great War.209 For example, Edwin Fletcher’s diary entry following the Battle of Jutland 
recorded that: ‘the noise was terrific, the flashes from the guns were awful’.210 Another sailor, 
W. Dawson stated: ‘All the horrors of warfare seemed to be blended together in one common 
inferno’.211 He concluded by saying ‘the slaughter was appalling [and] sickening’.212 Although 
lacking wider analysis, the testimony collated by Max Arthur also suggests that sailors were 
affected by traumatic experiences. For example, Arthur quotes a sailor named Jack Gearing, 
who was at Gallipoli, and recorded a British aircraft ditching in the sea: ‘we put the boats out, 
reached her before she sank and kept her up, but when we got the pilot and observer out, they 
were both dead. That upset us. They had been too long in the water’.213 Similarly, testimony 
collected by Baynham suggests that the deaths of German sailors could equally affect British 
sailors. He noted one sailor who remarked upon seeing German sailors: ’floating in the water 
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– they looked like a crowd of footballs. Occasionally you’d see a hand go up – singing out for 
help’.214  
It was especially traumatic leaving men in the water to drown as one sailor, Charles Blunt, 
noted.215 However, it was dangerous to attempt to rescue survivors and if ships were ordered 
to stand off there was little else to be done. The loss of HMS Aboukir, HMS Cressy and HMS 
Hogue, sunk by a single U-Boat in the early days of the war, demonstrated the danger in 
stopping to pick up survivors.216 William Brooman was aboard HMS Audacious when she struck 
a mine and wrote: ‘I think the seriousness of the disaster to our ship came home to us when 
we saw the remainder of the squadron turn & leave us, but this was the safest thing to do’.217 
Although British sailors would try and rescue defeated German sailors, safety of their own ships 
and crew was paramount and at the Battle of Heligoland Bight, attempts to rescue German 
survivors were abandoned when Zeppelins started dropping bombs on the rescuers.218 This 
earned the condemnation of one rating who stated: ‘I don’t think much of the German airmen. 
They dropped bombs, and I believe they drowned many of their own men by doing so’.219 There 
was also particular condemnation of the German ship SMS Nurnberg which had finished off the 
sinking Monmouth at Coronel and failed to pick up any survivors after the battle.220 After 
hearing of Dogger Bank, Abbott praised British sailors for rescuing 234 German sailors and 
comparing them to the Germans at Coronel who ‘sailed away and left them [the British] to 
drown and then said the sea was too rough, no real sailor would have said that or even thought 
it’.221 Although this could simply be a criticism easily made because it was not him who did it, 
it could also suggest that this stood contrary to his own interpretation of sailors’ duties and 
culture.  
Although sailors were used to the dangerous working conditions of the Edwardian navy, where 
accidental death was common, they exhibited a large degree of compassion for other vessels 
and their crews (including enemy sailors). Often they had friends aboard other ships or knew 
the vessels, but in addition they could relate to those people and knew that it could just as 
easily be them. For instance, Dennis noted after news of the sinking of HMS Hawke ‘I have a 
close friend serving on board the “Hawke”. George Oakley who belongs to St Albans. Has a 
wife and 1 child. Am rather concerned as to his fate’.222 Similarly, Edwin Fletcher recorded the 
loss of HMS Vanguard at Scapa Flow: ‘the “Vanguard” has blown up with all hands. All the fleet 
sent boats but I fancy there were not many survivors’.223 Over the next couple of days he noted 
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that the navy divers were recovering the bodies and said: ‘There were about 5 men saved from 
the “Vanguard” but in addition there were about 200 men out of the ship at the time’.224 
Likewise at the Battle of Coronel, Bamber recorded: ‘loss of Good Hope practically confirmed. 
She carried about 900 hands, most reservists, about 700 being married men’.225 Sailors were 
well aware of the hardship naval families faced when a man died at sea and this stirred a 
particular sense of pathos with the men. In particular, sailors had a history of helping those in 
need as demonstrated by the tradition of subscriptions on board whenever men died 
unexpectedly so as to send something home to a widow and any children.226 
The careful noting down of the numbers of men believed lost when a ship was sunk, and the 
futility of searching for survivors comes across poignantly despite only being briefly recorded 
in diaries. However, real joy was felt whenever men were rescued and sailors did not begrudge 
sharing supplies with those in need, as Walter Dennis noted: 
Warm clothing which had been sent to this ship by the Women’s Emergency 
Committee of the Navy League was distributed to the survivors of the 
“Irresistible”, what remained being given to our own fellows, this idea receiving 
the unanimous approval of the Lower Deck.227 
Just how keenly sailors felt the loss of friends and comrades is perhaps shown by the desire for 
revenge that some sailors exhibited. For example, after the loss of the Battle of Coronel, 
Canopus and Glasgow planned to head for Montevideo, in the words of Thomas Hinshaw: ‘to 
pick up more of our ships then – to strike back’.228 However, Canopus was ordered to return to 
the Falkland Islands and protect them. Nevertheless, a few days later a bellicose Hinshaw 
recorded: ‘Mine-field finished should like the “Sharnhorst” to bump it’.229 He did not have to 
wait long for his chance for revenge. The victory of the Royal Navy at the Battle of the Falkland 
Islands the following month was viewed by many as revenge for the losses at Coronel.230 
Hinshaw’s diary reveals excitement and a level of amusement in their victory: ‘Smoke forms 
itself into a German Squadron there will be some sport to-day & We won’t forget the Good 
Hope & Monmouth. They are steaming up unconcerned they can’t know what ships are here’.231 
This was followed by ‘4-45pm “Sharnhorst” quits… 6pm Goodnight “Gneisnau”. 8pm seas 
coming up Leipzig dips after putting up a grand fight’.232 Similarly, Henry Welch of HMS Kent 
was also present and described his pleasure in sinking SMS Nurnberg: ‘So, truly, we have 
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avenged the Monmouth’.233 Niall Ferguson has noted a similar experience amongst soldiers, 
and has suggested that it could become so powerful that men felt no regard for personal 
safety.234 Although individual acts are far less likely aboard a warship where there is greater 
distance to the enemy and men served far more as part of a weapon-body rather than 
individuals, the desire for revenge could nevertheless become very powerful. 
Sailors’ language of these experiences is further revealing and there is a strange convergence 
of feelings present in their descriptions of battle with diaries revealing that it was not 
uncommon for men to see beauty amongst the carnage. For example, Wood recorded: ‘it is 
very nice to lay here & watch the ships firing & hear the loveable rumbling noise as the shells 
pass over the hills and valleys’.235 Similarly, Dennis described ‘a perfect hail of shrapnel’ fired 
by HMS Vengeance.236 Welch demonstrates still further the conflicting approach to beauty and 
near-death experiences. ‘One shell burst on the water’s edge… Ye gods! it was lovely – only a 
trifle further and there would have been a few gaps among us’.237 Bourke has recognized this 
phenomenon amongst soldiers, and posited that ‘the emphasis on the beauty of war – the 
colour of napalm, the shine of steel, the maternal bulk of the tank – distracted from the smell 
of burning flesh, gaping wounds and dismemberment’.238 This served as a coping mechanism 
that combatants employed to deal with the emotional and mental stress they experienced.239 
Nevertheless, some sailors struggled to find the words to describe what they witnessed. For 
instance, watching the landing of troops at Gallipoli, W. Dawson stated: ‘the scene that followed 
cannot be put into words’.240 This problem has been noted by Paul Fussell, who argued that 
‘the presumed inadequacy of language’ was a reason why many soldiers did not talk or write 
in detail about the war.241  
However, there is the danger that diaries were consciously sanitized by their authors.242 In 
particular, Simon Jones has argued of the importance of diaries as a way in which men could 
leave a record of their lives for their families in the event of their death.243 It is common to find 
at the start of a sailor diary some note to say that it was being kept for the benefit of a family 
member.244 Therefore, although sailors may have believed that someone would be interested 
in hearing about their experiences, as Jones rightly points out, there is the danger that men 
gave an edited view of events, knowing that their diaries would be read by family members if 
                                            
233 DOC: Diary of Henry Welch; HMS Kent was a sister ship to HMS Monmouth and this thesis has previously argued 
about the bonds of loyalty to ships and shipmates. Ships with close or shared connections thus had greater links to one 
another.  
234 Ferguson, Pity, p. 363 
235 RNM 1984/467: Diary of Wood 
236 Diary of Walter Dennis 
237 DOC: Diary of Henry Welch 
238 Bourke, Intimate, p. 42 
239 Coping mechanisms employed by sailors will be considered in more detail below. 
240 RNM 1980/82: Diary of W. Dawson 
241 Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000 [first edition 1975]); p. 
170 
242 See Chapter One; See also John Tosh, The Pursuit of History, Revised Third Edition, (London: Longman, 2002 [first 
edition 1984]).  
243 Jones, ‘Psychology’, p. 233 
244 For example see Diary of Walter Dennis; See also RNM 1990/160: Diary of A. J. Bull. 
111 
 
they died.245 Yet this does not negate from their usefulness. Although the view presented by 
their diaries sometimes lacked specific detail, both the thrill and fear of battle comes across 
clearly. Again, this points to the neglected complexity of the sailor’s character. Diaries 
demonstrate that ratings experienced a range of emotions during battle. As Bourke has argued, 
men ‘reveal[ed] themselves as individuals transformed by a range of conflicting emotions – 
fear as well as empathy, rage as well as exhilaration’.246 A range of emotions could co-exist but 
at the same time there is a visible sense of duty, whether or not they were afraid. Their sense 
of duty and loyalty, in itself a complex issue divided between ship, shipmates, service and 
Empire, is one that they did not question.  
Whether eager and excited or apprehensive at the prospect of battle, sailors lived in a stressful 
environment where witnessing death and living with the constant threat of danger formed a 
key facet of naval life. This was especially so when ships were at sea with the threat from 
enemy shipping, particularly enemy mines and U-Boats. As one sailor quoted by the Hampshire 
Telegraph reminded the public, those below deck stood ‘little chance of escape should their 
ship be sunk’.247 Although Brooman played down the danger when his ship struck a mine, he 
did confide to his diary: ‘it is not at all a pleasant feeling to be in a vessel with a huge hole in 
the side’.248 Living on the edge of their nerves on a daily basis whilst at sea, the need to cope 
with stress was vital, inability to do so could otherwise be acutely debilitating. Dennis 
demonstrated this point noting three cases of what he termed “insanity” within a year aboard 
Vengence due to the pressures of war.249 An article in The Times commented on the possible 
dangers associated with living in war-time conditions within the first few weeks of the war:  
It must be almost impossible for landsmen to realize the nerve tension of those 
at sea who, night after night and day after day, have been waiting and watching 
for the expected blow to fall… But to live for nearly a fortnight with every faculty 
wound up to the highest pitch is an ordeal to which one cannot be subjected 
for very long without some loss of efficiency.250 
This recognition is particularly important especially in light of the studies conducted regarding 
soldiers and the effect of shell shock and the crisis of masculinity during the First World War.  
Again, this is an area where sailors have been neglected by historians. Whilst not downplaying 
the danger soldiers faced daily, they were cycled out of the frontline trenches on a regular basis 
and would have been unlucky if they spent more than 5 to 8 days in the forward lines.251 
Although it should be noted that the reserve trenches were also dangerous, nevertheless the 
ability for leave and being rotated away from action provided a distraction that allowed some 
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respite. Stress and mental debilitation was similarly an issue for sailors. For instance, Dennis 
recorded that a sailor by the name of Hutchins ‘was a tile loose, a sentry was placed over him 
to look after him. May do himself, or someone else, some harm?’.252 He wrote again a few 
weeks later that Hutchins and another were being sent back to England, ‘both these men having 
developed signs of insanity?’.253 He records one final account during the Gallipoli campaign, 
‘our Captain Cook developed signs of insanity to day, and was immediately placed under the 
guard of a marine. This is the 3rd case of this description on board here since the war started’.254 
In 1915 these symptoms were still not fully understood or recognized by British forces. Officers 
and psychiatrists believed that men suffered nerves or shell shock because they had not been 
‘hardened’.255 Dennis was evidently interested in what was happening to these men but whether 
he was sympathetic to their plight or thought them weak is unclear. The use of the question 
mark, a rare use of expression in sailor diaries, suggests that he is questioning of the situation 
and unsure what to make of it. 
However, such apparent weakness stood at odds with the Victorian and Edwardian perception 
of masculinity that was a key part of the image of British sailors. Therefore, faced with these 
problems, sailors employed a number of coping mechanisms (both consciously and 
subconsciously) in order to deal with their experiences. Again, historians such as Bourke, 
Ferguson and Jones have considered the ways in which soldiers dealt with stress, and these 
can be readily transferred to sailors. For instance, discussing their experiences with other 
sailors was one way of dealing with stress. As Bourke posited, stories often served a ‘cathartic 
and consolatory function rather than simply as an objective recital of “experience”’.256 Dennis 
recorded one such occurrence when he met ‘an “old ship” from “HMS Sydney” who gave an 
interesting account of their scrap with the “Emden”’.257 Whilst the retelling of this served a 
number of functions including demonstrating pride in his and his ship’s ability, and perhaps an 
element of boasting, it was also a conversation with a friend who would be able to understand 
certain aspects of the story and the experience the sailor had gone through.  
Similarly, Jones has argued that diaries and letters ‘formed part of the soldier’s attempt to 
make sense of what he had gone through’.258 It is important to note that a number of sailors 
became far less reticent with their diaries during the war years.259 For example, by 1915 Wood 
was aboard HMS Ark Royal and was particularly detailed in his diary of the Dardanelles 
campaign in comparison to his earlier commissions.260 Instead of a few lines per entry, he 
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began to open up and record more personal views. Furthermore, diaries were not written during 
actual engagements, which would have been impossible, but were instead written during quiet 
periods or off-duty time.261 As such they enabled sailors to have the ability to reflect. Again, 
Jones has argued that diaries, ‘may have been a rationalization of what they had done or 
thought that they should have done’.262 This would have allowed some level of absolution from 
blame and set their minds at ease.  
A further element to be aware of is the importance of the pronouns used by sailors to describe 
themselves in their diaries. As Bourke has argued, it was common for men to use “we” rather 
than “I” when describing their actions in battle in an attempt to distance themselves from the 
experience.263 Sailor diaries reveal regular use of the pronoun “we” or “our” rather than “I” on 
the lower deck when referring to engagements. For example, at Jutland Fletcher noted: ‘we 
could see both sides firing away at one another.264 Likewise Bamber wrote: ‘we opened fire 
from our fore turret but the first salvos fell short’.265 Whilst this use of pronouns is undoubtedly 
similar in relation to sailors, it is likely that the use of “we” also reflects the fact that sailors 
were part of a ship and viewed themselves as such; part of a weapon but not necessarily the 
ones that fired the guns.266 Yet physical distance and detachment from killing did not 
necessarily mean that sailors were unaffected. They were now undoubtedly at a greater 
distance to their enemy but Bourke has suggested that ‘combatants insisted upon emotional 
relationships and responsibility, despite the distancing effect of much technology’.267  It is 
evident that sailors did not distance themselves from the enemy and accepted responsibility 
for them, and this can be seen in attempts to rescue them if it were possible. Although sailors 
were naturally proud of their victory and the sinking of enemy ships, there is an element of 
humanizing present in the diaries and a demonstration of empathy. In particular, Thomas 
Hinshaw noted: ‘We have saved about 200 Germans, we have about 12 off the Leipzig and 
they say it was terrible yesterday’.268  
This stands in contrast to Jones’ assertions regarding the importance of combatants 
dehumanizing the enemy. Jones has posited that faced with the order to kill, men often turned 
to dehumanizing the enemy and promoting their own righteousness in an attempt to come to 
terms with their actions: ‘a way of bypassing inhibitions about killing’.269 This also served to 
incite hatred and encouraged acts of revenge killing.270 Terms such as “Hun” and “Bosche”, 
with their associated barbaric images, were therefore used by many soldiers to describe their 
enemy. However, sailor diaries do not suggest a high level of dehumanizing the enemy.271 
                                            
261 Jones, “Psychology”, p. 233 
262 Jones, “Psychology”, p. 233 
263 Bourke, Intimate, p. 35 
264 RNM 1980/115: Diary of Edwin Fletcher 
265 RNM 1998/43: Diary of Joseph Bamber 
266 For more information on the changing technology of gunnery on ships see Lavery, Able, pp. 212-214. 
267 Bourke, Intimate, p. 7 
268 RNM 2014/31: Diary of Thomas J. Hinshaw 
269 Jones, “Psychology”, p. 244 
270 Anthony Beevor, Berlin: the downfall 1945, (London: Viking, 2002), p. 170 
271 Similarly, accounts in the Hampshire Telegraph following the Battle of Jutland suggest terms such as these were not 
in common usage. See Hampshire Telegraph, 16 June 1916. This point is also made by A. Trystan Edwards who said 
114 
 
Instead the enemy is often referred to either as “them”, or by nationality.272 In addition, there 
is an element of respect and admiration for the enemy. For instance, Wood demonstrated the 
personalization that could take place. He described a bombing raid on their ships off the 
Dardanelles by a German aeroplane: ‘He was flying splendid [and] very steady... It was a 
splendid hit [and] credit is due to him whoever he was’.273 There is evidently a degree of 
appreciation for the skill of the enemy pilot, and Wood refers to the pilot himself rather than 
simply a German aircraft. Contrary to Jones’ argument, Bourke has argued that men also 
commonly personalized the enemy as a means of coping with stress and that this ‘formed a 
buffer against numbing brutality’.274 Nevertheless, Dennis did record a story he heard from 
some ratings regarding a marine who had been found ‘terribly mutilated, the head smashed 
and the stomach & legs hacked about, probably some result of German teaching in Kultur’.275 
Sailors were not therefore ignorant of the media and propaganda images published during the 
war but it is not evident that pejorative terms were common currency within the navy.276 
Another vitally important coping mechanism was humour and sailors adopted a distinct form 
of downplaying the danger and the pressure they were under.277 In particular, the Royal Navy, 
like the army, published its own magazines which poked fun at various elements of the war 
and masked some of its true horrors.278 Humour was a way of coping that could be employed 
every day and was not restricted unlike some of the other forms of stress relief considered 
here. Again, diaries reveal the common use of humour by sailors and their accounts are 
peppered with humorous comments. For example, Wood recorded: ‘several small guns fired at 
Queen E [HMS Queen Elizabeth] & she was hit 16 times but it was like throwing a flea at her 
anchor’.279 Similarly, Dennis reported his gun crew took out a Turkish gun believed to have 
been the one that gave Prince George a ‘smack’ the day before.280 These accounts downplay 
the seriousness of the situation and present shells hitting the ships as almost trivial. However, 
the shore-based batteries often managed to return heavy fire before they were silenced and 
there were near misses and damage done to the Royal Navy. Importantly what this also 
demonstrates, aside from a coping mechanism, is their underlying pride in the strength and 
superiority of British ships.281 The power of the Royal Navy was not going to be threatened by 
a lesser power firing a few shells.  
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272 See for example RNM 1984/467: Diary of Wood; Diary of Walter Dennis.  
273 RNM 1984/467: Diary of Wood 
274 Jones, “Psychology”, p. 244; Bourke, Intimate, p. 7 
275 Diary of Walter Dennis 
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In addition, enemy batteries were given names such as ‘Kaiser Bill II, Kier Hardy and Aunt 
Sally’, in an attempt to humanize and reduce the fear-factor of the enemy.282 Therefore, faced 
with the danger and knowing they had come through it, sailors were often flippant about 
engagements with the enemy. After a brush with an enemy destroyer in the opening days of 
the war, Wood noted that the enemy had ‘done no damage, only knocked paint off’.283 Again, 
this could be masking the truth in typical stiff-upper lip fashion but this demonstrates how 
sailors coped with pressure. However, Abbott suggested that sailors became used to the 
dangers, noting: ‘how soon one adapts themselves to circumstance and the disregard one has 
for danger’.284 Nevertheless, despite downplaying the seriousness of the situation, sailors 
needed time to rest and a break from the dangers by visiting a port for a few days. For instance, 
when leave was finally granted, Dennis recorded that it was ‘very welcome… everyone has had 
a very busy & trying time’.285 
A further mechanism was suggested by Baynham, who argued that disasters and accidents 
acted as a sort of ‘relief’ from the stresses of daily life at sea.286 In other words, Baynham 
argued, the regular accidents that occurred aboard and losses of other ships such as HMS 
Hampshire carrying Lord Kitchener, took sailors’ minds off the everyday threats that they faced 
at sea. The regularity with which sailors made a note of such accidents, which could often span 
a few days as further information filtered down, supports this hypothesis.287 Accidents and 
deaths on board are a common theme amongst the sample of diaries considered by this thesis. 
For example, Dennis described a ‘regrettable incident… a tube in C1 boiler burst, badly scalding 
5 stokers… All 5 men were suffering terribly, the flesh of their bodies peeling off’.288 W. Dawson 
aboard HMS Albion recorded hearing of the accident aboard Vengeance: ‘it was believed she 
had had an accident in her engine room’.289 This demonstrates that individual incidents aboard 
ships were interesting news to the crew of other vessels. Although it could also be argued that 
the regularity of these incidents reinforced the possible dangers that sailors faced as well, 
sailors accepted that their jobs were dangerous and accidents could easily happen.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated the complexities of the lower deck during the First World War. 
In particular, it has considered sailors alongside existing research on the Great War and placed 
them firmly within the historical narrative of socio-cultural studies, examining the competing 
ideologies and identities that made up their lower-deck culture. By specifically focusing on sailor 
diaries, it has enabled analysis of lower-deck testimony and presented a more nuanced 
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perspective. Importantly, it has shown that many sailors exhibited enthusiasm for war, despite 
the navy being a unique case which did not necessitate the same rush to the colours as the 
army. In addition, it has argued that sailor culture was intertwined with the public perception, 
which had been carefully crafted in the years leading up to the war. Sailors were conscious of 
how they would be viewed and determined to do their duty as was expected both by the public 
and their fellow sailors. Nevertheless, there was no universal feeling that existed for every 
sailor at the same time and this chapter supports the views of this thesis that the lower deck 
should be considered on an individual basis as well as collectively. Although sailors were 
enthusiastic for war, there were multiple reasons for this. On the one hand, it demonstrated 
imperial sentiment which formed part of the latent identity of sailors and was a key facet of 
their culture. Yet, it also demonstrated patriotism, both national and local, in addition to pride 
in the service itself and pride in individual ships and personal glory. As this thesis has argued, 
these were equally important concepts, distinct but also symbiotic. Therefore, whilst the 
boredom of stalemate naval war and the hardships endured resulted in negativity and the 
adoption of coping mechanisms, sailors did not lose their underlying imperialistic beliefs but 
took it on their own terms and allowed it to be subservient to other aspects as necessary. 
Furthermore, this chapter has advanced the historiography by considering the effect that killing 
and death had upon sailors, and has demonstrated that the Edwardian imperial image of noble 
sacrifice could be in conflict with other aspects of the sailor’s character. By drawing comparisons 
to the army, it has revealed sailors’ acceptance and involvement in the act of killing, and that 
they experienced similar nervous tensions to soldiers with the potential threat of mental 
breakdown. Likewise, sailors could exhibit feelings of both enjoyment and horror in killing the 
enemy, despite the distancing effect of modern technology. In order to deal with this they 
employed a variety of coping mechanisms, which allowed them to come to terms with their 
actions and protect themselves. Nevertheless, their testimony reveals that despite a level of 
enjoyment in battle they were affected by the death of friends, and also of their enemy. 
Importantly there was a degree of respect for their enemy, and sailors exhibited empathy 
towards those they had defeated because they, as fellow sailors, appreciated the inherent 
dangers of serving at sea.  
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Chapter Five 
Showing the Flag: sailors and the experience of naval 
propaganda in the 1920s 
 
Whereon, under the good Providence of God, the wealth, safety, and strength 
of the Kingdom chiefly depend….1 
 
After the First World War, the British Empire was increasingly challenged as the world’s premier 
power; Pax Britannica was effectively at an end.2 This was keenly felt by the Royal Navy which 
had, since the beginning of the twentieth century, been portrayed to the British public and the 
colonies as the most powerful navy afloat, and the shield of the Empire.3 However, the horrors 
of the Great War led to growing calls for universal disarmament, and the financial cost of 
winning the war resulted in an urgent need to “balance the books”. Consequently, as with 
Britain’s other military services, the navy’s numbers were to be cut dramatically. The navy’s 
cultural position and prestigious image was under threat. This was to stand in sharp contrast 
to the image constructed through carefully orchestrated naval theatre that has been considered 
in previous chapters.4 As such this was a turbulent time and this period witnessed the navy in 
flux as it sought to re-establish its position both in British culture and the world. Therefore, the 
1920s witnessed the continuation of naval pageantry and a number of important diplomatic 
overseas missions, known as “showing the flag”.5 However, despite the challenges presented 
by this period of the Royal Navy’s history, little attention has been paid to the socio-cultural 
implications of the reduction in size and power, and threat to prestige. Although historians such 
as Christopher M. Bell and Jon Wise have considered the economic and political implications 
alongside the Royal Navy’s position during the inter-war years, few have considered what effect 
this had on British sailors who were proud of the navy and its position in the world.6  
This chapter will reposition the cultural aspect of naval history during this period, and consider 
the challenges the Royal Navy faced at this time and the changes this brought. In particular, it 
will examine British sailors and their involvement with the diplomatic missions the navy 
undertook: their views on the Empire and the colonies, their experiences of pride, patriotism, 
                                            
1 The Naval Discipline Act, 1866 quoted on the title page of V. C. Scott O’Connor, The Empire Cruise, (London: Riddle, 
Smith and Duffus, 1925). 
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3 Jan Rüger, The Great Naval Game: Britain and Germany in the Age of Empire, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009 [first edition 2007]); p. 1; Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, (London: Penguin, 
2017 [first edition1983]); pp. 267-268 
4 See Chapter Two for further information. 
5 For the purpose of this chapter, the term “showing the flag” is defined in its broadest form as an event that showed 
the British flag abroad, but particularly as an officially organized visit to a foreign port. Jon Wise has called the term ‘a 
euphemism frequently applied to the appearance of the White Ensign in seaports around the world’ and has wisely 
warned of the dangers in the terms ‘generic nature’. Jon Wise, The role of the Royal Navy in South America, 1920-1970, 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2014); p. 3 
6 See the work of Jon Wise and also Christopher M. Bell, The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy between the wars, 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000). 
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and their relationship with imperialism.7 In so doing it explores the existing debate surrounding 
imperial sentiment. In order to do this, the practice of “showing the flag” will be considered 
with special attention being paid to the cruise of the Special Service Squadron, which traversed 
the globe between 1923 and 1924, and its visit to Australia especially. By examining the 
testimony of sailors who took part, it will suggest that sailors exhibited latent imperial 
sentiment. In particular, their expected experiences of “otherness” in the colonies were 
influenced by imperial perceptions and demonstrates the influence of imperial propaganda on 
sailor culture.8 However, it also argues that this was not universal and sailors continued to 
demonstrate independence particularly in their personal enjoyment.   
The Royal Navy in the 1920s 
Despite victory in 1918, the end of the First World War did not mark an end to hostilities for 
the Royal Navy. In particular, the navy played a role in the Baltic sphere of the Russian Civil 
War, the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire and Greek Independence.9 This period also 
witnessed the British Empire reach the zenith of its territorial extent, with increased demands 
being put upon Britain’s military resources.10 However, the financial cost of winning the war 
and the drastic changes in European politics meant that the post-war situation had a significant 
influence upon Britain and in turn the Royal Navy, and its sailors. The socio-economic situation 
in Britain during the inter-war period has been well considered by historians, and in this 
instance the navy has not been completely ignored.11 In particular, the rise of political activism 
on the lower deck culminating in the mutiny at Invergordon in 1931 has attracted scholarly 
interest.12 Nevertheless, it has not been examined in detail alongside studies of British culture, 
which is strange given the navy’s pre-war position and growing threat to its prestige, but this 
mirrors general trends of neglect already considered. 
The Government was understandably pragmatic about military costs and dramatically reduced 
the navy lists, although the naval budget was not curtailed with the same severity as that of 
the army.13 Bell has suggested that this was, in some part, due to the respect that was still 
                                            
7 Although an important aspect of sailors’ interaction with the colonies, the “run ashore” is not considered in detail by 
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‘feeling of “otherness” that the colonies helped to create’. Andrew Thompson, Empire Strikes Back? The impact of 
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Journal of Contemporary History, 2003, 38, pp. 171-185; p. 175; Arthur, True Glory, p. 155  
11 For more information on the British socio-economic situation generally see Keith Laybourn, Britain on the Breadline: 
A Social and Political History of Britain, 1918-39, (Gloucester: Alan Sutton, 1990); Martin Pugh, We danced all night: a 
social history of Britain between the wars, (London: Bodley Head, 2008). 
12 See for example Anthony Carew, Lower Deck of the Royal Navy, 1900-39: Invergordon Mutiny in Perspective, 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1981) which is recognized as a key text. The importance of Invergordon will 
be considered in more detail in Chapter Six. 
13 Harrington, ‘“Mighty”’, p. 175; Kennedy, Rise, pp. 270-273 
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paid to the Senior Service and the acknowledgement that the navy remained necessary to 
protect the Empire.14 On the other hand, Kennedy has argued that whilst it was inevitable for 
all the services to be cut, the army was hit worst because of the horror of the trenches.15 
Nevertheless, the changing diplomatic situation placed Britain under further pressure. The two-
power standard, never really viable, was now unmanageable and acceptance of the United 
States of America’s growing power was recognized as necessary. The British Empire simply 
could not afford an arms race with the USA along the lines of Anglo-German competition pre-
1914. Consequently, Britain adopted diplomatic pacifist measures such as the Washington 
Treaty in 1922, which limited the number and tonnage of ships nations could build.16 Adoption 
of the “Ten Year Rule” further curtailed the navy, hindering planning and the building of new 
ships by effectively ruling out the chance of the British Empire entering any significant war for 
ten years.17 This was met with criticism by many and as Captain Augustus Agar candidly wrote, 
‘it was obvious when looking ten years ahead that by 1932 our battle fleet would be obsolete 
and out of date’.18 
In addition to the financial challenges, the changing public attitude to popular militarism post-
war was to leave a conspicuous gap in the navy’s cultural image.19 The last event of British 
naval pageantry had been the Review in July 1914, which had followed the now established 
traditions of naval pageantry whilst also serving the additional purpose of reminding the 
European powers of British naval supremacy.20 However, the post-war situation was drastically 
different. Whilst the declaration of war witnessed the Fleet assembled at Spithead to 
tremendous crowds, the Armistice saw the Grand Fleet escort the defeated German ships to 
Scapa Flow without the cheering crowds and also to a location far removed from the majority 
of the British public, without royalty or any other semblance of the pageantry that had gone 
before.21 Although a correspondent from The Times referred to the German navy’s surrender 
as a ‘pageant’, it resembled pre-war naval theatre in very few ways.22 This was no victory 
parade for the Royal Navy. 
This absence of pageantry might appear strange given that the image of the Royal Navy had 
been carefully constructed and became a ‘cultural symbol’ prior to the First World War.23 
However, as Rüger and Wise have argued, this was the price ultimately paid by the navy for 
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its failure to defeat the Germans in an heroic naval battle worthy of Trafalgar.24 The importance 
of Trafalgar in both popular culture and naval circles should not be overlooked.25 For example, 
Adam Nicholson has argued that ‘the received idea of Trafalgar’ was the heroic ideal in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.26 Furthermore, Trafalgar ‘played itself out in the mind of 
Englishmen as a near-perfect example of violent moral theatre’.27 This is what the public had 
gone to war expecting. Yet following the war, collective public thought focused on the men of 
the army who had served and died in the trenches, and this was plainly reflected by the navy’s 
‘conspicuously small’ part in the Peace Celebrations of 1919.28 However, sailors’ views on the 
matter have been overlooked and is where this study breaks new ground. Given the sense of 
superiority that the navy and its sailors had enjoyed in British pre-war culture, it is important 
to question whether the challenges to the Royal Navy’s prestige affected sailors as it was 
intrinsically linked to their culture.  
On the face of it, British newspapers sought to portray the surrender of the German Fleet and 
the Royal Navy’s role in a positive light, and highlighted the pride of the victorious sailors. For 
instance, one correspondent wrote: ‘the justifiable pleasure of the Fleet in a work well done 
was shown unmistakably by the cheers of the ships’.29 However, the same correspondent also 
wrote, ‘there was deep satisfaction that the tedious task of the Navy had been fulfilled’.30 This 
is an interesting comment. Either the correspondent is referring to the monotonous experience 
of those sailors present at Scapa Flow, or is suggesting that the task of keeping the German 
Navy contained in the North Sea was beneath them.31 If the latter then he may have been 
attempting to demonstrate that the navy had done its duty even if it had not covered itself in 
glory. Meanwhile, another correspondent wrote: ‘British seamen… cannot understand this 
abject handing over of a fleet’; it was against the honour of the British sailor.32 Whilst this fits 
with the established heroic masculine image, sailors’ views on the subject are less clear. For 
example, on witnessing the surrender Edwin Fletcher made no mention of this apparent 
disgrace. He was relieved it was over whilst also proud of their accomplishment and wrote: 
‘The Germans surrendering their capital ships, brings the war practically to a close… it has been 
a good job well done. Thank God it is over’.33  
Officers’ diaries on the other hand suggest a different story. A number of naval officers, 
including Admiral Sir David Beatty, recorded a sense of ‘bitter disappointment’ amongst sailors 
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that their chance had not come.34 However, sailor testimony reveals that they were more likely 
to record jubilation that the war was over rather than disappointment and a belief that they 
had failed to play their part. Again, Edwin Fletcher contrasts starkly. Upon hearing of the 
cessation of hostilities he wrote:  
Hurrah… Hostilities ceased at 11AM. So I hope this finishes the war. Admiral 
gave a speech on the QD congratulating everyone. Order to “splice the 
mainbrace” tonight at 7. Boys also to have a tot of Rum… Everyone had a jolly 
time tonight.35 
This testimony demonstrates relief and celebration at the news, not a questioning of their duty, 
and again suggests that other elements of their culture could easily take precedence. Yet 
whether sailors did this after the initial relief had worn off is not reflected by their diaries.  
Therefore, there was an evident distancing from previous policy and aversion to acts of naval 
pageantry continued into the early 1920s in line with a critical re-evaluation of war and the 
militarism perceived to have led to the First World War.36 Jon Wise has said that, given this 
prevailing and understandable atmosphere, there could be ‘no return to the vast international 
naval spectacles of the pre-war years’.37 This changing atmosphere was demonstrated by the 
growth of anti-war literature, such as Ford Madox Ford’s Parade’s End (1924-1928) and Robert 
Graves’ Goodbye to all that (1929) which mirrored a society struggling to come to terms with 
what it had suffered.38 However, despite this negative attitude, naval pageantry was re-
established in 1924 when the Reserve Fleet was mobilized for the first time since 1914.39 
Although this was not without controversy.40 Nevertheless, the scale of the display was far 
smaller than the one 10 years before: losses in the number of ships both from the war and 
disarmament meant that the scale of the event had dramatically decreased.41 The navy had to 
rely on numbers being made up ‘by destroyers and minesweepers and a number of older 
vessels that were propped up for the display’.42 Consequently, any doubts about the continued 
importance and power of the Royal Navy was ‘not meant to show in its public celebration’.43 
As such, the re-introduction of naval pageantry remained an important development and 
allowed for the ‘re-opening of the naval theatre’.44 Certainly the navy still occupied a prominent 
position in British culture and, for example, was celebrated at the Wembley Exhibition of the 
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had any effect on the re-introduction of naval pageantry. 
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same year, demonstrating that it remained a visual symbol to the public.45 Billed as ‘Wembley’s 
Battle Fleet’, there was a display of model fleets celebrating great naval victories including The 
Armada, Trafalgar and Zeebrugge.46 This allowed some celebration of three key stages of 
British naval history. However, Jutland was conspicuous by its absence. The Devon and Exeter 
Daily Gazette suggested that as a subject Jutland was deemed too difficult to display due to 
‘the extremely complicated conditions of modern warfare’.47 This unobtrusively sidestepped the 
issue of which side was really victorious and was typical of the way in which contemporaries 
viewed it. Similarly, Brian Lavery has noted the importance of putting HMS Victory in dry dock 
in 1922, stating that ‘For many [it was] the greatest naval event of the 1920s’.48 This initiative 
followed a public appeal to save the iconic vessel.49 Therefore, continued attempts were made 
to celebrate British naval heritage by drawing links between old navy heroes of the age of sail 
and the modern navy in the minds of the British public, and popularizing great naval victories.50 
Furthermore, other aspects of pre-war naval pageantry were re-introduced regardless of the 
growing aversion towards militarism. This included public ship launches as early as 1920 with 
the traditional ceremony, giving some “normality” to the proceedings.51 Once again these 
launches were well publicized in the press. For example, HMS Frobisher was launched in 1920 
and the Daily Mail proudly reported: ‘the ship has cost (exclusive of armament) nearly 
£1,250,000’.52 However, what stands out is that there were now noticeably fewer launches 
being conducted. Thus the opportunity for naval spectacles was substantially reduced. The 
impact of this is difficult to measure. However, when HMS Rodney and HMS Nelson were 
launched in 1925, the press were eager to report the events as the newest post-Washington 
ships and the first launched in nine years.53 Therefore, this suggests that there remained a 
public appetite for grand ship launches.  
In addition, as naval pageantry began to increase once more, one event that became an annual 
calendar fixture in the late 1920s was the introduction of Navy Days. Bell has argued that these 
were ‘the most overtly propagandistic of the navy’s activities between the wars’.54 Lavery has 
also commented on their importance, saying it was ‘one answer to the navy’s declining 
prestige’.55 In particular, Lavery added that size and scale was important and suggested that 
Plymouth and Chatham ‘suffered because of the lack of facilities for the biggest battleships’.56 
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Nevertheless, Lavery argued that Navy Days were successful in popularizing the Royal Navy 
and cited sailor Bob Tilburn who stated that attending a Navy Day prompted his ‘one ambition 
to join the Royal Navy’.57 In Lavery’s words: ‘Navy Days certainly worked for Bob Tilburn’.58 In 
addition to Navy Days, Bell argued that the navy ‘found greater scope’ with the Navy Weeks 
which were held annually between 1927 and 1938, stating that their popularity ‘is attested to 
by contemporary press reports and the size of the crowds they attracted’.59 Thus despite the 
challenging situation, the navy continued to be a visual element of British imperial power and 
one increasingly utilized for publicity after the mid-1920s.  
“Showing the flag” 
Within the complex political and economic situation of the inter-war years, the Royal Navy was 
initially slow to reassert its place in the post-war world. In addition, the need to popularize the 
navy and reinforce its position overseas was not immediately recognized. The war-time 
propaganda machine was quickly dispensed with at the end of the war, regarded by many in 
authority as an abhorrent necessity that could now be abolished along with many other war-
time protocols.60 In particular, Wise has noted the unwillingness of the Admiralty to send a 
naval mission to Poland in 1920; when forced, the mission lasted a year before being 
summoned home due to Treasury pressures and continued lack of interest by the Admiralty.61 
Bell has noted that such overseas missions were initially viewed as ‘worthwhile’ by the 
Admiralty but of greater importance to ‘diplomats and statesmen’.62 Therefore, overt 
propaganda continued to be frowned upon by naval elites and, as Bell has argued, the belief 
that the navy should be the ’silent service’ remained deeply entrenched.63  
Yet, by the mid-1920s this view was changing. In particular, it was strongly argued that 
“showing the flag” would demonstrate the continued power of the Royal Navy whilst providing 
economic benefits to Britain’s flagging economy. It was believed that it would help to secure 
orders for British yards in foreign markets, aid British economic prosperity and reassert Britain’s 
imperial position in a difficult political environment.64 Bell has argued that the Royal Navy 
should be credited with a degree of success for its attempt, stating that the ‘low cost of the 
programs’ made showing the flag ‘at least cost effective’.65 This success is predicated on the 
acceptance that the Royal Navy remained a powerful symbol and a useful propaganda tool. Bell 
has thus argued that the ‘navy was the most visible symbol of British power and prestige abroad 
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during the interwar period, and the Admiralty never questioned the link between naval strength 
and national influence’.66  
Certainly officers like Captain Augustus Agar did not doubt the importance of showing the flag.67 
Agar wrote that:  
When it became known that the flag worn by the ship was the White Ensign of 
the Royal Navy… any apprehension which those ashore may have previously 
felt were at once allayed. Instead of fear there was confidence and goodwill, 
because the White Ensign signified authority in support of law and order.68 
Agar’s imperialistic tone demonstrates his belief in Britain’s civilizing mission and reveals the 
reasoning of naval elites. This was similarly demonstrated by sailors, although rarely couched 
in quite so openly imperialistic terms. Whether other nations actually felt reassured is beside 
the point; what is important is that the navy, officers, and sailors thought this was the case.69 
Agar’s account of the Royal Navy between the wars is understandably biased, but nevertheless 
it provides an interesting description of the navy’s role as a tool of political and imperial 
propaganda. The ultimate adoption of a showing-the-flag policy demonstrates that naval elites 
and the British Government believed in its ability to promote and support the Empire.  
Consequently, during the 1920s and 1930s a number of showing-the-flag missions were 
undertaken. As Wise has stated, these made use of ‘the best-known and most powerful 
warships in the Royal Navy’ in order to create the greatest impact.70 HMS Renown conveyed 
the Prince of Wales across the globe between 1919 and 1922, and the Duke and Duchess of 
York in 1927; HMS Repulse took the Prince of Wales to South Africa, West Africa, and South 
America in 1925.71 However, Bell has raised an interesting point. Evaluating the success of 
showing-the-flag missions is a secondary issue; it is more important that the naval elites 
believed this to be true and thus whether this was an holistic belief amongst sailors generally 
should be queried. Wise makes the salient point that there were important ‘diplomatic 
subtleties’ present when showing the flag.72 In addition, there were carefully planned elements 
designed to generate the most propaganda from the visit, such as ‘the pre-arranged itinerary, 
the timing, [and] the type of vessel employed’.73 Nevertheless, as Wise noted, port visits have 
elicited very little interest from historians except as part of a chronology of other events.74 
Again, this thesis builds upon this by considering sailors ashore during these visits especially 
as part of the Empire Cruise and seeks to move beyond the work of historians such as Spence 
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and Buckner.75 The Empire Cruise was the most notable of the navy’s attempts to “show the 
flag” and involved a large-scale round-the-world cruise of the Special Service Squadron from 
1923 to 1924. This cruise has been called ‘a new undertaking’ by Ralph Harrington as it was 
‘specifically a demonstration of naval power’ rather than simply a royal tour.76 This extensive 
enterprise will form a case study in this chapter and consider testimony from sailors who took 
part. In particular, it examines their attitude to the Empire Cruise juxtaposed to the inter-war 
situation.  
From the start, the imperial element was very visible, as Wise has argued:  
The stated purpose of this major undertaking was to emphasize the link 
between these far-distant lands and the Crown and to remind those countries 
of their dependence on British sea power.77  
For instance, the Admiralty records relating to the cruise note the desire for: 
sending a really representative Squadron of our most modern ships round the 
Empire… in order to follow up any agreements for co-operation at the Imperial 
Conference by creating Dominion interest and enthusiasm so that such 
agreements may be really carried out.78 
Similarly the official reporter who accompanied the cruise, noted journalist and author V. C. 
Scott O’Connor, wrote that the purpose was expressly declared: ‘to meet our kinsmen overseas, 
to carry to them a message of peace and goodwill, and to revive in their hearts and in ours the 
ties that bind them to us, and bind us to them’.79 This was a propaganda drive par excellence. 
Wise has argued that officers were certainly aware of this and openly discussed the point, citing 
one midshipman who noted in his diary ‘the propaganda purposes of the enterprise’.80 
The Admiralty attempted to promote imperial links still further by arranging for HMAS Adelaide 
to accompany the Special Service Squadron on the return voyage from Australia.81 Ostensibly 
this was for the purpose of training exercises, but was recognized by the Admiralty as a useful 
show of imperial unity at a time when it was coming under increased pressure.82 In effect this 
meant that the best British ships were touring the world accompanied by the best of one of its 
chief Dominions. This was picked up by Australian newspapers, and The Telegraph (Brisbane) 
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boldly stated it was ‘a matter of pride’.83 Nevertheless, the importance of this was ignored by 
both sailors and O’Connor who made only fleeting reference to HMS Adelaide.84 
However, the aims of the cruise were clear: to strengthen links between colonies and the 
mother country. It was billed as a success by the Royal Navy and received popular support in 
both British and overseas newspapers. For example, upon its return The Times declared: ‘The 
Squadron has done a great work, a work of which none living may measure the scope and the 
full consequence. It has been on a mission; it has sown the seed of Empire loyalty’.85  
Nonetheless, its enduring legacy is less certain. For example, the film commissioned to 
document the cruise, Britain’s Birthright, was described by Bell as a ‘commercial failure’.86 
Firstly, the navy struggled to find a film maker prepared to support the venture, suggesting 
that both the enterprise and the navy as a subject were not deemed popular topics. Bell 
highlighted this point and argued that a key reason for this was that new technologies, such as 
aeroplanes, were drawing public attention away from the navy.87 Secondly, the film was not 
popular abroad, and The Times reported that the film was ‘refused by all the Dominions’ and 
only shown by private enterprise.88 This is particularly thought-provoking given the interest the 
ships received abroad, and suggests that the novelty factor was an important draw rather than 
imperial sentiment or links to the mother country. The Times also suggested that a key reason 
for this failure lay in the Americanization of the film industry and stated that ‘in some Dominions 
the theatres are very largely in the control of American interests’.89 Similarly, this loss of market 
share by Britain was noticed in other ways. For instance, in Australia, one sailor noted that 
‘English motor firms were not adapting to the Australian market and needs thus losing out to 
America’.90  
The success of showing the flag therefore depended upon imagery and the ability to appeal to 
the public. In particular, as Wise highlighted, the type of warship selected was important.91 
There was a great deal of complexity behind the choice of ships to be sent depending upon the 
particular politics of the mission. This is evident from the Admiralty records documenting the 
planning process for the Special Service Squadron, and there was some debate over which 
ships should be chosen to go.92 Whilst it was proposed that “the best” ships should be sent, it 
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was thought by some within the Admiralty that this show of strength would be counter-
productive at a time when the Dominion navies were being encouraged to contribute more 
towards imperial defence.93 Nevertheless, it was strongly argued that the benefits of sending 
“the best” outweighed the concerns, and it was decided that those ships most capable of 
projecting the image of imperial power should make up the squadron. However, logistical 
factors were also important such as the size of the harbours and the fleet’s refit schedule so 
that ships selected would be available to go and there would be no detrimental effects.  
In the Admiralty’s opinion, HMS Hood was the natural choice to lead the squadron as the most 
modern and powerful battlecruiser afloat and the largest warship in the world.94 Although a 
widely studied vessel, few historians have specifically considered the cultural impact of HMS 
Hood. Ralph Harrington has bridged this void and demonstrated the links between the inter-
war navy and British culture and how, like HMS Dreadnought, Hood became so iconic. 
Harrington has called Hood’s selection for the Special Service Squadron ‘a necessity’, arguing 
that she was one of the most visible elements of British naval prestige between the wars.95 As 
the greatest of the British battlecruisers, Hood was ‘referred to almost routinely as “the pride 
of the navy”’.96 Harrington argued that, ‘in many ways the fact that the Royal Navy could still 
claim to have the largest, fastest, most costly warship afloat was a significant element of Hood’s 
particular status’.97 Hood’s position in British popular culture was reinforced by a strong 
propaganda drive following its commissioning in 1920 as part of a concerted attempt to counter 
the perceived challenge to British naval prestige.98  
For instance, Harrington argued the reasoning behind sending HMS Hood was that: ‘The 
appearance of the biggest warship in the world off the shores of imperial cities across the globe 
was naturally intended to provoke awe in those who beheld her’.99 This is supported by sailor 
testimony which suggests that British seamen were also very aware of the imposing power that 
their ships represented. For example, on their arrival at Cape Town in heavy fog, Arthur Russell 
recorded:  
Great disappointment was felt by all through the existence of the bad weather 
– because nothing looks more inspiring and beautiful than to watch from the 
shore Britain’s two largest warships and four powerful cruisers slowly steaming 
into harbour, the decks of each ship lined with bluejackets and the bands 
playing a “march”.100  
                                            
93 ADM 116/2219 
94 Wise, The role, p. 21; Harrington, ‘“Mighty”’, p. 179; See also ADM 116/2219. 
95 Harrington, ‘“Mighty”’, p. 179 
96 Harrington, ‘“Mighty”’, p. 171; Richard Hough, The Longest Battle: the war at sea 1939-45, (London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, 1986); p. 89 quoted in Harrington, ‘“Mighty”’, p. 171 
97 Harrington, ‘“Mighty”’, p. 174 
98 Harrington, ‘“Mighty”’, pp. 173-174; Hood’s prominent position in the Special Service Squadron further assisted in 
cementing its image as the symbol of British naval power in the inter-war years. Just how deeply this image resonated 
with the British public is perhaps shown by the horror at its cataclysmic loss in 1941 and continued interest in its history 
and sinking. See also Harrington, ‘“Mighty”’, pp. 171-172; Taylor, End, pp. 202-207; The Guardian, 24 July 2001. 
99 Harrington, ‘“Mighty”’, p. 179 
100 RNM 1988/259/1: Diary of Arthur Russell 
128 
 
It is unclear whether Russell is referring to the locals or the crew by the use of the word “all” 
but nevertheless it suggests he believed that the fleet was awe inspiring. Furthermore, Russell 
suggests that there was demand for the squadron to visit ports in addition to the organized 
cruise programme. It was decided that Hood and Repulse were to call at Mossel Bay, Port 
Elizabeth, East London and Durban and he wrote: ‘each port holds an excited and enthusiastic 
population – the excitement being due to the fact that the Admiral has proposed to stay at 
each port for about 12 hours and allow the people to see the “floating power” of Britain’.101 
Similarly, in Malaya Woolman proudly noted the excited locals and what he perceived as the 
keen interest displayed by these subjects of the British Empire. He described a visit aboard by 
a group comprising Tamils, Sikhs, Japanese, and Chinese stating: ‘Of such and many other 
types were the motely throng that swarmed here, there and everywhere aboard the two huge 
ships. Of such is the great British Empire composed’.102 More humorously however Douglas 
Poole was aboard HMS Carlisle on his way to the China Station when the Special Service 
Squadron called into port. His initial words were not of the grandness of the sight or pride in 
seeing the squadron but rather: ‘The arrival of the S.S.S. was a sign for a break in the weather. 
Hitherto it had been nothing else but sunshine’.103 
Nevertheless, sailor diaries demonstrate that the response from both white and indigenous 
populations was typically one of awe and excitement in seeing the ships, which was interpreted 
by the sailors as pride and loyalty to the Empire.104 For instance, Russell wrote: ‘Many visitors 
came aboard during the afternoon and their faces shewed that the latest warships with their 
powerful guns filled them with pride.105 However, the dichotomy between the visual effect of 
the ships on indigenous and white inhabitants was paramount and recently Harrington has 
argued that HMS Hood meant different things to different people in the colonies: to the 
Europeans she ‘symbolized and made real a remote and intangible homeland’ and to the 
indigenous population she reinforced ‘the power and beneficence of their imperial overlord’.106 
This suggests some support for O’Connor who noted that ‘she has warmed the hearts of our 
own people, striving to maintain under conditions of exile… the greatness of the Empire they 
serve’.107 In addition, sailor diaries support this dual role. For example, Frederick Bushell wrote 
regarding white colonial desires for a link to home: ‘met a very nice old Scotchman who has 
come from Pretoria [to Cape Town] to see the Fleet’.108 Meantime, Russell continued to 
demonstrate the power instilled on the locals. Writing about his experience at Freetown in 
Africa, Russell noted: ‘today we had about 200 black visitors – they were exceedingly 
pleased’.109 A further entry continues in this vein:  
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many chiefs of various tribes visited the ship today – some carrying ornamental 
spears and other dangerous looking articles of warfare. They marvelled in the 
size of our 15’’ guns… I think, by the expression on their faces they would far 
sooner face a spear than our guns.110 
Again, this reflects the awe that the locals felt but also demonstrates Russell’s pride in the size 
and power of the ship. Furthermore, Russell stated: ‘These people are indeed lucky because 
there are thousands in England who have never seen a warship’.111 This is an interesting 
comment given the close proximity to the First World War and the level of pre-war naval 
pageantry. It is perhaps telling of the lack of naval pageantry post-war and its perception by 
sailors as to the lack of interest in the Royal Navy by the British public.  
The other ships that took part in the Empire Cruise were chosen, therefore, as suitable escorts 
for Hood: the most modern of their class to ensure the world saw the best of the Royal Navy. 
This included Repulse, Delhi, Dauntless, Danae and Dragon. It is unclear whether the choice of 
HMS Delhi was due to the proposed visit to India (which was cancelled fairly early in the 
planning stage), but the Admiralty records suggest it was simply because it was a modern ship 
of a suitable class and would be available.112 Nevertheless, Rüger has pointed to the importance 
of links forged between locations and ship names, therefore this is an interesting point to 
raise.113 The Special Service Squadron did call at Trincomalee, Ceylon (present day Sri Lanka) 
where the name may have aroused some additional interest.114  Contemporaries were cognizant 
of local links and, in his chapter on the visit to Malaya, O’Connor made reference to HMS Malaya 
which was gifted to the Royal Navy by the Malay States.115 Sailors were also aware of the 
patriotic connotations of this and Arthur Russell wrote during their time in Malaya: ‘The ships 
are open to visitors in the forenoon from 9.30AM rather an unusual privilege – but really not 
too great a privilege for such a patriotic nation – the people having presented to Britain the 
fine Battleship HMS Malaya’.116 Therefore, sailors were aware of these imperial links, although 
the extent to which this was also reinforced during the cruise by commentators such as 
O’Connor is unclear.  
In addition, the ports to be visited during the Empire Cruise were chosen with a specific 
diplomatic agenda. For example, the selection of the Protectorate of Zanzibar was called ‘an 
unlikely destination’ by Bruce Taylor.117 However, Taylor argued that Zanzibar was considered 
an important location to visit in order to demonstrate the continued power of the Royal Navy 
to the protectorate, as it had witnessed the surrender of HMS Pegasus in 1914: the first British 
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surrender in a hundred years.118 Therefore, there was a desire to make an example to the 
protectorate. For instance, Bushell noted: ‘Dressed ship and fired a Royal Salute of 21 guns for 
Sultan’s benefit’.119 Whilst this salute would have been dramatic and have demonstrated the 
power of the navy, Bushell does not comment on whether he was aware of this. It is 
unsurprising that O’Connor makes only a slight mention of the loss of HMS Pegasus before 
blaming it squarely on the inadequacy of Zanzibar to field its own navy and the importance of 
having one to protect the coast.120 Again, this signifies the necessity of their link to the British 
Empire, their dependence upon it, and that they should be grateful for its continued protection.  
Conscious efforts were made to impress British power on the locals throughout the cruise and 
events were specifically organized to do this. Simple things such as the searchlights being 
aimed on the African coast during the night had a powerful political message. Harrington 
argued: ‘The ships’ searchlights were a particularly effective means of conveying their ability 
to project British power across the globe; visually dramatic, effective far inland, distinctly 
modern, and echoing the power and penetration of gunfire’.121 Wise supports this, stating: ‘the 
mixed message behind this powerful announcement of the ship’s presence was 
unmistakable’.122 However, although the effect on the locals was not doubted, it is unclear 
whether sailors understood or were conscious of this deeper meaning. Russell, aboard HMS 
Hood, certainly noted the use of searchlights on the African coast but simply recorded the 
exercise each time he saw it.123 Meanwhile Frederick Bushell found such displays an 
inconvenience, writing: ‘Searchlight display from warships in harbour interrupted our cinema 
several times’.124  
Nevertheless, this relative silence should not be taken as evidence that sailors were unaware 
of the deeper meaning behind aspects of the cruise such as this. Furthermore, their diaries 
documenting the various port visits do much to counter this suggestion and demonstrate 
recognition of the politics behind displays. For example, Wilfred Woolman described a 
ceremonial march past of a naval brigade at Singapore numbering 2,000 men, complete with 
artillery: 
This march undoubtedly impressed the natives. In the early part of the war 
[First World War], there was a mutiny among the Sikh regiment at the Tanglin 
barracks, Singapore, which was nipped in the bud by a party landed from HMS 
Cadmus and thus prevented what would have proved an ugly affair. This show 
of force today evidently brought back that incident vividly to the minds of the 
inhabitants and impressed them with the might of Britain’s power.125 
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Therefore, Woolman not only demonstrates an awareness of the politics behind the display but 
also that he believed the event was an important success and reinforced British imperial power 
to the colony which he did not question. 
However, despite the key aim of the enterprise and the overt imperialistic displays by the cruise 
abroad, the departure of the Special Service Squadron from Britain was distinctly low key, and 
very different from pre-war naval theatre. Although the 1920s saw the gradual reintroduction 
of naval pageantry, Taylor stated that the ships sailed ‘without fanfare’.126 Somewhat strangely 
perhaps, contemporaries who were otherwise promoting the Empire Cruise did not hide this 
apparent lack of enthusiasm. In particular, O’Connor wrote that the squadron: ‘departed from 
our shores without any noise or circumstance, their departure stirring scarcely a ripple upon 
the calm surface of English life’.127 O’Connor argued that this was due to the disillusionment 
and hardship caused by the war, suggesting that the public appetite for such pageantry was 
still considered to be low.128 Although the papers reported on the squadron’s departure, without 
a dramatic spectacle and large crowds, the lack of pageantry made it a challenge to make it 
newsworthy.129 For instance, the Daily Mail reported on the departure early on 28 November 
1923 and that the ships were ‘heartily cheered by Service men in the dockyards as they passed 
down the harbour’.130 Local papers do not add much, although the North Devon Journal noted 
that ‘among the crew of the flagship “Hood”, are two well-known Barnstaple men’, which may 
suggest some local pride in their involvement.131 
Similarly, sailor diaries reveal few differences to departing on a typical commission, 
commenting on the weather and receiving messages of good wishes from ashore, and do not 
suggest that they thought this lack of publicity odd.132 However, Woolman hinted at the 
situation by noting that the squadron: ‘weighed anchor and silently, unostentatiously glided 
off’.133 On the other hand, their quiet departure was not overlooked by one officer who served 
on Hood during the cruise. C. R. Benstead was more candid and wrote that they had:  
idly speculated upon the manner of send-off our people would give. The subject 
was controversial, but we agreed that a vast crowd would see us depart… We 
sailed; and there were none to bid us good-bye.134  
Although Benstead does not go into detail regarding the controversies, this lends support to 
the argument that the navy’s position in popular culture was deeply affected by the changing 
opinion of the British public. It also suggests that sailors were expecting some level of 
enthusiastic display. Some may have experienced pre-war naval pageantry, and more would 
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have witnessed it. Instead it appears that the Admiralty observed the mood and was fearful of 
a public backlash if they made a spectacle out of it.135 Interestingly, Rüger has not commented 
on the Empire Cruise and it may be that its success aided the reintroduction of naval 
pageantry.136 Whilst the cruise may not fit the typical naval theatre that Rüger investigated, it 
is a strange omission given that it put the navy on the world stage once again and his study 
continued into the 1920s and 1930s.  
Eager flag wavers? Sailors’ thoughts on “showing the flag” 
Although there was a muted atmosphere at home, the Empire Cruise was an important 
undertaking with imperial (and economic) aims, and had been well-planned to ensure 
maximum effect. Furthermore, the scale and duration of this spectacle of naval pageantry 
meant that sailors were very much a part of the nature of the cruise. Consequently, how they 
engaged with “showing the flag” is important, as this put them undeniably at the forefront of 
the British imperial mission. The cruise meant sailors would be away from home for ten months 
and therefore the Empire Cruise would significantly affect them.137 Bruce Taylor succinctly 
summed up the Empire Cruise: ‘For most it was the beginning of an unforgettable adventure, 
the zenith of the peacetime Navy. For others… it was a desperate wrench’.138 To demonstrate 
the “wrench”, Taylor gave an example of an officer who was a newlywed and for whom the 
cruise meant time away from his bride.139 However, Taylor argued that “for most” it was an 
“adventure” and the inference is that it must have been an enjoyable experience, yet he 
neglects to consider the lower deck in detail. It is also interesting that O’Connor avoided 
discussing the attitudes of sailors as they departed from Britain, simply noting: ‘Of those who 
were concerned in the personal fortunes of each one of those men who sailed from England in 
these ships, this is no place to speak’.140 However, as it was his mandate to promote the Empire 
Cruise, it is surprising that O’Connor did not choose to portray sailors’ enthusiasm. This 
suggests that sailors may not have been overt in their enthusiasm, and this view may be 
supported by the diaries’ lack of description regarding their departure.  
However, it is more complicated than this. Firstly, Wilfred Woolman suggests to the contrary 
by noting the background excitement prior to the departure of the squadron:  
For weeks past, the great cruise has been the one topic of conversation 
dominating all others. Again and again the itinerary has been gone over on 
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maps and charts and now a globe is brought into the mess with the trip marked 
on by a white strip, adding a new zest to the journey…141  
Therefore, Woolman suggests there was a degree of excitement and interest in the experience 
amongst the lower deck. Similarly, Russell indicated his feelings at being part of the cruise 
when, following an announcement made by the captain, he wrote: ‘he tells us that H.M. the 
King is very interested in this cruise (so am I)’.142 On the other hand, Frederick Bushell noted 
with some humour: ‘it is a small consolation to know that we are on the way home, though we 
are going a long way round to get there’.143 This suggests an element of veracity to Taylor’s 
argument and that it depended on the personal circumstances of the sailor as to how they 
viewed the experiene. 
Nevertheless, despite the adventure it promised, within a few days of the squadron leaving 
Britain some sailors were already grumbling at the tedium of the voyage. For example, Bushell 
stated with evident sarcasm: ‘This lovely cruise is getting rather boring’.144 Perhaps even more 
telling is a further comment: ‘I have to be inoculated early next week, that should relieve the 
monotony somewhat’.145 Although presumably humorously meant, it is suggestive of the level 
of boredom sailors were experiencing. This view is also suggested by Russell who wrote, ‘one 
feels rather depressed after staring at the sea for 5 or 6 days on end’.146 Woolman expressed 
a sense of boredom, too, noting: ‘we had a whist drive in the mess, making a very welcome 
break to the monotony’.147 It is somewhat contrary to the image of the exciting Empire Cruise, 
and indeed the popular image of sailors as adventurous, uncomplaining stalwarts of the Empire, 
to hear them - only a few days into their voyage - complaining of boredom.148 Perhaps adding 
to this was a lack of routine training exercises recorded by sailors in these opening days, which 
usually helped to instil some structure in their daily lives.149 Yet, despite the apparent grumbling 
of the men, the diaries demonstrate that many were excited at the prospects the Empire Cruise 
offered. Whether this reflected their own imperial sentiment, eagerness for adventure or a 
combination of both needs to be considered.  
As the main objective of the cruise, visits to British colonies feature highly in sailors’ diaries. 
For many it was their first visit to these ports and consequently they were usually detailed in 
their description. After the monotony of day-to-day life at sea, the “otherness” of the colonies 
was the experience that they wanted to record for posterity. Arthur Russell made this clear 
when he wrote that ‘Naval affairs afford little or no interest to diary holders’.150 Their language 
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is revealing of how they perceived the Empire but, more importantly, it demonstrates how 
imperialist ideas had been adopted into sailor culture. In particular, Russell described the 
approach to Port Swettenham like something from a Boy’s Own Paper story, demonstrating the 
excitement and also the link to imperial adventure: 
it indeed thrilled me – having at last actually steamed up a river between 
jungles which I have read so much about in books – I eagerly scanned the 
outer edge of the jungles with a telescope with the hope of perhaps being able 
to see some wild animals but I was doomed to disappointment.151  
However, on their arrival there was little celebration and Russell described the Chinese locals 
who turned out to greet them: ‘the Chinese spectators watched us pass by and their faces bore 
no signs of emotion at our great dimensions they simply wore the stolid expression so 
characteristic of Orientals’.152 It is unclear whether Russell had picked up this stereotypical view 
of “Orientals” from previous experience or perhaps from popular imperialist stories. However, 
this account suggests he had a clear picture in his mind of what he might experience.  
Sailors were acutely aware of their surroundings and noted items of interest, including tangible 
links to Britain and the Empire. For example, at Zanzibar Wilfred Woolman noted a prominent 
feature: ‘In the main street is a tall milestone, the first reading on which is London, 8064 
miles’.153 This would have served as a focal point to all locals, traders and visitors, constantly 
reminding them about the trade link of which they were a part. Furthermore, Woolman 
suggested that the link to the Empire, and indeed home, was particularly evident, noting the 
common sight of packaging in shops: ‘one is suddenly carried back home by seeing such things 
as Sharp’s Kreemy Toffee in the tins so familiar in England, Coleman’s Mustard, Sunlight Soap, 
etc.’.154 Although not specifically referring to it, Woolman is drawing a link to trade and to the 
Empire which clearly had an effect on him and demonstrates latent thoughts of imperial culture.  
Furthermore, considering sailors’ experience of patriotism in the colonies provides an insight 
into their own relationship with imperialism. In particular, it demonstrates the contrast between 
imperialism for white and indigenous populations, and also sailors’ own perceptions of 
“otherness”. For example, whilst at Sierra Leone, Russell noted that: 
German is never used now in Sierra Leone – many of the black soldiers here 
proudly wear the Great War medals… Altogether they are proud of England and 
quite happy and content under British Rule.155  
This suggests that Russell understood this to be a demonstration on the part of the locals to 
eschew anything as unpatriotic as the language of their Empire’s vanquished enemy. However, 
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he does not explain or demonstrate he was aware of whether this was due to government 
edicts or enforcement. Bushell, on the other hand, was ‘surprised’ to hear the locals singing 
‘“Yes we have no bananas”’ and noted that ‘they seem to know most of the old wartime 
songs’.156 However, he makes no comment as to why they have learnt these songs or any 
reference to their involvement in the war. This surprise suggests that he had not considered 
their involvement in the Great War.  
Nevertheless, despite recognizing patriotism amongst indigenous populations, the size of the 
colony and the port being visited, and whether it was a white majority population, was an 
influencing factor in the scale of the reception and how patriotic it was. For example, at 
Auckland Frederick Bushell enjoyed their arrival and wrote that: 
The Harbour Board building is beautifully illuminated and has Haere Mai! Haere 
Mai! written in lights which in Maori means “Come Here. Come Here (or 
welcome gallant sons of the sea)!!” and there are the usual signs on the 
buildings such as “Welcome to the Boys in Blue” “Safeguards of the Empire” 
etc. until we are not quite sure what we really are, and shall soon imagine we 
are real sailors.157  
Putting aside his humour and general excitement at the welcome, it is clear that he felt pride 
at the greeting they received. This stands in contrast to other experiences of local languages, 
notably at Singapore where the men attended a dinner at the town hall which had been 
decorated by Chinese locals. However, being in the presence of some government officials who 
translated the banners with Chinese characters decorating the building it appears that 
messages reading ‘dear departed one’ and similar funerary themes were being displayed which 
prompted Arthur Russell to note ‘the Orientals take advantage of the ignorance of the white 
race for not knowing the Chinese language’.158  
Consequently, some of the most patriotic receptions that the Special Service Squadron received 
were in the primarily white Dominion of Australia where the squadron called at various ports.159 
Woolman recorded a particularly positive experience:  
For nearly four months, we have been travelling around Australasia and on 
leaving it I cannot help but reflect on the fact that here we have vast dominions 
with resources scarcely touched, where there is work for everyone who is 
willing to work and where everyone seems happy, contented and 
prosperous...160  
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Woolman added, ‘Many people, not content with giving entertainment and hospitality, have 
added valuable souvenirs to weld the links of friendship which binds the colonies to the mother 
country’.161 Thus he recognized it as a place where one had the ability to better one’s self but 
he also speaks with a sense of pride that it is a British possession and delight in the evident 
links he felt existed between Australia and Britain. 
On the other hand, Russell presents a rather negative view about the colony and wrote:  
A great many immigrants from our own little island were abroad and they were 
not slow in telling us how they have fared during their stay in Australia – so far 
I have not met one who is content with his lot…162 
Nevertheless, despite Russell’s reservations about the opportunities offered by Australia, he 
evidently enjoyed the patriotic displays he witnessed. Russell noted as he and a party of men 
journeyed into the countryside:  
it was inspiring to see so many clothes props bearing the Union Jack – some 
people had hung their flags on the fence of their garden close to the rail track. 
Groups of kiddies hunger over the… window sills, garden fences, and railings 
cheering and excitedly jumping up and down waving little flags & handkerchiefs 
– of course we being full of pride & perhaps (swank) waved our hands or saluted 
the elderly people. (Oh! well if you want to know. Yes! we waved our hands to 
the young ladies too!163  
When encountered, displays of patriotism were assumed to be exhibitions of universal pride in 
the Empire.164 This suggests that the imperialistic atmosphere had an effect on sailors and they 
were more likely to respond favourably when it was encountered. 
However, although the majority of ports offered a warm welcome, the squadron’s visit to the 
port of Hobart on the island of Tasmania was a stark contrast to their mainland Australia visit. 
It was the most unenthusiastic visit recorded by sailors during the entire cruise and more 
surprising because it had a predominantly white populace. Woolman noted: ‘There was no 
display of bunting, such as we have seen at all our other ports of call, and only a few flags here 
and there’.165 Summing it up, he continued:  
No cars were provided for us – we had to find our own way and walk through 
the muddy streets in our uniforms. The people we passed showed not the 
slightest interest. After Melbourne, it was so noticeable. It was the coolest 
reception we have had so far. Perhaps we have been spoilt and expect to be 
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made a fuss of everywhere we go, but there was not a vestige of enthusiasm 
displayed anywhere…166  
Similarly, Bushell commented on the atmosphere: ‘There were comparatively few people at the 
dock to see us come alongside and it seems very quiet after our last two ports’.167 The following 
day Bushell went ashore and he ‘did not get a very good impression of Hobart… there seemed 
to be absolutely nothing to do at all’.168 The local and Australian press, such as The Argus 
(Melbourne), blamed the weather, although the Tasmanian Daily Telegraph noted: ‘despite 
unpropitious and hazy weather… thousands of loyal Tasmanians greeted the advent of the pride 
and flower of Britain’s Navy by demonstrations of enthusiasm and national fervour’.169 Another 
paper proclaimed, in contrast to Woolman’s comments, that ‘Jack ashore had a good time’ and 
enjoyed ‘motor car rides’ and ‘free tram rides’.170 
On the other hand, O’Connor wrote that the people of Hobart appeared more English, ‘their 
manner more reserved, and quieter and less expansive than that of the Australians’.171 
However, O’Connor conceded that the Special Service Squadron was not met with much 
enthusiasm and suggested the reason for this coolness was that the effects of convict life had 
‘reached their most poignant’ in Tasmania and ‘cast a gloom over the city’.172 Unsurprisingly 
O’Connor’s chapter on the visit to Hobart is relatively short.  
Considering another published account therefore allows further excogitation of this point. For 
instance, C. R. Benstead did not avoid the subject but detailed a rather surprising story:  
Inspired by an organisation avowedly hostile to British interests, the voice of 
calumny had been raised against us… The general scheme was this: in the 
visiting Squadron the men were convicts who preferred to serve their sentence 
in His Majesty’s ships instead of his prisons…173  
Benstead concluded that once this had been countered the people of Hobart were very 
welcoming.174 The veracity of Benstead’s story is unclear but he was an officer trying to make 
light of the experience in a published account and thus clearly wished to project imperial unity. 
However, later that year a memorial tablet was installed at a signal station in Hobart to mark 
the squadron’s visit, leaving an indelible mark on the town.175 This was originally proposed by 
a private benefactor but the local board ‘recognising the “usefulness” of such a plate to visitors, 
deemed it a duty to the public to carry the idea into effect’.176   
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Nevertheless, sailors were much affected by the lack of enthusiasm they encountered 
especially, as Woolman noted, after what they had experienced previously. Whilst Woolman 
and Bushell were vexed by the lack of opportunities they encountered, this was not simply 
annoyance at not being made a fuss of. Although their previous success undoubtedly increased 
their awareness of this, it is likely that this also affected their own sense of pride and made for 
an uncomfortable time.177 In particular, that they experienced this in a white colony perhaps 
added to the surprise at the less than friendly welcome. A similar situation occurred at Quebec 
in Canada, however here sailors noted that it felt as if they were in a distinctly French town 
rather than a British one. For instance, Bushell noted: ‘Quite 80% of the people speak nothing 
but French… from the matelots point of view the only redeeming feature is that beer is 5 cents 
per glass!’.178 Similarly, Woolman wrote: ‘Quebec is undoubtedly French’.179 Bushell also 
suggested a lack of awareness of the Empire and recorded stopping at a little store ‘kept by an 
old woman who had an idea that England was where the King and Queen lived’.180 This 
testimony suggests some feeling of affront to sailor pride but was perhaps assuaged somewhat 
by the feeling that the colony was “distinctly French” unlike the experience at Hobart which 
could not be excused by “foreignness”.  
Another important aspect of the port visit was opening the ship to visitors, known as “At Home” 
days. These provided an opportunity to further demonstrate the power of the Royal Navy to 
locals. They also allowed an opportunity for the men to interact with the locals, particularly the 
white colonials, and both gain more from the imperial community spirit. For example, at 
Fremantle Bushell wrote: ‘At present my head is full of such details as: length of Hood… I hope 
they are all correct to a few places of decimals as I have been repeating them parrot fashion 
to visitors all day’.181 “At Home” days provided the chance for sailors to make friends with the 
locals for whom they would conduct guided tours of the ship and treat to tea in their mess. The 
point of this was an expected reciprocal arrangement whereby their new acquaintances would 
take them around the port town and show them the sights.182  
Therefore, this was not just a visit of ships and sailors to a port town but also the port town to 
ships and sailors. This was an important facet of the visit to sailors, and led to some annoyance 
when there was no reciprocation. As Woolman noted: ‘usually, people like to show their 
appreciation by inviting us in return and help us to see some of the sights of their town. I was 
a little piqued, therefore, when they said “well, good-bye and thank you very much”’.183 In 
addition to guided tours, visitors were able to buy souvenirs of their visit: a tangible reminder 
of the Empire Cruise and one that would serve as a reminder of the strength and power of the 
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Royal Navy. Russell suggests that these were popular and following their visit to Trincomali 
recorded: ‘Our ship’s bookstall takes the eye of all the visitors and hundreds of “Repulse” 
photographs are purchased during the visiting hours. It was necessary to send to England for 
another 3,000’.184 Sailors would also pose for photographs with their visitors: another tangible 
reminder.185  
One aspect of these “At Home” days evidently enjoyed by some sailors was the hosting of 
children’s parties aboard. Indeed this fits with the stereotypical image of the sailor: a diligent 
family man.186 Woolman enjoyed these parties and described them in some detail. For instance, 
at Cape Town he described the cancellation of the children’s party due to bad weather and 
wrote: ‘we heard later that Cape Town… was a city full of crying children’ because of this.187 
Following another party, Woolman noted: ‘All the attractions were well patronised, not only by 
the kiddies but by the grown-ups too, who were simply amazed to find such things on board. 
Many of them confessed they thought the children would be bored for three hours on board 
the ship’.188 On the other hand and in contrast to this image, Bushell remarked on being asked 
by a female visitor to help find her missing children and was unimpressed at the task of looking 
for lost children amongst the crowds.189 
However, there was more to this than a reflection of imperial imagery. Sailor testimony 
suggests a degree of pleasure in these open days and seamen recorded interesting encounters 
with the locals. Their language demonstrates that sailors took pride in their ships and enjoyed 
showing them off to visitors but they also enjoyed the chance for social interaction and new 
experiences. Nevertheless, the repeated demands made upon them and the vast numbers of 
visitors aboard caused some inconvenience to sailors, which impacted upon their own comforts 
and could cause irritation. For example, Bushell complained about the crowds and wrote: ‘Mess 
absolutely crowded for tea. Sat opposite two giggling girls, quite took away my appetite’.190  
Public interactions with the sailors was particularly important. As this thesis has argued, sailors 
were a vital part of the imperial image of the Royal Navy and the sailor as a construct was 
equally important. They were a fundamental part of the pageantry and in particular the 
extended pageantry when the navy came ashore in the colonies and took part in organized 
marches. These served to further reinforce upon the locals the power of the Royal Navy and its 
men. As Arthur Russell commented at Zanzibar: ‘Still further have we ventured to exhibit the 
efficiency and power of our navy’.191 Route marches attracted significant public interest and at 
Zanzibar, even on a small scale march to the church accompanied by Hood’s band, Bushell 
recorded that they ‘were nearly stifled by the swarms of natives running alongside’.192 Similarly 
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Russell stated that a march in which he took part ‘was a complete success and was the event 
of the visit – thousands of people of all nationalities greeted us with cheers’.193 Likewise at 
Cape Town, Wilfred Woolman wrote of ‘A route march through the town by marines and parties 
landed from each ship which evidently delighted the inhabitants’.194  
Whilst these marches could demonstrate power and create excitement, they also allowed 
different experiences depending on the audience. For example, at Fiji Woolman noted: ‘The 
natives watched the procession with the utmost reverence, but there was no waving of flags 
or cheering’.195 This did not dampen his opinion of their success. This suggests almost godly 
worship of the bluejackets. In comparison, where there were white audiences, displays of “tub-
thumping” patriotism were far more evident and the mood was expected to be different. There 
was less superiority and a different sense of pride. Consideration of local newspapers lends 
support to sailor testimony. For example, The Brisbane Courier wrote: ‘The principal event of 
the visit of the English naval squadron to Adelaide took place this morning’ and described it as 
‘a glorious and impressive spectacle’.196 Its most patriotic comment summed up the event: ‘The 
huge crowd remained steady, and gazed with wonderful appreciation at the units of the British 
Navy, and gloried in the thoughts of the great traditions associated with Britain’s supremacy of 
the sea’.197 Thus these different forms of imperialistic appreciation again demonstrates the dual 
role of the cruise and the contrast between white and indigenous populations. Nevertheless, it 
suggests a level of awareness amongst sailors but also pride in how they were viewed.  
However, although they enjoyed the fuss, it is again evident that sailors sometimes found 
ceremonial duties tiresome.198 This is hinted at by Russell who wrote: ‘It was terribly hot on 
the march but no one faltered or openly complained’.199 This suggests that complaints may 
have been made in private. Therefore, although recognized as their duty and an order to be 
obeyed, participation was viewed by some sailors as a chore, as Russell noted regarding their 
visit to Port Adelaide. He was one of 150 men given shore leave whilst another 800 took part 
‘in the ceremonial march in Adelaide. So by 9AM Port Adelaide was overcrowded by sailors and 
marines – we with a cool appearance and the others sweating out their very lives’.200 His sense 
of smugness is barely contained. On another ceremonial occasion, at Fremantle, Russell wrote: 
‘I was not there this time (and I’m not sorry either) a rifle gets a bit weighty in these 
climates’.201 Again, this also reveals the balance between duty and personal enjoyment.  
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Colonial experiences: imperial sentiment v personal enjoyment 
The experience of sailors in the colonies therefore raises an important question regarding what 
seamen felt about their interactions with the colonies and imperialism as a whole. As this 
chapter has argued, sailors were aware of their part in the Empire and proud of Britain’s 
position, and of what they regarded as their colonies. However, the concept of “pride” is a 
complicated issue. Although sailors were displaying pride in the Empire, it is also evident that 
alongside this there was individual pride in the ships and the service as well. This combination 
is demonstrated by an incident of international rivalry described by Frederick Bushell. Recording 
their arrival at Zanzibar he noted the USS Concord was in harbour and wrote in his diary: 
‘Yankee light cruiser type boat lying in harbour when we arrived and soon were scooting round 
in a motor boat of theirs but they soon piped down when we hoisted out our CMB [Coastal 
Motor Boat]’.202 There is a sneer of superiority in this comment, demonstrating his pride in the 
Royal Navy and a belief that British vessels were better than American ones. This sense of 
superiority is interesting given the economic situation at the time and its effect on the Royal 
Navy through the Washington Treaty and, of which the sailors must have been aware.203 
However, the Empire Cruise was to show the world that Britain still had the biggest, most 
modern ships, and that Britannia still ruled the waves. Therefore, Bushell’s testimony suggests 
this idea still had some currency with British sailors.  
Therefore, there is a danger in seeing sailors’ pride in their ships simply as synonymous with 
pride in the Empire. Although this chapter has demonstrated that sailor culture fostered 
imperial sentiment, such sentiment is more often implied than stated, and there is little 
evidence to suggest that imperial sentiment was a single factor. For example, Russell noted 
that on leaving Cape Town they had ‘left behind… a high reputation for the British Navy’.204 
Similarly Woolman wrote: ‘Once more the Special Service Squadron has scored a success and 
won the hearts of the people of Vancouver and British Columbia generally with, it is hoped, 
permanent results’.205 Therefore, although the Empire was important, the Royal Navy’s 
reputation, intrinsically linked with their own, was also important and a source of pride.  
In particular, the pride and patriotism that sailors believed the colonies demonstrated helped 
shape their interpretation. Given the level of organization, it is not surprising that none of the 
diaries considered describe witnessing any dissent in the colonies.206 Instead sailors’ testimony 
suggests many accepted without question that local inhabitants were proud of the Royal Navy 
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and, by extension, the Empire.207 Again, this confuses matters as there is no clear demarcation 
between pride in the navy and pride in being part of the Empire. Sailors did not consider which 
the greater draw was: the novelty of their visit or patriotism. If they did, then they did not 
make the distinction. Although they were aware that the ships were an awe-inspiring sight they 
equated this primarily with pride and respect. Therefore, sailor testimony suggests they did not 
question that the colonies were better off under the aegis of the Union Flag.208 Whether 
consciously or subconsciously, sailors felt some degree of benign duty of care to those people 
under their protection suggesting that this element of imperial thinking was part of the wider 
sailor culture.209 
However, despite this, it is necessary to question the importance of their enjoyment and the 
role this played; in particular, how vital it was for sailors to have an opportunity to relax.210 
The opportunities presented by the different colonies was very much at the forefront of sailors’ 
minds. Furthermore, the interest shown by sailors does not necessarily equate to interest 
simply because they were British colonies.211 What was on offer was an important factor and 
itineraries and ports of call formed a common topic on the lower deck, and older sailors would 
have shared with their younger messmates their own experiences of different ports: which 
were good and which were bad, and what was available for their entertainment.212 For example, 
one of the most anticipated visits was to Australia. Already possessed of a reputation as a place 
where people could make something of themselves, Australia was a colony with great potential 
draw to the sailors who visited. Prior to their arrival, Russell recorded: ‘I am really getting quite 
enthusiastic about our long stay in Australia because it is supposed to be a very pleasant 
land’.213 This demonstrates his expectations and the thoughts and feelings he has formulated 
about Australia either from books, hearsay, or propaganda. Similarly, enjoying themselves was 
clearly on Bushell’s and his friends’ minds. On one visit ashore in Australia he wrote: ‘Should 
have caught the 9-30 train to some unearthly place in the bush… but we conveniently made a 
mistake & went to Adelaide’.214 Sailors were adept at finding the experience they wanted. 
Furthermore, sailors also used this opportunity to visit friends or family members who had 
emigrated and the diaries describe a number of liaisons.215 Again, this demonstrates a sense 
of independence amongst sailors, that they would take matters into their own hands if it were 
possible, especially when the potential benefits outweighed the possible repercussions. 
                                            
207 As previously mentioned, sailors were usually good at recognizing when they were unwelcome visitors and thus this 
one-sided report of local patriotism suggests that concerted efforts were made to keep any disruptions hidden.  
208 RNM 1988/259/1: Diary of Arthur Russell; RNM 2004/55/1: Diary of Frederick Bushell 
209 This has been used by others as a defence for empire. In particular, see Agar, Showing, p. 26. 
210 This has been considered in previous chapters, particularly Chapter Three and Chapter Four. 
211 For instance Woolman proclaimed that the USA’s territory Hawaii was superior to the British colony Jamaica; See 
RNM 1999/31: Diary of Wilfred Woolman. 
212 RNM 1999/31: Diary of Wilfred Woolman; McKee, Sober Men, pp. 84-101  
213 RNM 1988/259/1: Diary of Arthur Russell; Although Russell was ultimately disappointed as discussed above. 
214 RNM 2004/55/1: Diary of Frederick Bushell 
215 RNM 1999/31: Diary of Wilfred Woolman; Stone, Hero, p. 87 
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Larger colonies had more to offer sailors, assisted by the more-developed imperial societies 
present such as the Navy League who catered to the sailors’ needs.216 For instance, Douglas 
Poole also wrote that the Special Service Squadron enjoyed, ‘The Squadron club being open in 
which 1,000 meals were served daily and as much beer… as you wish’.217 Russell added to this: 
‘Here the men can obtain beer and refreshments also cigarettes, free of charge’.218 On the 
other hand, smaller colonies provided fewer opportunities for sailors to have fun ashore, as 
Russell noted at Zanzibar: ‘It is of course obvious to any sensible fellow that the people of this 
island cannot entertain us on a lavish scale’.219 This also reflects the difference between white 
and indigenous populations. For example, Poole noted: ‘The European community ashore has 
arranged a varied programme of entertainments for the amusement of the sailors during their 
stay’.220 Although usually giving a warm welcome, native colonies lacked this imperial 
infrastructure catering towards sailors’ enjoyment, and cultural differences could not always 
bridge the gap. In particular, it is important to recognize how sailors viewed race, and its 
influence on the manner in which they reported their experiences abroad. For example, it is 
evident that whether the population was white or indigenous was important. They were very 
conscious of the difference and noted when there were fewer white people in the colony.221 
However, this should not be seen simply as xenophobia but rather that sailors relied heavily 
on white locals to provide an opportunity for them to enjoy themselves within their own cultural 
expectations.222  
Nevertheless, indigenous peoples provided a much desired experience of the exotic which 
formed part of the globe-wandering experience.223 This is demonstrated by the detail sailors 
used to describe their experiences, from the local customs and curiosities to the outrageous 
attempts at Westernization. For example, sailors made fun of the locals who: ‘were either naked 
or wearing ridiculous imitations of European clothing’.224 Thus they satisfied the “exotic” and 
“uncivilized” stereotype.225 Displays such as snake charming and tribal dances provided simple 
and cheap entertainment which sailors enjoyed but viewed with varying degrees of scepticism 
and amusement. For example, on having his fortune told Bushell remarked: ‘It was most 
amusing, in all probability I should have been a Admiral if I had another 5/- in my purse but 
he could only make me happy and “comfortable” with my last two shillings – “oh what fools 
these mortals be”’.226 However, there is a distinct lack of respect for these customs and 
                                            
216 For instance Launceston in Australia was proud that it was the first Australian town to have a Navy League and its 
ability to provide entertainment for the British Sailors. See Daily Telegraph (Launceston), 8 March 1924.  
217 RNM 1994/253/1: Diary of Douglas Poole 
218 RNM 1988/259/1: Diary of Arthur Russell; See also RNM 2004/55/1: Diary of Frederick Bushell. The importance of 
alcohol should not be discounted as sailors often wrote of their drinking exploits and the encounter with American 
Prohibition. See RNM 1999/31: Diary of Wilfred Woolman; RNM 2004/55/1: Diary of Frederick Bushell. 
219 RNM 1988/259/1: Diary of Arthur Russell 
220 RNM 1994/253/1: Diary of Douglas Poole 
221 RNM 2004/55/1: Diary of Frederick Bushell; RNM 2014/59/1: Diary of LSA Reynolds 
222 For further information on “otherness” and how this was used to define “Britishness” see Thompson, Empire Strikes 
Back?, pp. 179-202. 
223 McKee, Sober Men, pp. 166-167 
224 RNM 2004/55/1: Diary of Frederick Bushell  
225 Whilst racism was common this was casual and typical of the time and defined superiority. In particular, the rise of 
orientalism and the portrayal of natives in British culture. For example, see Mackenzie, Propaganda, pp. 39-66. 
226 RNM 2004/55/1: Diary of Frederick Bushell; This line is taken from A Midsummer Night’s Dream by William 
Shakespeare and suggests that Bushell is fully cognizant of how foolish such superstition is. 
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although “otherness” was exotic and exciting, it was simply viewed and absorbed as something 
to be enjoyed and experienced.  
The importance of enjoyment is shown further by the disappointment recorded when ports and 
colonies did not live up to their reputation. For example, Russell was disappointed with Australia 
and did not find it as enjoyable as he had expected, stating: 
The Australian people of this port [Fremantle] are very nice but they are 
rather too abrupt in their mannerisms. They are not slow to speak their mind 
and by doing so perhaps quite unconsciously injure the feelings of some of 
us.227  
He also noted that there was a lack of interest from the Australian women and this may also 
have influenced his views. Following a dance party he wrote: ‘only 2 females condescended to 
dance with our chaps. At this we were greatly surprised because at Cape Town, dancing on 
board was accepted with enthusiasm’.228 On the other hand, Bushell did not encounter the 
same problem and made a number of female acquaintances whilst in Australia, and it appears 
that this particular episode may have added to Russell’s negative experience.229  
However, despite the adventure and wide variety of events laid on to provide entertainment, a 
number of sailors found the Empire Cruise a tiring experience. The length of the cruise and the 
constant demands made of them increased the wishes to be home and for the cruise to be 
done with. Woolman summed this up succinctly: ‘we are all thoroughly fed up with all this joy-
riding and are all longing to be home’.230 Although couched in jocular terms, “joy-riding”, it is 
evident that he meant a degree of seriousness with this comment.231 Similarly, on the home-
run across the Atlantic, Bushell wrote that: ‘most people have written for each day of this week 
– at sea – as there is nothing else to note’.232 On finally arriving in his home port Woolman 
wrote: ‘home at last’; Bushell noted ‘cheering ship’ as the squadron broke up but gave no 
further sense of his feelings at returning.233 Nevertheless, the Empire Cruise returned with 
glowing praise from the colonies especially for the behaviour of all the sailors who had taken 
part and who had formed a crucial part of showing the flag.234 
Conclusion 
This chapter has considered the Royal Navy and its sailors during the inter-war years, especially 
focusing on its continuing role in supporting the Empire despite the changing economic and 
                                            
227 RNM 1988/259/1: Diary of Arthur Russell; One Australian paper wrote that Australians are ‘naturally hospitable’ but 
that there had ‘been some good-natured badinage’ with the British sailors. World (Hobart, Tas.), 1 April 1924 
228 RNM 1988/259/1: Diary of Arthur Russell; Whether any stereotypical British/Dominion views had a bearing on this 
is unclear but perhaps the white population in South Africa was more welcoming. 
229 RNM 2004/55/1: Diary of Frederick Bushell 
230 RNM 1999/31: Diary of Wilfred Woolman 
231 See also Lavery, Able, p. 83 
232 RNM 2004/55/1: Diary of Frederick Bushell 
233 RNM 1999/31: Diary of Wilfred Woolman; RNM 2004/55/1: Diary of Frederick Bushell 
234 Eastern Districts Chronicle (York, WA), 7 March; Sunday Times (Perth), 18 May 1924; The Times, 5 July 1924; Stone, 
Hero, p.87. Taylor has noted the importance of all the troublemakers being discharged before the squadron sailed to 
remove the danger. Taylor, End, p. 23 
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political situation. By appraising the continued use of naval pageantry, despite the disruption 
of the First World War, it has examined sailors abroad in the Empire at a time when the navy 
was being used to reinforce Britain’s imperial image. Their involvement, and position in British 
culture, ensured that sailors were fully aware of their status and image. As such, it has revealed 
that feelings of pronounced imperial sentiment continued to form a key element of sailor culture 
during the inter-war years. Nevertheless, it also demonstrates the importance of the wider 
discourse. Imperial sentiment meant different things at different times depending upon 
circumstance but became more pronounced during episodes of increased patriotic fervour, 
particularly during the heady imperialistic atmosphere of the Empire Cruise. Such sentiment 
was latent and formed part of the way in which they interpreted and made sense of their 
experiences. Sailors approached their encounters confident in British superiority over both 
white and indigenous populations and with an unquestioning belief in their role as the premier 
naval power. However, examining episodes of “showing the flag” reinforces the arguments of 
this thesis and demonstrates that although pride in the Empire was overarching, equally 
powerful were feelings of pride in themselves, their ships and the service itself. These formed 
part of the construct of imperial sentiment but were not always synonymous with it and could 
be interpreted differently by sailors.  
Furthermore, it is evident that sailors used the opportunity to enjoy themselves and explore 
the colonies they visited and demonstrates their independence to imperial aspects of sailor 
culture; it was a culture that sat underneath an imperial agenda but was not governed by it. 
Consequently, their enjoyment was equally important to any understanding or acceptance of 
the cruise’s imperial aims. This was a body of men who wanted excitement and is demonstrated 
by the more difficult encounters described by the men, especially at Hobart. In particular, 
although experiences of “otherness” were exciting, sailors welcomed cultural similarities and 
recognized that white colonies would provide better enjoyment for them. Nevertheless, their 
expectations were undoubtedly predicated upon some understanding of the colonies portrayed 
through imperialist channels and their vivid descriptions of encounters with the “exotic” 
supports the image of the globe-trotting adventurer. Although sailors could form their own 
interpretations, their experiences were couched in terms they were familiar with and ultimately 
viewed through the prism they occupied.  
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Chapter Six 
Firing up the boilers: sailors and imperialism in the 
1930s 
 
If we were challenged in the Mediterranean, please God that challenge would 
be properly met.1 
 
The 1930s witnessed increasing tensions in Europe with the resurgence of Germany under the 
Nazis and the strengthening of dictatorships in Italy and Spain. In consequence, the naval 
disarmament treaties of the 1920s, which had achieved a moderate level of success, gradually 
fell away, and by the mid-1930s British rearmament had begun in earnest.2 The uncertainty of 
global affairs during the 1930s demanded that Britain reassert itself on the world stage and, 
as the key symbol of the Empire, the Royal Navy was increasingly called upon to do this. 
However, the economic situation at the beginning of the decade resulted in a naval mutiny 
which struck at the bedrock of British imperial prestige.3 As such, this is a period of naval 
history that has understandably enjoyed a healthy interest by historians concerned with the 
political, economic and strategic aspects of the Royal Navy. This chapter expands the existing 
debate, juxtaposing the experiences of sailors alongside a number of key events, which 
challenged both the Empire and the Royal Navy’s image. In particular, it examines The 
Invergordon Mutiny, The Abyssinian Crisis, and The Spanish Civil War. In addition, it continues 
to consider the theme of naval pageantry, which gained greater importance as British naval 
power was challenged and the navy reverted to imperialistic displays to position itself on the 
world stage. Finally, it examines the beginning of rearmament in order to demonstrate the 
complexity of sailors’ characters as feelings of patriotism, duty, and concern over the threat of 
war came together. By considering these themes, this chapter posits that despite a weakening 
of British imperial prestige, the image of the Royal Navy remained integral and, more 
importantly, the Empire remained an important facet of sailor culture. Setting this within the 
wider discourse of British imperial sentiment, their testimony demonstrates that they remained 
convinced they were the finest sailors and that the Royal Navy (and by extension the British 
Empire) was pre-eminent.    
                                            
1 Sir Roger Keys MP quoted in The Times, 8 April 1936 
2 Emily O. Goldman, Sunken Treaties: Naval Arms Control Between The Wars, (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1994); p. vii  
3 Kenneth Edwards, The Mutiny at Invergordon, (London: Putnam, 1937); p. 11; Stephen Roskill, Naval Policy between 
the Wars: Volume 2 The Period of Reluctant Rearmament 1930-1939, (London: Collins, 1976); p. 89; Christopher M. 
Bell, ‘The Royal Navy and the Lessons of the Invergordon Mutiny’, War in History, 12, 2005; pp. 75-92, p. 76 
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The Invergordon Mutiny 
In September 1931, following an announcement of a reduction in pay, the sailors of the Atlantic 
Fleet of the Royal Navy mutinied at Invergordon when they refused to put to sea for 
manoeuvres. The Times reported events with evident understatement: ‘The promulgation of 
the reduced rates of naval pay has led to unrest among a proportion of the lower ratings’.4 
Although popular memory has almost forgotten the mutiny, at the time the impact upon Britain 
and the world was resounding.5 As a key symbol of the British Empire, the mutiny of the Royal 
Navy had severe political and economic ramifications which threatened to undermine Britain’s 
place on the world stage. The mutiny forced Britain to abandon the Gold Standard, and Alan 
Ereira has argued that ‘it is hard to overstate the importance’ of this given what had happened 
to the German economy.6 Similarly Kenneth Edwards, a retired officer and one of the first 
historians of the mutiny, wrote: ‘in British minds, for more than two centuries, the Royal Navy 
had been regarded as the symbol of Great Britain’s character and fortune; the very foundation 
of her security’.7 Therefore, this was a defining moment for the Royal Navy in the 1930s, and 
would continue to overshadow the navy for the remainder of the period.8 Certainly, the 
importance of the mutiny should not be understated. Perhaps most importantly for the sailors, 
it forced the Government to concede to their demands in front of the world.  
Consequently, the Invergordon Mutiny has attracted a degree of interest amongst historians.9 
However, this has typically been from an economic and political history perspective. Edwards 
produced the first study in 1937 and this was followed by David Divine in 1970 after the initial 
release of Government papers, and then Stephen Roskill in 1976.10 The topic has continued to 
attract some scholarly attention since the 1970s with the causes of the mutiny eliciting the 
most debate. In a charged atmosphere of naval treaties and pay cuts designed to balance the 
books, there were a number of issues affecting the Royal Navy at the beginning of the 1930s. 
The historiography of this divides into two schools of thought. The first, promoted by both 
Edwards and Roskill, argues that blame ultimately rests with the Admiralty’s handling of the 
situation in announcing the pay cuts and the belief amongst sailors that they had been 
betrayed.11 To some extent Brian Lavery has supported this approach, stating that the 
Admiralty displayed ‘spectacular incompetence’.12 The second, taken up by Anthony Carew, put 
the emphasis on the long-term factors affecting the navy over the period and that class tension 
was a key issue.13 Carew caveated himself by stating that this ‘point is certainly not without 
                                            
4 The Times, 16 September 1931 
5 Edwards, Mutiny, p. 11; Roskill, Naval Policy, p. 89; Bell, ‘Royal Navy’, p. 76 
6 Alan Ereira, ‘The Hidden Life of the British Sailor’, History Today, 1982; pp. 27-32, p. 27 
7 Edwards, Mutiny, p. 5; Rüger has argued strongly regarding the navy’s role as a symbol. For further information see 
Jan Rüger, Great Naval Game: Britain and Germany in the Age of Empire, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
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8 Roskill, Naval Policy, pp.131-132; Anthony Carew, The Lower Deck of the Royal Navy, 1900-39: Invergordon in 
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9 See for example Edwards, Mutiny; David Divine, Mutiny at Invergordon, (London: Macdonald, 1970); Roskill, Naval 
Policy; Carew, Lower Deck; Bell, ‘Royal Navy’, pp. 75-92. 
10 Stephen Roskill served as official historian to the Royal Navy. 
11 See Edwards, Mutiny; Roskill, Naval Policy; Bell, ‘Royal’, p. 87. 
12 Brian Lavery, Able Seaman: The Lower Deck of the Royal Navy, 1850-1939, (London: Conway, 2011), p. 288 
13 See Carew, Lower Deck. See also Bell, ‘Royal’, p. 87-88. 
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relevance’ although as a solution ‘is too simple’.14 The importance of long-term factors has 
been recognized by other historians, such as Lavery, who also noted the existence of deeper 
issues behind the mutiny. Lavery stated that ‘to the lower deck it was the last straw’ and that 
the continuous pressure placed on the navy was damaging for morale.15 Similarly Edwards 
suggested that long-term issues played a role, affecting morale, particularly the policy of 
disarmament and the sight of half-built ships rusting on the stocks whilst famous warships 
were broken up.16  
However, a recent approach by Christopher M. Bell has been particularly succinct in 
excogitating the existing historiography, arguing that both schools fail to deal with the issue 
satisfactorily.17 Instead, Bell advocates that ‘the main causes of the Invergordon mutiny must 
be sought in short-term factors, and in particular the Admiralty’s inept handling of the pay 
cuts’.18 Bell’s argument is commendable and does much to counter Carew’s hypothesis 
regarding the strength of class tension which, although undoubtedly present, did not exist on 
the scale he envisaged.19 Sailors did not blame their officers for the situation nor (except in 
one recorded incident) attempt to harm them.20 Importantly, the blame was not laid at class 
level but at the Admiralty as an entity.21 Set within the confines of this thesis, it is important 
to be aware how the Royal Navy – a benchmark of the imperial image – mutinied and what this 
meant to those who took part. In particular, it will consider their loyalty – an important factor 
at the time but one that historians have so far failed to capitalize on in the wider debate over 
levels of imperial sentiment.  
Nevertheless, examining the socio-cultural aspect of Invergordon presents additional problems 
for historians seeking to move beyond official records; perhaps an indication of why this area 
remains relatively untouched by historians.22 Stemming from a desire by all involved to protect 
themselves and their position, there is a significant silence on the matter. Mutiny is one of the 
severest of naval crimes and threatened the careers of both sailor and officers alike.23 Although 
in the aftermath the Admiralty effectively swept the incident under the carpet, it is 
understandable that officers in the Atlantic Fleet wanted to protect themselves against 
accusations of wrongdoing; and sailors had to look out for themselves and their crewmates.24 
As Ereira has said, ‘everyone had a reason to conceal what they knew’.25 The fear of 
recriminations was well-founded as the Admiralty discharged a number of sailors “services no 
                                            
14 Carew, Lower Deck, p. 162 
15 Lavery, Able, p. 288 
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17 Bell, ‘Royal Navy’, pp. 87-88 
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19 See Carew, Lower Deck; See also Bell, ‘Royal’, p. 88. 
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21 Bell, ‘Royal’, pp. 88-90 
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23 Divine, Mutiny at Invergordon, pp. 19-21; Lavery, Able, pp. 66-69 
24 Ereira, ‘Hidden’, p. 31 
25 Ereira, ‘Hidden’, p. 31 
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longer required” following the mutiny.26 Despite adopting a “conspiratorial” tone, Ereira noted 
the difficulties in using other material such as diaries and logs to study the mutiny, stating that 
even officer’s private diaries were self-censored and ‘in some cases, pages were glued together. 
Ships logs were written up most selectively’.27  
Thus far the majority of historians have overlooked lower-deck testimony, focusing primarily 
on the published accounts – the most cited being the autobiography of Len Wincott published 
in 1974.28 Wincott was a self-styled ringleader and one of a number of sailors discharged 
following the mutiny. His autobiography was damning of the existing historiography, arguing 
that historians had not engaged with sailors themselves but had based their research on official 
records.29 However, although his criticism is valid, this does not negate from his own overt 
agenda.30 Both Edwards and Divine gave credence to Wincott’s role in the mutiny and relied 
upon a pamphlet published in 1931 and attributed to Wincott.31 However, this is controversial 
as Wincott later denied having anything to do with the production of this pamphlet.32 As such 
Roskill urged caution, believing it to be an exaggerated account from a sailor whose word could 
not be trusted.33 Roskill argued that historians have given such weight to Wincott because the 
first historians to engage with the Invergordon Mutiny had no other lower-deck testimony at 
their disposal.34 Roskill’s caution has some strong foundations given the almost unquestioning 
belief in Wincott’s statements by both Edwards and Divine.35 Yet, despite accepting this 
shortcoming, Roskill similarly failed to seek out and examine sailor testimony in detail.  
Therefore, Wincott raises a valid point. Although Ereira highlights the lack of sailor testimony, 
there is enough material extant to give some indication of lower-deck sentiment. In particular, 
and the paramount point, the silence on the subject of the mutiny is resounding. Given what 
was at stake it is unsurprising that lower-deck diaries are more than usually reticent on the 
subject.36 Nevertheless, this silence is important and deserves consideration. A deliberate 
silence is precisely what this absence of lower-deck dialogue represents since collectively the 
lower deck was aware of the situation at Invergordon. To argue that there was a lack of 
knowledge and information about what was happening at Invergordon would be incorrect. As 
Commander Arthur Layard noted: ‘The air is full of cypher messages about this pay reduction 
and trouble in the A. F. [Atlantic Fleet]’.37 This suggests that sailors would have had an 
understanding of what was going on, even in the absence of newspapers. In any event the 
                                            
26 Roskill, Naval Policy, p. 121; ADM 178/114 
27 Ereira ‘Hidden’, p. 31 
28 See Len Wincott, Invergordon Mutineer, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1974). 
29 Wincott, Invergordon, p. 85 
30 Len Wincott was a member of the British Communist Party and later defected to Soviet Russia. For further information 
see Roskill, Naval Policy, p. 100. 
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32 Roskill, Naval Policy, p. 100 
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37 RNM 1990/271: Diary of Commander Arthur Layard; Layard was serving overseas with the Mediterranean Fleet at 
this time.  
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foreign press picked up the story with eagerness and on 23 September 1931 Layard managed 
to see a paper and wrote in his diary: ‘In other words plain mutiny’.38 Poignantly, there were 
also isolated incidents aboard other Royal Navy vessels. In particular, HMS Delhi was in the 
West Indies and mutinied in sympathy which, although quickly resolved, resulted in visits to 
American ports being cancelled.39   
Diaries of sailors serving overseas, and thus removed from the mutiny itself, are also 
conspicuous in their absence of making any critical comments. For instance L.A.C. Cantellow 
simply wrote: ‘News came through about the reduction in pay’ and made no further 
observations over the following days.40 Thus this silence suggests a desire to commit nothing 
to paper which might incriminate them. This is perhaps not so unusual, as historically sailors 
had shied away from discussing politics openly or in their diaries.41 Again, officer diaries can 
give an added perspective beyond that offered by most lower-deck diaries. For example, 
Commander Layard, wrote that: ‘The seaman’s messes are really bloody’ following the 
announcement of the pay cut.42 Nevertheless, in addition to the limited lower-deck testimony, 
the increased use of oral history in the 1970s and 1980s meant that a number of sailors were 
interviewed on their involvement, and this provides some further insight.43  From a review of 
the records of the Imperial War Museum it appears sailors’ attitudes to the Invergordon Mutiny 
was a stock question asked by a number of interviewers, irrespective of whether or not the 
interviewee was present at Invergordon.44 Although oral history presents its own problems to 
historians, when used alongside the above-mentioned sources, oral testimony offers an 
opportunity for historians to bridge the vacuum and examine these silences further. Again, 
however, as yet few historians have utilized this material. Consequently, a number of holdings 
from the IWM have been drawn on below. 
A key issue regarding Invergordon and this topic is the question of sailors’ loyalty.45 Whilst 
historians have considered this, it has been primarily a side issue to examination of the effect 
the mutiny had on the Royal Navy, and perceptions of British imperial power.46 Certainly 
historians have recognized that, following the mutiny, ascertaining the loyalty of the lower deck 
was an important line of enquiry.47 Much was done to reassure the British public and the world 
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39 Edwards, Mutiny, p. 275; Bell, ‘The Royal Navy’, p. 88; In addition, HMS Delhi had mutinied for around 2 hours during 
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41 Christopher McKee, Sober Men and True: Sailor Lives in the Royal Navy, 1900-1945, (London: Harvard University 
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that the Royal Navy remained a harmonious, loyal and able-bodied fighting machine. 
Furthermore, the press downplayed the mutiny and suggested that all was as it should be.48 
Writing only six years later Edwards was at pains to stress the loyalty of the lower deck was 
beyond doubt:  
The British sailor is intensely proud of the Service. This pride, although 
inarticulate, is one of the greatest forces on the lower deck. It is based upon a 
tradition of complete supremacy over the navies of all other powers.49 
Although Edwards was writing in the highly charged atmosphere of the late 1930s, this was 
certainly the view amongst contemporaries and Admiralty investigations after Invergordon 
suggested that ‘most ratings were instinctively loyal’.50 In particular, Admiral Kelly who 
conducted the investigation into the mutiny on behalf of the Admiralty ‘was encouraged by the 
respect mutineers has shown to their officers throughout the mutiny’.51 This has been 
supported by Roskill who noted that despite the mutiny, sailors continued to turn in for the 
hoisting of the colours.52 This does not suggest any deep animosity against the flag or to the 
patriotism and symbolism inherently linked to it. Similarly Edwards noted that despite some 
hesitation, the “Still” continued to be sounded as ships approached others lying at anchor.53 
This demonstrates that the respect due to others was capable of overriding any detrimental 
sentiment. More recently, Brian Lavery has stated: ‘the men were always keen to state their 
basic loyalty to the crown and the navy’.54   
Thus it has been suggested that during the mutiny sailors remained fundamentally loyal to the 
navy (and for this read loyalty to the King and Empire) throughout the mutiny.55 In particular, 
there was no violent upheaval of the established order. Carew especially has focused on the 
political nature of Invergordon and argued strongly about the use of the term “mutiny”.56 Carew 
opined that it would be described more accurately as a strike, and Wincott used similar 
terminology.57 Certainly contemporaries sought similarities between mutineers and sailors who 
had northern, industrial backgrounds, in the belief that these people had communist 
tendencies.58 As Edwards has stated, the mutiny at Invergordon is something of a paradox 
being completely peaceable in nature.59 Therefore, there is some support to Carew’s assertion 
that it was a strike. Re-classifying it as such removes the perceived breakdown of loyalty that 
the image of a mutiny conjures up. Yet the basis for this is questionable. The military is 
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governed by its own law and mutiny is seen as a criminal attempt to resist these laws.60 
Although it could be argued they are synonymous, there is a danger that Carew is shoehorning 
the mutiny into an inappropriate industrial setting. Nevertheless, he is supported by Edwards 
who argued that it ‘was not regarded as such by the majority of the men’.61 However, contrary 
to this, sailor testimony suggests that they were well aware of the seriousness of their actions 
and the possible ramifications. For instance one sailor, Frank Miles, stated: ‘we were 
committing mutiny, unheard of in the British navy’.62 Mutiny was a crime set out in the King’s 
Regulations and naval heritage still remembered those at Spithead and The Nore in 1797. 
One item that has been widely discussed by Edwards, Divine, Roskill, and Carew is the 
importance of the manifesto, or petition, produced by sailors aboard HMS Norfolk during the 
mutiny.63 It did not suggest any radical action against the Government, the King, or the Empire 
and opened with: ‘We the loyal subjects of HM the King’.64 If a genuine reflection of lower-deck 
sentiment, then this again reinforces the loyalty of the lower deck.65 However, the manifesto 
has been viewed with caution by historians such as Roskill because its ownership was claimed 
by Wincott.66 In addition, Roskill has argued that the manifesto did not have a wide readership 
in the Fleet and cannot be indicative of the lower deck.67 Certainly it is questionable how much 
information was passed between the different ships and both George Weekes and Frank Miles 
suggest this would have been nearly impossible.68 
Nevertheless, sailors did resent their loyalty being called into question. In particular, there was 
anger at the insinuation made by the Labour MP Admiral Dewar regarding their loyalty. An 
election poster published for Dewar’s campaign ran with the heading: ‘“Leaders of Lost Causes,” 
and stated: “The British Navy at Jutland in 1916 beat the ex-Kaiser; and at Invergordon in 
1931 it beat Mr Montagu Norman”’.69 Montagu Norman was the governor of the Bank of England 
at the time and the connotation was made that sailors had been disloyal and damaged the 
country by their actions. In addition, it attacked their reputation and position in society. 
Consequently, The Times reported that: ‘Indignation has been roused in Portsmouth, especially 
among Naval men’.70 This has been supported by Barry Hunt and Mike Farquharson-Roberts, 
who have argued that it cost Dewar votes from naval circles.71  
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To expand upon this debate, examination of sailor testimony suggests that there was no 
determined disloyalty on the part of the lower deck. For instance, George Weekes, a sailor 
aboard HMS Warspite, said the whole incident was down to the political situation and the cuts 
which ‘were unfair to the lower, to the ordinary class seamen’.72 Similarly, Norman Clements 
commented on the visit of Admiral Kelly to the ships when they returned to Portsmouth where 
he gave a speech noting their loyalty. Clements suggested that there was appreciation and 
respect for Admiral Kelly, saying that he [Kelly] had seen the King and told him that the navy 
was still loyal but it was the effect on sailors’ families that caused the problem.73 Therefore, for 
Clements loyalty was not in question and their mutiny had nothing to do with loyalty to service, 
King and Empire. Clements is worth considering as he was a Marine and therefore separate to 
the lower deck but still close to them in social standing. Marines were “sworn men” and in 
Clements’ words it would have been impossible to refuse if the officers had ordered them to 
take action against the mutineers: ‘never downed tools and said we’re not doing it… I don’t 
think a marine would do that’.74  
However, it is also important to recognize that there were a range of loyalties present that 
perhaps have not been fully considered by historians. As discussed at some length in this thesis, 
a sailor’s loyalty was not clear cut; within sailor culture there existed simultaneously loyalty to 
shipmates, loyalty to the ship, loyalty to the service, loyalty to the Empire, and loyalty to local 
towns (especially their home ports).75 In particular, loyalty to shipmates is clearly evidenced 
and the mutiny elicited a good deal of sympathy amongst the lower deck despite the cuts not 
affecting all sailors. For instance Frank Miles, a sailor aboard HMS York, confirmed he was on 
the post-1925 rate (a lower rate not affected by the cuts) but stated: ‘I joined in the mutiny 
but simply because we felt sorry for the older people’.76 This is interesting because it 
demonstrates the strength of loyalty to shipmates even over their sense of duty.77 This 
sympathy extended outside of the Atlantic Fleet and Seaman Thomas Teece, when asked 
whether there was sympathy for the mutineers replied: ‘Oh, yes. Definitely’.78 Similarly, 
Seaman John Skeats also expressed sympathy for the mutineers.79  
On the other hand, Edwards has argued that these younger ratings ‘were more impressionable 
to subversive propaganda’ and that they ‘joined the mutineers in a spirit of sheer 
hooliganism’.80 However, whilst the mutiny undoubtedly provided an excuse for some sailors 
to pursue personal agendas, the majority of testimony points to genuine sympathy with their 
fellow sailors being a key reason for their involvement. Yet, the mutiny was evidently a divisive 
issue and when asked if everyone on York was in agreement Miles was certain that this was 
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not the case: ‘No, no we were one of the ships where maybe 30-40% were in agreement and 
the remainder were not. Mostly the senior rates, see, they had a lot to lose. But on some of 
the ships it was 100%’.81 Miles also confessed to some disharmony amongst the crew because 
of this: ‘there was a certain amount of bitterness, bound to be… but not to us, the ones already 
on the new scale of pay’.82 Nevertheless, Miles suggested that bitterness did not come to 
anything but that ‘it made just a bad feeling all through the ship’.83 Norman Clements supports 
this stating that there was no intimidation: ‘there was sympathy all round’.84 However, sailors 
were also accused of lacking loyalty to their brethren by not taking part and there is evidence 
to suggest that peer pressure played a role in deciding whether or not to mutiny.85 Lavery 
noted the importance of ‘inter-ship rivalry’, which was a key facet of navy life, and was brought 
to bear by the mutineers.86 For instance, sailors from HMS Hood received abuse from Rodney 
and Malaya, and Repulse also suffered negative comments.87 Therefore, Edwards failed to 
analyse sailors sufficiently given the complexities of the situation.  
Nevertheless, the fact remains that despite the pay cuts being brought in across the board, 
only sailors from the Atlantic Fleet mutinied whilst the rest of the navy, despite some minor 
incidents, remained loyal, at least perceivably even if they had sympathy with their fellow 
sailors.88 As such, Bell surmised that conditions were unique within the Atlantic Fleet.89 This 
argument has some validity because whilst the pay cuts were announced and explained 
elsewhere in the service, the Atlantic Fleet’s orders were delayed as they sailed north.90 This 
meant that the men found out through other channels before they were told officially and this 
led to ill-feeling. Supporting this, Lavery has noted Invergordon was an awful place to break 
the news and argued that had they been at home ports the affair might have been more 
subdued and families may have been able to deter them from taking action.91  
In arguing that it was a unique case, Bell dismissed the view of other historians that a link can 
be drawn to Devonport and sailors from this port being more mutinous.92 Other historians are 
less convinced, however. For example, Edwards noted ‘the dockyard port of Devonport was the 
link between a number of events’.93 In particular, earlier that year the crew of HMS Lucia had 
mutinied at Devonport and was reported as a case of ‘mass indiscipline’.94 However, Bell makes 
no reference to the Lucia incident. This suggests support of Roskill’s view, that the Lucia 
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incident was simply ‘a case of an “unhappy ship”’ and not indicative of wider sentiment.95 
However, Edwards also drew a link between Devonport and a Chilean warship that mutinied in 
the weeks prior to Invergordon which had recently undergone a refit there.96 This made 
headlines in the days leading up to Invergordon as well as a military mutiny in Bolivia.97 Both 
were believed to be the work of communist agencies.98 Similarly, Carew has argued the 
importance of the Devonport link, and more recently Taylor has also argued of the existence 
of a link between the two, stating that the presence of Devonport ships at Invergordon was 
significant.99  
The threat of a communist presence was certainly a genuine fear amongst the Admiralty and 
Government who, following Invergordon, investigated suspected communist links to the port 
town. To put this into context, during this period there was a continuing fear of the “Red 
Menace” infiltrating society and it is therefore not surprising that the Admiralty fixated upon 
this theory.100 This was further propagated in the following weeks by several arrests of known 
or suspected communists who attempted to encourage further mutiny.101 In particular, parallels 
were drawn with the Kiel mutiny in 1918 and a recent visit of certain British sailors to that port 
which included one of the Invergordon ships, HMS Norfolk.102 Deeply rooted in 
contemporaneous beliefs, it is not surprising that Edwards’ study paid careful attention to the 
navy’s visit to Kiel, and the key similarities between the two mutinies.103  
Nevertheless, despite being a genuine fear, as Bell has stated, the threat of total breakdown 
perceived by the Government was in their minds alone.104 Sailor testimony supports this 
interpretation, suggesting that loyalty was not in question and their actions points towards the 
issue being with pay and the handling of the situation, and not any latent communist sentiment 
against the Service and Britain. True, there are various accounts of sailors singing “The Red 
Flag” during the mutiny, such as those noted by Clements who recalled that many returning 
from the meeting ashore were singing it.105 In addition, Weekes gives a particularly interesting 
account of an episode he witnessed on Valiant:  
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there was a piano up on the top of a turret, you see. Most unusual, you see. 
When we passed them… the people on the turret with the piano, they struck 
up “The Red Flag” on the piano. We were so amazed.106  
Given the strict naval discipline faced by sailors, this sudden breakdown would understandably 
have caused amazement.  
However, there is a difference between singing an anthem and wholeheartedly acting upon an 
ideology. None of the diaries considered suggest any communist plot, nor does the oral 
testimony considered suggest this. Newspapers offer some further insight. For instance, the 
Daily Mail, reported on the alleged attempt by George Allison and William Shepherd to incite 
further mutiny in Portsmouth amongst sailors returned from Invergordon. The report quoted a 
sailor who in response to Allison and Shepherd’s request allegedly asked what good it would 
do his wife whilst he was in prison, and asked for £100 up front.107 This further suggests that 
it was primarily a pay-related issue and not disloyalty based on a communist element within 
the Fleet. Furthermore, this is supported by the findings of Admiral Kelly discussed above, that 
it was the threat the pay cut posed to sailors’ families which angered them more than anything. 
As Conley has argued, sailors were increasingly proud of their image and, despite what some 
contemporaries believed, they were dutiful husbands.108 Again, this demonstrates a level of 
independence. Thus this was a group of men pushed by circumstance and a fringe element, 
who felt there was no option left to them to make their grievance heard. For the most part they 
acted peacefully and respectfully to their officers, the country was not at war and there was no 
risk of a serious breakdown and overthrow of society.109 Order did not break down because 
they were disloyal to the navy or Britain but rather because of loyalty to their fellow sailors.  
Nevertheless, given the vital role of the Royal Navy, both actual and perceived, within the wider 
imperial image, efforts to limit the damage of the mutiny were carefully considered. In 
particular, Ereira has commented on the importance of terminology and that the Admiralty 
actively avoided the use of the term “mutiny”, stating that ‘the prestige of Great Britain was 
intimately bound up with the prestige of the Royal Navy’.110 As Ereira and Rüger have noted, 
contemporaries remained fully aware of the importance of the navy as a symbol.111 Similarly, 
Edwards wrote ‘the realisation that there was insubordination of a very serious character in the 
Royal Navy delivered a blow to the nation which was almost personal in its intensity’.112 
Although Edwards was writing during the late 1930s when the Royal Navy was experiencing 
rearmament, and could be accused of being hyperbolic, this view is generally supported by 
more recent historiography, particularly both Bell’s and Rüger’s work on links between the 
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image of the navy and empire.113 As discussed in previous chapters, the image of the Royal 
Navy in British popular culture should not be underestimated.114  
In a pointed attempt to reassure and suggest that all was well, British newspapers tried to 
downplay events. For instance, the Devon and Exeter Daily Gazette carried a report on sailors 
of the Atlantic Fleet enjoying shore leave once they had returned to their home ports:  
During the week-end spent in their several home ports, sailors of the Atlantic 
Fleet have certainly done their best to reaffirm the landsman’s pride and belief 
in our Navy. Cheery good humour, and quiet conviction that the inquiries will 
be opened today will remove such misunderstandings as may have existed, is 
the spirit reported from all ports… If the sailor is grousing at all it is mainly 
about the sensational and galling reports regarding him that have appeared in 
the foreign press. That, however, is the price he has to pay for his ill-considered 
escapade.115 
Similarly The Times wrote of Hood returning to Portsmouth: ‘The men came up “at the double” 
and took their stations smartly in the traditional British way’.116 Whilst this and other papers 
were evidently trying to reassure the British public and the world that the Royal Navy was as 
disciplined as ever, reinforcing traditional masculine imperial values, it also downplayed the 
seriousness of the issue by referring to it as an “escapade” and appealing to the stereotypical 
image of Jolly Jack Tar getting up to his tricks.117 HMS Hood in particular, with her key position 
in British popular culture and indeed international culture, was a media-friendly ship to feature 
prominently in the papers and drive home the message.118  Consequently, Ereira has suggested 
that the papers did as they were bidden by the Government which caused the public to believe 
the press was being censored.119 Edwards also noted this feeling: ‘It was concluded that a 
censorship had become necessary, and that the press was under orders to minimise the true 
facts’.120 However, the press was not censored and Edwards argued that there was nothing 
strange in this approach, but that it ‘was in accordance with British tradition’.121 
Yet although the mutiny was swiftly swept under the carpet, memory lingered and the damage 
this caused is demonstrated by an article in the Devon and Exeter Daily Gazette which 
commented on an alleged mutiny aboard Hood in 1933: ‘The supposed mutineers on HMS Hood 
were, we now know positively, perfectly disciplined and jolly bluejackets, who had been landed 
to enact the role of pirates as part of Fleet exercises’.122 Edwards also commented upon this 
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noting: ‘absurd as these reports were, they showed that a certain section of the British public 
was receptive to the idea of mutiny in the Royal Navy. It is almost certain that no such report 
would have been circulated in the days before September 1931’.123 Thus, the mutiny had 
implications on the image and prestige of the Royal Navy, both at home and abroad. In 
particular, it resonated in America, with its growing naval power, and Edwards argued that it 
‘was at last proof that the British sailor was not the infallible creature Americans had 
believed’.124 Furthermore, Edwards wrote that it was deeply felt in Italy where the dictatorial 
powers were strengthening their grip.125 However, it would be overstepping the mark to argue 
that this perceived loss of discipline and subsequent loss of British prestige was a contributing 
factor to the rise of expansionist ideas of Italy and Germany as Edwards suggested. The Royal 
Navy remained a formidable power during the 1930s. Furthermore, sailor testimony does not 
suggest that they thought it lessened their image. On the contrary, Frank Miles said: ‘I think it 
showed people abroad, Russians or Americans or whatever that we had the guts to stand up 
for ourselves’.126 This suggests that other elements of sailor culture had the power to take 
precedence over duty to the Empire and the navy, and reinforces the argument regarding 
sailors’ independence. Furthermore, it also suggests an element of lower-deck pride in their 
victory over the Establishment. 
Continuing Pageantry  
Despite the apparent damage to the prestigious image of the Royal Navy caused by the mutiny, 
and continuing anti-war sentiment, during the 1930s naval pageantry remained an important 
part of the British imperial image.127 The Devon and Exeter Daily Gazette reported in 1930 
‘That amateur soldiering is unpopular among the rising generation’ of school children but that 
‘Among those of maturer age, however, the enjoyment of warlike displays appears to be 
undiminished’, noting the phenomenal success of Navy Week.128 Additionally it gained a further 
importance at this time because the ‘dual challenges of a rising rival on the Continent and a 
chronically overstretched empire abroad motivated a wave of renewed rituals’.129 The re-
emergence of German naval power was deeply troubling and Emily Goldman has argued that 
the creation of the German pocket battleships put Germany back into the naval power ratio.130 
Similarly Divine argued that they were ‘the symbol of German naval renaissance’.131 This was 
not lost on the British public, nor on sailors. For instance Able Seaman Jack Napier said: ‘We 
heard about the German ship-building and how their fleets were all modern’.132 Therefore, in a 
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time of uncertainty, naval pageantry afforded a number of opportunities to reaffirm traditional 
ideas of British power and prestige.133  
A key feature of the decade was the Naval Review in celebration of George V’s Silver Jubilee in 
1935. In addition, that year the Navy Week went to additional lengths to put on a show: The 
Times reported it ‘was the most successful of any’ Navy Week with 333,007 people attending.134 
Given the financial situation, events such as this were accepted cautiously by the monarchy 
and there were voices of opposition.135 However, this opposition was not widely publicized and 
the press ‘emphasized consensus and continuity’.136 In particular, the press repeatedly 
published information on previous Reviews alongside information regarding new warships being 
launched.137 Thus when the Home Fleet visited the Thames as part of the celebrations, The 
Times reported that the ships arrived in ‘aloof and silent dignity’, words chosen to reinforce the 
almost magisterial position of the Royal Navy in British culture.138  
As with pre-war naval pageantry, sailors regularly commented in their diaries on day-to-day 
pageantry and special events they took part in. For instance, William Brooman recorded 
‘Holding the fort [in Malta] while the Mediterranean Fleet are in Home waters for the Naval 
Review’.139 Brooman noted the Fleet was returning for the Review ‘celebrating His Majesty’s 
Silver Jubilee’ but he makes no further comments about the jubilee and neither does he make 
any reference to how he feels about his ship not being included in the celebrations.140 On the 
other hand, Leonard Williams was aboard Hood for King George VI’s Coronation Review, and 
said the return from the Mediterranean ‘made a welcome break for the ship’s company as they 
were able to visit their homes’.141 For those who were not at their home port, special 
entertainments were laid on for officers and ratings when they were granted shore leave.142 As 
a published memoir, Williams elucidates rather more and speaks with some pride of the light 
display that they created (his branch was responsible): ‘The whole effect was like something 
out of Fairyland. Hood cast her reflection on the water like jewels on rippled velvet’.143 As the 
previous chapter demonstrated, illumination of the Fleet was a typical activity and was used to 
demonstrate the dual themes of power and technology.144 The Times wrote: ‘large numbers of 
visitors are expected in the town from to-morrow onwards, and particularly on Saturday and 
Sunday, when the Fleet is to be illuminated’.145  
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Given the success of the Silver Jubilee Review, it is not surprising that the Admiralty continued 
to believe that Reviews were a useful tool and pushed hard for a Coronation Review in 1936 to 
mark Edward VIII ascending the throne. As Rüger has argued: the Admiralty ‘was very keen’.146 
Although due to the abdication of Edward VIII this did not take place, it was repeated in 1937 
when George VI was crowned. Perhaps the most interesting incident here is the refusal of the 
Australian navy to send their flagship to take part in the Coronation Review, indicating further 
breakdown in the imperial force and increased autonomy of the dominions. The Australians 
made it clear that they had better things to do than send their ship round the world again.147 
The views of sailors on this issue are not recorded either by unpublished diaries or published 
memoirs considered by this thesis. Similarly, the press blanked the voice of opposition and 
thus they made little of the Australian flag ship’s absence despite coverage of other dominion 
ships, notably from India.148   
Furthermore, despite voices of dissent, the number of visitors continued to increase yearly.149 
At what turned out to be the last Navy Week prior to the Second World War in 1938, the Daily 
Mail reported: ‘The annual naval display is a sight never to be forgotten’.150 Visitors were 
treated to ‘Mock battles, air raids, dress parades and naval drills… “staged” in the immense 
dockyards for the benefit of “John Citizen” to see how his tax is spent, and how his shores are 
guarded’.151 Although given the international situation and the personal agenda of the Daily 
Mail’s editors in 1938, this concerted praise is not surprising. The availability of Navy Week also 
continued to be reinforced with papers giving travel information on cheap day excursions.152 
The relative cheapness of the day was also extolled, for instance The Times stated: ‘Navy Week 
is the most democratic of all Service entertainments, for there is one price only, 1s.’.153 The 
navy used various mediums to advertise Navy Week and draw greater crowds. In particular, 
an 18 foot model of HMS Repulse was ‘taken on a tour of the Midlands and the South of England’ 
to ‘interest the public in Navy Week’.154 On another occasion there was an exhibition at Olympia 
headlined by the Daily Mail as ‘Seeing the Navy at Home’. This included ‘full-sized replicas of 
the living quarters of an L class submarine, and three of the messes in HMS Orion’, providing 
further opportunity for the public to see what life was like aboard.155 
Alongside this the navy continued its traditional forms of pageantry, such as the naval field gun 
display. Douglas Poole described one such event at Durban: ‘The Navy gave a display with 
Naval field guns, the Commander in Chief taking the salute at the march past, which was much 
appreciated by everyone’.156 The field gun exercise was especially poignant in South Africa 
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where the naval brigade has played a key role in the Boer War and thus served to reinforce the 
political message behind the pageantry.157 However, whether Poole was cognizant of this is 
unclear. In addition, the “Showing the Flag” policy continued alongside regular port visits 
around the Empire.158  For instance HMS Ajax visited the Caribbean and South America in 1935. 
As had been done in the 1920s, ships would be open for visitors, sailors would land to conduct 
marches, and searchlight displays would be held. Brooman noted of his visit to Trinidad in 
1935: ‘HMS “Ajax” landed a party of seamen and Royal Marines for a demonstration march 
through the town of Trinidad’.159 On the following day Brooman recorded this was followed by 
an “At Home” being given but wrote: ‘unfortunately tropical torrential rain spoilt the whole 
show, the bunting and other decorations being soaked through, anyhow the best is done to 
give the guests an “Ajax” welcome’.160 On a more sombre note, Edward Records described the 
navy marking the death of King George V: ‘divisions at noon… while a salute was fired. It 
consisted of 1 gun for every year of his life, fired at 1 minute intervals. 70 minutes’.161 Records 
does not mention any complaint at having to stand on parade for 70 minutes other than the 
fact he mentions the length of time. Nevertheless, he and his friends on the lower deck were 
evidently interested in events and Records wrote: ‘Most of the talk aboard is of putting the 
[royal] family in its correct sequence of taking the crown’.162 
However, Bell has suggested that although ‘The navy remained genuinely popular’, it was 
hindered by numerous factors.163 In particular, Bell argued that:  
The navy’s difficulties might have been alleviated if a greater effort had been 
made to win the support of the British public… its only objective was to reinforce 
the idea that seapower still mattered to Britain. It did not attempt to educate 
the public about how seapower operated or, more importantly, what was 
required to maintain it.164 
Thus although Bell recognized the continued use of naval pageantry, he believed that it was 
used inefficiently considering the pressures facing the navy and did little to help sustain it. 
Nevertheless, despite Bell’s misgivings regarding its uses, naval pageantry remained a vital 
tenet of British imperial imagery, even if it may have better served the navy’s interests to 
educate their audience. As Rüger has noted, ‘The naval theatre of the 1930s was designed to 
affirm the unity of empire at a time when this unity was being challenged more than ever 
before’.165 Importantly, and to advance Rüger’s thesis, as the forgotten participants in naval 
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pageantry, the imagery also worked on sailors themselves. As this chapter argues, it remained 
a common belief that they were part of the best navy in the world. This sentiment was regularly 
expressed and was a fundamental part of lower-deck culture.166 As Seaman Walter Basford 
said: ‘When you were in the navy you were really something’.167  
Policing the world – the Abyssinian Crisis and the Spanish Civil War 
Despite the restrictions imposed upon the Royal Navy by inter-war disarmament treaties, 
Britain remained a dominant naval power and continued her various overseas roles.168 Although 
Paul M. Kennedy has argued that the navy’s overall position during the inter-war period was in 
serious decline, going so far as to state ‘the British Empire… had lost its muscle’, other 
historians have been more positive.169 In particular Bell has argued that the adoption of ‘a one-
power standard was not a sign of imperial decline’.170 Given Britain’s continued involvement in 
world affairs and its strength ratio as it entered the Second World War, this would not seem 
without some grounding.171 However, the deterioration of the political situation in Europe and 
escalating conflicts of the 1930s demanded the involvement of the Royal Navy and added 
significantly to the pressures it faced. In addition, the Royal Navy was expected to continue its 
age-old role policing the world’s oceans and protecting British interests overseas. As such, 
British warships were deployed keeping the peace during the Abyssinian Crisis and the Spanish 
Civil War; both conflicts were instrumental to the shaping of the political situation on the eve 
of the Second World War and thus deserve consideration at this point.  
The role of “Policeman of the seas” had long been propagated to the British public and writing 
to the Devon and Exeter Daily Gazette, one commentator wrote that although it was now far 
easier to rush troops to different areas of the world ‘the psychological effect is not the same as 
that gained by the display of the White Ensign’.172 Similarly after Invergordon the prompt 
response of the navy to an incident in Cyprus caused another commentator to write of the 
timely arrival of British ships and that ‘it will also, doubtless, have the effect of acting as a 
timely damper upon other disturbances of a similar character… in different portions of our far-
flung Empire’.173 Sailors were fully cognizant of this position and recognized the navy’s mission 
to police the seas.174 As Petty Officer Stan Smith summed it up: ‘The Royal Navy between the 
wars was a benign policeman with a beat covering all the world’s seas’.175 Likewise during the 
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Abyssinian Crisis William Brooman recorded HMS Ajax was ‘to act as a Policeman to the 
entrance to the Suez Canal’.176  
HMS Hood again stands dominant in this decade and Taylor has argued that ‘as the ultimate 
symbol of British seapower it was natural that the Hood should feature prominently in this 
strategy’ of appeasement.177 When Hood hove into view crowds would gather to see her mighty 
superstructure, demonstrating the perceived power of the Royal Navy.178 Leonard Williams 
joined her just before the start of the Spanish Civil War and wrote that she was ‘the finest 
looking ship in this, or any other navy’.179 Furthermore, Taylor has argued that ‘Hood’s role as 
the sharp instrument of Britain’s foreign policy if push came to shove was not lost on the lower 
deck, which christened her “The Seven B’s”: Britain’s Biggest Bullshitting Bastard Built By 
Brown’.180 This attitude is supported by sailor testimony and Thomas Teece, a Petty Officer 
aboard HMS Protector, recounted one occasion where they were challenged by a Spanish 
cruiser but ‘the Hood came up and stopped all that’.181 Similarly, William Townley took evident 
enjoyment from the Royal Navy’s superior firepower. Recounting one encounter where Hood 
went to the aid of a hospital ship, Townley said it ‘was hilarious… we told these destroyers to 
shove off or we would open fire on them’.182 On another occasion known as the “Bilbao 
Blockade” the Spanish asked Hood to hand over an armed merchant man, “Potato Jones”, or 
they would be fired upon.183 Townley said that Hood’s captain responded: ‘You can open fire 
when you like’, and ‘when the turrets trained round on her she [the Spanish] decided it was 
time to go back in the harbour’.184 Following this incident, Admiral Pridham aboard Hood wrote: 
‘we… did feel that we had been “a big bully”’.185 Perhaps somewhat curiously, Leonard Williams 
made little of their part in this standoff in his autobiography, where it might be expected he 
would publicize the story because it was deemed of interest to the public.186  
Thus sailors retained a genuine sense of pride in the Royal Navy and Britain, and a sense of 
superiority over other nations. For example, William Brooman, recorded the events of the 
Abyssinian Crisis with no hint of doubt that it was Britain’s duty to be ready to intervene as and 
when to maintain order.187 After being called off hurricane rescue duty in the Caribbean, 
Brooman wrote: ‘there is no doubt that the Italian-Abyssinian Affair and other affairs in Europe 
make it necessary for a modern cruiser as the “Ajax” is, to be on the scene of activities’.188 He 
does not disclose his feelings regarding their imminent departure to a possible warzone except: 
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‘we welcomed the cooler atmosphere’.189 Whether he was concerned at the possible danger is 
not mentioned but the comment about the weather suggests that it was seen as a reprieve; 
his comment also suggests a hint of pride in the Ajax that its presence was necessary.  
As the crisis continued, Brooman found himself at Alexandria where he wrote: ‘Britain’s Fleet 
is absolutely ready in every respect for any particular duty which we may be called upon to 
carry out’.190  Again, Brooman noted their prowess, stating: ‘special precautions being taken 
by all ships against a surprise “Air Attack”, a good reception awaits the first aggressor’.191 
Similarly, John Skeats made the following remark about the Mediterranean Fleet at Alexandria: 
‘we were there to keep control of the Italians because of their activities in Abyssinia’.192 Skeats 
made no suggestion that he doubted their ability to perform this duty should the need arise. 
This fighting talk suggests the lower deck saw it as their duty to intervene if necessary and 
were ready to do so. Skeats made a similar observation on the outbreak of the Second World 
War: ‘I think the attitude of the British nation at that time that you can’t do this sort of thing, 
we are the British, we will not allow you to do this, you know, the old spirit of the gunboat’.193 
Similarly, Edward Records demonstrated that he felt it was Britain’s duty to stand up to Italy 
and enforce her will. He followed the discussions in connection with a proposed oil embargo on 
Italy with interest stating: ‘If they don’t impose an embargo I shall be disappointed. All the 
British cackling will have been all flannel’.194 This suggests a deep-rooted concern that Britain’s 
position in the world would suffer if it did not make a stand. In addition, Records recounted an 
interesting account of a discussion he had with some Somali policemen regarding Italy and 
Germany:  
One or two of the Somali police asked me what I thought England would do 
about Abyssinia. They said they didn’t think Italy was so strong and expected 
England to assist Abyssinia. Now they don’t know what to make of things… 
They are surprised at Italy’s strength, but firmly believe that Britain is the 
strongest nation in the world now and for ever more. I told them that we 
expected when we came up here to go to war against Italy, and we’d polish 
them off in 3 months. Couldn’t do it any quicker as Italy is a long country to 
walk through.195 
Despite the typical stoic humour, this account provides an insight into several fundamental 
points believed by sailors. Although simply framed, it is revealing about what they took from 
such interactions with indigenous peoples in the colonies, and it is the sailors’ views that are 
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important.196 Firstly it suggests that they did not think Britain’s power was seriously questioned 
by indigenous people in the colonies, and that they did not doubt Britain’s ability to enforce its 
will; secondly it suggests that sailors believed indigenous populations expected Britain to assert 
itself; thirdly that sailors had expected the situation to deteriorate into war and that is was 
likely Britain would have to step in; and fourthly that sailors did not doubt Britain’s ability to 
defeat Italy, although Records may have made his reply so light-hearted for the benefit of the 
Somalis.  
Again, this episode demonstrates the complex issue of sailor pride. Whilst Records highlights 
pride in British strength because it was defined as such by the situation, pride continued to 
mean different things to sailors, not just pride in the navy but genuine pride in other British 
abilities. For instance, Brooman spent some time at Haifa during the Abyssinian Crisis and 
described improvements made to the harbour and town ‘carried out by two English firms, and 
the present results give credit to British workmanship’.197 Sailors were proud of what they 
perceived as benefits brought by Britain and E. G. T. Ardley wrote of a visit to Trincomali: ‘In 
the native quarters the streets are clean and well kept, the meaning of sanitation and hygiene 
being taught with great success’.198 Ardley also demonstrated a belief in the power and moral 
good of Britain in the world. A visit to Dar-es-Salaam prompted an account of a group of 
Africans travelling to Britain after the Great War to request assistance in the return of the skull 
of Sultan Makuraura [Mkwawa], taken as a trophy by the Germans.199 Ardley proudly wrote: 
‘the British were known throughout the world for respecting the beliefs of all who sheltered 
themselves under their flag’.200 Similarly, Ardley wrote of Malta becoming a British possession: 
‘by the voice of the people’.201 He described Malta as being: ‘the proud possession of the 
mistress of the seas from Phoenica [sic] in 1400BC to the British Empire in 1930’.202 Although 
clearly his perspective and should be viewed with caution, it demonstrates Ardley’s imperialist 
views and how he fits the navy within this. This view was similarly propounded by Leonard 
Charles Williams who wrote of the Maltese as ‘our responsibility’ and such beliefs reveal that 
the moral message of imperialism expounded by social commentators had traction.203 
Nevertheless, Ardley was also evidently aware of the tensions within the Empire. In Bombay 
he noted that: ‘our walks were limited owing to the trouble with the Ghandi-ites’.204 He also 
discussed the difference in how sailors were greeted in the Seychelles in comparison to India 
where ‘the people seemed to give us the impression that we were not wanted, by either white 
or black’.205 However, he does not comment in detail upon these issues and whether he 
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understood the political reasoning behind any tensions. On the other hand, as discussed in 
Chapter Five, sailors were not unaware of feelings in the colonies and ports they visited, and 
noted when they encountered any issues, or if there was something in the colony’s history that 
affected the visit.206 In particular, Basford noted that the Chinese were particularly unfriendly: 
‘The Chinese never had any time for you’.207  
Alongside feelings of national pride there continued to be sense of racial superiority over other 
nations, although once again this was not necessarily a question of colour.208 For instance, 
Daniel Owen Spence has noted this in connection with the threat of the Japanese navy.209 
However, of particular note during the 1930s was a dislike for the Italians. Although Brooman 
is not overtly imperialistic in his diary, he stated: ‘the Duce is very obstinate and not at all 
popular in the Royal Navy’.210 More recently, Lavery has argued that ‘seamen despised the 
bombast of Mussolini’s regime in Italy’.211 He cites Able Seaman John Whelan who commented 
on a discussion with another sailor and said: ‘lower deck sailors… loathed Mussolini long before 
British civilians were officially authorised to do so. It was a matter of pride, not politics’.212 
British sailors in particular viewed the Mediterranean as their territory and did not like Italian 
posturing, especially Mussolini’s argument of Mare Italia or the ‘Italian Lake’.213 Similarly 
Leonard Williams noted a certain coolness towards the Italians by the mid-1930s due to their 
activities.214 Furthermore, Able Seaman Fred White displayed stereotypical beliefs of racism 
and regarded the Italians as ‘slovenly’.215 Again, describing clashes ashore, Whelan noted: ‘our 
battles with the Italians were motivated by the bitterest contemptuous hate’.216 In addition, 
Records spoke with damning sarcasm of Italy’s involvement in Abyssinia revealing a keen 
dislike: ‘Great stuff Muss [Mussolini] you’ll sure get it in the neck. He is acting with utter 
disregard of any nation and with contempt also to the world’.217 Nevertheless, when sailors of 
different nationalities met at sea there were expected behaviours to be followed and such 
sentiment was curtailed by etiquette. As Brooman noted: ‘As a mark of respect and friendship 
Italian Troopships when passing HMS “Ajax” parade a guard, with fixed bayonets and give the 
salute, this mark of respect is returned by HMS “Ajax”, sounding the “Attention” on a bugle’.218   
Similarly the old rivalry with the French continued, despite previous alliances, as Ardley 
demonstrated when he recounted a meeting with the French sloop Amates: 
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We were surprised to see that she was one of our own old “Flower” class sloops 
which had been evidently turned over to France after the Gt War. Yet what a 
great change had come over her in those years, from once a splendid looking 
craft with grey upper work, yellow funnels, white ship-side and decks like only 
a British man-o-war can be, to a craft ill-used, unpainted, rust showing through 
everywhere and decks in a filthy condition, a condition in which Frenchmen 
could live. Yet it seemed as if she knew that we were of her original flag, for 
the engines were running as smoothly as in days gone by, as much as to say 
“My nationality may be changed, as also my flag, but my heart beats made in 
England”.219 
This reveals a certain distain and belief in British superiority, as well as British naval superiority 
over the French sailors who could not maintain such high standards. Again, Records expressed 
disappointment in the French, noting on the re-occupation of the Rhineland in 1936: ‘It is a 
pity that nations do not uphold things they sign. France have been very backwards in coming 
forward over the Abyssinian affair. Now she will be the opposite and I hope we’ll be the same 
as she was over the Abyss [Abyssinian] war’.220  
In addition, relations with American sailors were only moderately better. Whelan noted:  
when ships representing three or more navies were in port and a rough house 
started, the British and Americans fought shoulder to shoulder. It is a 
regrettable fact, however, that if they were the only two naval powers in port, 
the British and Americans were at one another’s throats at the slightest 
provocation.221  
After one large fight between British and American sailors in Gibraltar, Whelan said: ‘Were 
proof needed that the Royal Navy is more disciplined than the American, it was given then. 
The British took names, the Yanks clouted their compatriots over the head’.222 The inter-war 
years were marked by ill-feeling towards the Americans, which Roskill has argued ‘was on the 
British rather than the American side, the former still regarding the US Navy as something of 
a parvenu from whom they had little or nothing to learn’.223 Edwards also noted the 
disagreement, arguing that rivalry was based on the growth of the USA and its attempts to 
gain equal power status with the British Empire.224  
However, relations were markedly better with German sailors and more recently Taylor has 
argued that the lower deck was on far better terms with German sailors than with their French 
and Italian counterparts.225 For instance, Percy Price recalled playing football against the 
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German crew of the Graf Spee: ‘You used to go ashore to the various places in Tangiers and 
used to hang out… we were friendly’.226 Similarly, Cantellow recalled a port visit to Rio where 
he met ‘a very nice German fellow’.227 Likewise, Fred Coombes noted that at Tangiers the 
British ‘chose to chum up with the German [cruisers]… where the German and British had some 
battles royal with the French and Italian crew’.228 Leonard Williams suggested a key reason for 
these alliances ‘was because the Germans and ourselves were beer drinking types, whereas 
the others usually drank wine’.229 The importance of such cultural similarities has much to 
commend it from a social interaction viewpoint.230 In addition, White suggested there was 
greater respect because the Germans were smart-looking and ‘a credit to their nation’.231 
Furthermore, Able Seaman Joseph Rockey drew a direct comparison and said the Germans 
were ‘well disciplined… theirs was a harsh discipline, and we were disciplined’.232 Again, the 
British viewed themselves as smart and well-disciplined whereas they did not feel the same 
regarding the French and Italians, and this is another reason for greater respect between the 
German and British navies.   
Thus there was particular dislike of the rising navies of Italy and America which were viewed 
as infringing upon the Royal Navy’s position, and this stemmed from both their own views and 
inculcation. Although Taylor has argued that ‘the political complexities… were lost on much of 
the lower deck’, this does not mean that sailors were incapable of understanding situations and 
following them with interest.233 In particular, it had never been easier for sailors to keep up to 
date with developments and access news stories and through the availability of the wireless 
aboard ship. As Leonard Williams noted, most ships were fitted with ‘a radio and local 
broadcasting apparatus with extension loudspeakers fitted in all parts of the ship’.234 This 
allowed sailors to formulate their own opinions but also hear those of others as well.  
For instance, William Brooman aboard HMS Ajax was on routine duty off Bermuda when they 
received a sudden change in orders: ‘We are left to surmise why this sudden change in our 
sailing orders, probably the answer is to be found in the Italian-Abyssian [sic] dispute’.235 This 
is the first reference Brooman’s diary makes to the conflict but it is apparent that he and his 
crewmates were aware that something was happening. Furthermore, Brooman suggests that 
sailors were eager for news, writing upon their arrival at Gibraltar: ‘It is a treat to be able to 
buy English Newspapers (four days old) and read what is happening at Geneva and Europe’.236 
However, the lower deck was not bound by political sentiment and Leonard Williams wrote that 
‘sailors the world over have a knack of conveniently sweeping under the carpet any political 
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rumpus, as having nothing to do with them’.237 Similarly Arthur Townley suggested that politics 
were easily cast aside for when more important things were at stake, for instance rescuing 
other sailors from the water: ‘You can’t let people drown just because you might not agree with 
their politics’.238 In arguing that sailors were not capable of understanding the complexity of 
political situations, Taylor is doing sailors a disservice; this is not a comment that can be applied 
wholeheartedly to the lower deck. Sailors had other worries which to them were far more 
important but if events began to affect them then they wanted to know about it and understand 
why they had to be involved.239  
This is demonstrated by the Royal Navy’s involvement in the Spanish Civil War, and Roskill 
has argued that this was an important episode for the navy between the wars and put it back 
into the public eye.240 However, once again there has been a lack of engagement from the 
perspective of the lower deck. Importantly, sailors were very conscious that this was not their 
war.241 Nevertheless, because of the effect the conflict was having on the Atlantic and 
Mediterranean, Britain adopted a policy of non-intervention but patrolled the Spanish coast in 
the interests of British shipping and humanitarian aid. Consequently, this necessitated British 
warships being close to the conflict and suffered numerous incidents. For example, they faced 
aerial attacks and in particular HMS Hunter was badly damaged when she hit a mine. This 
naturally angered sailors and prompted Leonard Williams to state: ‘It was a sad affair and we 
were really wild about this’.242 Many sailors could not understand or see the benefit of their 
involvement especially when, despite their peace-keeping role, they were often targeted. For 
instance, John Skeats wrote that the navy was ‘bombed and generally ill-treated by either 
side. It didn’t matter that we were there’.243 Meanwhile, William Townley wrote that ‘it was a 
waste of time’.244 Likewise another sailor, Thomas Teece, called it ‘the most boring thing I’ve 
ever been in’.245  
On the other hand, John Whelan did not suggest it was a boring experience but evidently 
thought they were underappreciated. Whelan recounted a conversation with a friend who 
complained that although all the blockade runners were popular with the press, he wondered 
‘what half these “I’m going in” heroes would do without us’.246 Nevertheless, Percy Jones, 
serving aboard Hood, stated: ‘We done quite a good job, during the Spanish Civil War, taking 
refugees from Barcelona and Valencia and Palma to Marseilles’.247 Despite being bored, 
Thomas Teece supports this view and acknowledged that the refugees appeared grateful for 
                                            
237 Williams, Gone, p. 126 
238 IWM 10744: William Arthur Townley; This is discussed further in Chapter Four. 
239 For instance the minor mutiny of HMS Delhi in the Baltic in 1919 was resolved when it was explained to them that 
they were there to counteract the Bolsheviks. IWM 669: Walter Nicolson Basford 
240 Roskill, Naval Policy, p. 369 
241 See IWM 18007: John Goldup Skeats 
242 Williams, Gone, p. 118 
243 IWM 18007: John Goldup Skeats 
244 IWM 10744: William Arthur Townley 
245 IWM 10741: Thomas Teece 
246 Whelan, Home, p. 69 
247 IWM 20817: Percy Thomas Price 
170 
 
the help the navy gave.248 This suggests that despite the knowledge they were playing an 
important role, it was not enough to alleviate both the boredom and the danger when they 
were aware it was not a war they were actively involved in.249 Sailors did not object to being 
the policeman, this was an important part of their role on some level, but they needed purpose 
and they also wanted respect.250 In particular, a comparison can be drawn to their role during 
the Abyssinian Crisis where their presence was much more respected. 
Yet this did not stop a number of British sailors from being sympathetic to the situation. As 
Whelan commented:  
This was a wretched business, for not only was it plain that both sides had 
treated their prisoners abominably, but there were scenes of heart-rending 
poignancy on the quaysides when the silently assembled women did not find 
their menfolk among our passengers. We were glad when the job was 
finished.251 
Whelan also suggested that sailors were happy to help with the humanitarian crisis and 
described several individual enterprises to help Spaniards caught up in the war: including the 
transport of escaped political prisoners and personal messages from people they met in other 
ports along the coast.252  
Consequently, Edwards has argued about the importance of the Abyssinian Crisis and Spanish 
Civil War for sailors as it made them feel as though ‘they were at last doing a real job, and 
were earning the respect of most of the civilised world’.253 Certainly this was the opinion of 
naval commanders at the time. For instance, Admiral Fisher commented at the 1936 Navy 
Week that ‘it is the men who count all the time, and… you have got something you can count 
on’.254 Similarly Lord Chatfield noted: ‘at this moment the Navy stood high in the respect of 
the world’.255 Yet, whilst this may be true of the Abyssinian Crisis, as has been argued above, 
it is less clear that sailors involved with the Spanish Civil War took such pride. In particular, it 
might be expected that the terrible bombardment of the Spanish town of Guernica which 
shocked the world would have caused sailors to feel as though they were part of an important 
protective mission. Yet this event went unmarked in both the published and unpublished 
testimony considered by this thesis.256  However, unlike the Abyssinian Crisis which saw what 
they viewed as an upstart European nation bullying a primitive country, a civil war meant that 
they were stuck between two opposing sides who did not want them there.  
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Nevertheless, from the point of view of the navy’s image, both conflicts arguably assisted in 
re-asserting the navy on the world stage. Furthermore, the Abyssinian Crisis was asserted to 
have lessened tensions between Britain and some of its mandated territories, especially Egypt. 
In an article entitled ‘Thanks to the Duce’, the Devon and Exeter Daily Gazette reported that 
‘A joint parade of British bluejackets and Egyptian troops has actually been staged’.257 
Similarly William Townley suggested that in his experience British ratings commanded far 
more respect than soldiers amongst the locals in Palestine and Egypt, and could go ashore 
where soldiers could not because their image was far more respectable.258  
In addition, Roskill argued that the involvement of the Royal Navy in the Spanish Civil War 
was important. In particular, although sailors did not comment upon it, Roskill suggested that 
the bombing of Guernica may have influenced the Coronation Review and the need for British 
posturing, stating:  
Though the occasion was in the main ceremonial the mobilisation of the 
Reserve Fleet was again rehearsed, and the general tuning up of the Navy for 
war was thus carried a stage further – amid all the gun salutes, displays of 
bunting, cheering to order and fireworks. But it is worth recalling that only 
some three weeks before the review the little Spanish town of Guernica has 
been destroyed by German bombers.259 
The situation required the navy to be portrayed as strong and counter the growing threats in 
Europe.260  
Therefore, there is some merit towards Edwards’ assertion regarding the importance of these 
conflicts and their effect on sailors. Furthermore, despite their grumblings, sailors do not 
appear to contradict this image. The navy was again fulfilling its key role in world politics: that 
of a defensive power policing the ocean, which many still viewed as their duty.261 This also 
supports Kennedy’s argument regarding the impact of disarmament on the British where the 
navy had only just been built up to be the most powerful force in the world prior to the First 
World War only to stagnate in the 1920s.262 The steady resurgence of the navy in British 
society, and in world affairs prior to the Second World War, was therefore important to sailors 
who firmly believed in the power of their navy, and to whom it was a key part of their identity 
and culture. 
Rearmament and the road to war 
As the political situation deteriorated during the second half of the decade, Britain no longer 
could ignore the question of rearmament: continuing the policy of naval arms control was not 
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viable.263 Germany had already rejected the Treaty of Versailles in 1933 and her modern 
pocket-battleships made her, in the words of Emily Goldman, ‘a major contender’.264 Although 
Britain did not cast aside its policy of Appeasement, by the mid-1930s British rearmament was 
proceeding as quickly as possible. This was well detailed by the press and, although the navy 
did not receive sums on the same scale as before the First World War, the navy was finally 
reversing the position of the 1920s.265 For instance, 1936 was the biggest year for naval ship 
building since 1918 with expansion featuring heavily in the press.266 In February that year the 
Daily Mail reported that the ‘cost of Britain’s recent precautions [was] nearly Eight Millions’, 
and that ‘The worsening of the international situation has largely influenced the Government 
in its determination to speed up the overhauling and reconditioning of the defence service’.267  
However, Roskill has stated that the full scale of rearmament was kept quiet from 1936, 
suggesting: ‘These precautions were obviously inspired by the desire not to provoke the 
dictatorships into undertaking retaliatory building, and to avoid alarming the home 
population’.268 Despite the press coverage, and the popularity of the anti-war voice, the British 
public was unsure whether or not there was going to be a future war. Yet sailors were less 
uncertain. Serving on the frontline, as it were, of British foreign policy, especially in light of the 
Abyssinian Crisis and the Spanish Civil War, sailors had a good understanding of the severity 
of the European situation. For instance, Edward Records wrote regarding the Locarno Pact in 
1938: ‘Well it’s a pretty kettle of fish. The people at home do not realise how serious it is. If I 
get through my time in the service without a war [I] shall consider myself exceedingly lucky’.269 
Records therefore followed news of British rearmament with interest, noting in his diary: 
‘England is rearming. £10,000,000 extra on this years’ Armament Bill’.270 However, Records 
also suggests an element of happiness with British rearmament. He was disgusted at the failure 
of the League of Nations – especially over the Abyssinian Crisis – saying ‘Sincerely hope we 
leave the league of nations [sic]’.271 Records hoped that British rearmament would be ‘a fore 
runner with a break from the league in view’ and therefore clearly believed that power needed 
to be asserted.272 This suggests that he was pleased that the navy was finally receiving the 
funds it needed and that it would assist in maintaining the power and reputation of the Royal 
Navy in order to keep the peace. 
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In addition, the scale of rearmament was particularly noticeable to sailors and, as Lavery has 
noted, there was an influx of new recruits and expansion of training establishments.273 When 
interviewed, John Skeats revealed that sailors were all too aware of this, stating that ‘the navy 
was expanding rapidly, they were taking on air gunners like wildfire’.274 Reflecting on the 
situation, Williams wrote that in 1934: ‘It was very noticeable that since the Nazi Government 
had taken over in Germany… our fleet practices had become more intense’.275 Similarly Whelan 
wrote that ‘By May, 1939, the carefree quality of our exercises had been replaced by a solemn 
urgency’.276 Although both Williams’ and Whelan’s memoirs were published, there is supporting 
evidence to suggest that the urgency and seriousness of the situation they describe are not 
entirely influenced by post-war events and memories. For instance, Thomas Teece thought that 
the Mediterranean Fleet had been working up to war during the 1930s.277 Similarly sailor diaries 
make regular reference to either taking part in exercises or witnessing them, and Brooman’s 
comment, ‘sighted HMS “Glorious” (Aircraft Carrier) with HMS “Guardian” (Net laying vessel) 
carrying out gunnery practise, HMS “Searcher” (Destroyer) attending on’, is typical of such 
descriptions.278 
Despite the seriousness, these exercises also demonstrate other feelings such as pride in the 
navy and light-heartedness. For instance, Brooman recorded with a hint of pride observing the 
destroyers at gunnery practise in Alexandria: ‘what a grand spectacle they make, the 
Greyhounds of the Ocean’.279 This sense of pride is recorded with greater clarity when writing 
of an air attack practise: ‘this part of the programme makes us realise the importance of our 
Fleet Air Arm, and we are proud to have such efficient members and machines in that particular 
unit’.280 Similarly Records makes practising for gas attacks seem relatively humorous, despite 
the horror of the reality of which many would have been aware, writing: ‘First time I’ve seen a 
person in it [the protective clothing]… They had them on about 10 minutes and were sweating 
like the devil when they took them off’.281 In particular, Records evidently has some 
understanding about the dangers of gas warfare as he wrote with intonations of disgust that 
the Italians had ‘used gas against the Abyssinians who are unprotected for that type of 
warfare’.282 Interestingly his criticism of Italy’s actions ignores various aspects of Britain’s 
colonial subjugations and instead gives support to Ardley’s comments on the moral purpose of 
the British Empire.  
In particular, the threat brought about by growing German naval strength was not lost on the 
lower deck who had had numerous encounters with their German counterparts during the 
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Spanish Civil War, which allowed them to form their own opinions. Furthermore, the pocket-
battleship Graf Spee represented Germany at George V’s Coronation Review and Roskill argued 
that German ‘smartness and very evident power made a great impression on the vast 
crowds’.283 Although this chapter has demonstrated there was a level of respect between British 
and German sailors, they realized that the “naval holiday” had weakened the Royal Navy’s 
position.284 As Able Seaman Jack Napier commented: ‘If war ever came, we thought we were 
going to get a good hammering… Our ships went back to the 1914-18 war’.285 However, this 
did not mean that sailors thought that they would lose if it came to war. Sailors recognized 
their own ships were being replaced and William Brooman remarked on joining the newly 
commissioned HMS Ajax: ‘we have joined a modern and well constructed ship’.286 The belief in 
their superiority was not curtailed by the Germans building a few smart new warships. When 
asked if he had thought the Royal Navy could handle the Germans, Thomas Teece replied ‘Yes’ 
without any show of concern.287 Granted he was speaking with the knowledge that Britain was 
victorious, but the additional testimony considered above demonstrates that British sailors 
continued to feel a strong sense of superiority despite their respect for the German navy and 
sailors.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has considered the difficulties faced by the lower deck during the challenging and 
changing international situation of the 1930s. It has examined how the deteriorating 
international situation caused the navy to be increasingly utilized to assert Britain’s position on 
the global stage. The navy’s increased involvement in world affairs by the late 1930s reaffirmed 
its grandeur and power. Examining these key events reveals the continued importance of the 
navy as an image of the Empire – not only to the public – but also to sailors who continued to 
play a prominent role. It heightened their feelings of imperialism and patriotism, which 
reaffirmed important elements of sailor culture and as such it remained a crucial part of their 
identity, each reinforcing the other. Furthermore, it has allowed further insight into the sailor 
character and the competing elements of sailor culture. For instance, the question of loyalty 
regarding the mutiny at Invergordon is important. Despite the seriousness of their actions, at 
no time did sailors consider themselves to be disloyal to the Empire or seek to bring about 
significant social change. Instead, what it demonstrates is the complexity of sailors’ loyalty, 
and this chapter has progressed this beyond the existing discourse which is limited to whether 
they were loyal or disloyal, ignoring the nuances of the situation: loyalty was not clear-cut and 
conflicted with other sailor loyalties. In addition, the uncertainty of the international situation 
increased rivalry with other nations and their navies. British sailors continued to believe that 
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they belonged to the best navy in the world and were proud of their perceived image, which 
was integral to their identity. Relations with the rising Italian navy were particularly heated, 
stemming from a belief that they were encroaching on British rights and possessions. In 
particular, the Mediterranean Sea had long been considered to belong to the Royal Navy. This 
was ingrained sentiment, nurtured within the navy as part of its heritage and was also 
reinforced by concepts of British racial superiority, utilized to justify their imperial position and 
identity. Thus, as Italy began to assert itself, this drew anger from British sailors who 
considered themselves superior to the Italians and also resented their intrusion on the Empire’s 
dominance.  
Furthermore, this chapter has demonstrated sailors’ perceptions of the navy’s role during both 
the Abyssinian Crisis and the Spanish Civil War. In doing so this has introduced a new 
development to the history of the lower deck during the 1930s, moving beyond the confines of 
socio-political studies. These conflicts placed sailors on the frontline of events and demonstrate 
their relationship with the navy, the Empire and the political situation of the time. In particular, 
examining the Abyssinian Crisis has shown that sailors felt a deep sense of pride in their 
perception of Britain’s place in the world and that they believed it was their duty to stand up 
to Italian posturing, defending both their position as the premier world power and the moral 
duty they perceived was due to Abyssinia. Similarly, although they did not see the benefits in 
their involvement in the Spanish Civil War and questioned how much good they did, it was their 
duty and they did it nonetheless. As such, despite the challenges, sailor culture continued to 
extol the same ideology. Their feeling of superiority continued to be strong despite the growth 
of other naval powers and lack of investment and modernization since the end of the First 
World War, of which they were aware. Consequently, as Britain approached the Second World 
War, British sailors continued to accept as fact that they were the best sailors in the world and 
the Royal Navy was the mistress of the seas.  
 
176 
 
Chapter Seven 
Conclusion: Sailors - the sure shield of empire 
 
This thesis has examined British sailors and their relationship with imperialism, together with 
concepts of identity, pride, and patriotism during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth 
centuries. In doing so it has engaged with the growing trend of cultural and gender histories of 
the Royal Navy, whilst at the same time developing the social history of the lower deck 
alongside imperial studies. More importantly, by using unpublished sailor diaries and testimony 
it has moved away from the overreliance on published memoirs and officer diaries of existing 
studies. As Christopher McKee acknowledged, in order to deconstruct the character of sailors, 
historians need to examine ‘those who know naval sailors best – the ratings themselves’.1 
Consequently, this has enabled a significant insight into the nuances of the character of sailors 
during the verisimilitudes of empire. Although historians such as Mary A. Conley, Quintin 
Colville and Isaac Land have investigated the intricacies of sailors’ identities, this thesis has 
further demonstrated how these were shaped by the lower deck’s understanding, and 
interpretation, of the Empire and imperialism.  
The sailor image was intimately linked with the Empire through social constructs and symbolism 
portrayed to the public by a variety of everyday cultural mediums as well as orchestrated naval 
pageantry.2 Furthermore, as their imperial image developed, it saw them increasingly 
portrayed to the public as possessing heroic, chivalrous and respectable characteristics. This 
drew upon Victorian and Edwardian ideas of masculinity which traversed the strata of British 
society. Sailors did not question this element of their identity and by the late-nineteenth 
century increasingly viewed themselves as respectable men and servants of empire with a 
distinct sense of duty. However, they also retained aspects of the “Jolly Jack Tar” image and 
thus their identity was that which they required at that point in time, an element of fluidity 
rather than fixed. As Linda Colley argued, people wear multiple hats and therefore can possess 
multiple identities depending upon the situation.3 Consequently, sailors were not simply passive 
respondents to this manufactured cultural image but identified with it in their own way. This is 
demonstrated particularly clearly by their attitude to their uniform. The image of the 
‘bluejacket’ was iconic and the sailor uniform was widespread in society by the early-twentieth 
century. However, as Colville has demonstrated, it was also important to them, and they made 
it their own by making alterations to the standard design according to their own tastes. It 
became an embodiment of their image and their identity as they saw themselves. Thus when 
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the naval brigades began to wear khaki during the Boer War many sailors were unhappy with 
this and they perceived it as a loss of their identity, particularly as they were sometimes 
indistinguishable from the army. Therefore, they sewed on their own badges in an attempt to 
make it theirs and reassert their own identity.4 The presence of this imperial identity 
demonstrates that the nuances of the lower deck’s relationship with the Empire and imperialism 
requires greater consideration.  
The growth of this imperial identity meant that sailors had a well-developed relationship with 
the Empire. In particular, this was both displayed and nurtured during events of naval 
pageantry. The spectacle of naval pageantry was one of the primary ways in which sailors 
regularly encountered overt imperial themes and this thesis has argued that sailors are the 
forgotten participants: both as part of the spectacle portrayed to the British public but also as 
receptive agents who observed and absorbed the imperial message. Naval pageantry took 
many forms and varied in scale. However, in addition to the more overt forms of ship launches 
and fleet reviews considered by Jan Rüger, this thesis has examined the pervasiveness of 
pageantry in sailors’ everyday lives and argued that through these experiences the lower deck 
developed its identity and understanding of the Empire. Furthermore, it has noted the 
importance of Daniel Owen Spence’s argument that ‘Beyond Britain, the Royal Navy was a 
crucial cultural adhesive for binding the empire’s young settler societies together with the 
mother country’.5 Thus it has expanded the examination of naval pageantry to consider how it 
occurred overseas, where sailors were on display to the colonies as visible symbols of 
imperialism, and how they interacted with these experiences. In particular, overseas naval 
pageantry was used to impress upon the colonies the continued power of Britain and the 
necessity of strong links to the mother country. It has argued that sailors were often aware of 
these political messages and recognized that the displays in which they took part had such 
agendas. However, despite this, sailors embraced the patriotism they experienced on these 
occasions and many did not question and or doubt its sincerity.  
Nevertheless, by examining pageantry through such a broad spectrum it has demonstrated 
that sailors responded in different ways to imperialism and, more importantly, that they were 
not always receptive to imperial messages. Like the public audiences, sailors were similarly 
struck by the grandeur of the spectacle which fostered feelings of imperial sentiment but these 
were not blind or universal expressions of imperialistic beliefs. Feelings of consensus and 
conflict co-existed: sailors could feel proud of the sight of the navy and embrace the imperial 
symbolism being displayed, but they could also see their duties as a chore and prefer to be 
enjoying themselves with the crowds ashore.6 Whilst social histories of the lower deck, such as 
the work by Brian Lavery, have recognized that sailors had a strong relationship with the navy, 
their feelings and how they interacted with, and indeed understood this themselves, was more 
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complex.7 For instance, pride was overt and heightened during imperial spectacles. However 
whilst “pride” is a useful umbrella term, the concept is more nebulous. Sailors exhibited pride 
in their ships, the service, the monarch, the Empire, fellow crewmates, themselves, as well as 
both national and local pride. Collectively this was influenced by a number of different factors 
and depended upon the situation. For instance, national pride could be heightened by war and 
large patriotic displays but this could also generate equal feelings of pride in the service and 
themselves. In addition, their image and identity was intimately bound up within this and it 
gave sailors a heightened sense of superiority, which was also supported by a long naval 
heritage, imperial inculcation and an understanding of racial concepts.  
Therefore, there was rarely a singular feeling of pride in the Empire. Instead, sailors’ pride 
collectively grouped together these different expressions of pride. This does not mean that 
sailors were not proud of the Empire specifically, but these other aspects were often present 
and could take precedence. Whether sailors broke down their sentiment in their own minds is, 
however, a rather more complicated issue. They did use their understanding of imperialism to 
interpret their experiences. Furthermore, they recognized displays of patriotism in the colonies 
when they observed it as sincere colonial appreciation, despite often realizing that there was 
an agenda behind political expressions of power. As their own image was bound up with this, 
they were usually relatively receptive and enjoyed the experience, not simply because they 
had a good time but because it reinforced their understanding of their identity. This sense of 
appreciation appealed to sailors on an imperial level and also on a personal level. Whilst sailors 
did not like awkward social experiences (which could sometimes come with being made the 
centre of attention), they did enjoy validation of their social standing and appreciated their 
contributions being recognized. 
In particular, public recognition of their contribution to the Empire and Britain was important 
especially during war because their role and duty as servants of empire was intricately 
connected to their image. This has also demonstrated how the Victorian and Edwardian 
construct of heroic masculinity was especially important to how sailors were identified by the 
public and also how they identified themselves. Their sense of duty and the acceptance of their 
professional, masculine image was paramount. Thus sailors accepted it was their duty to serve 
the Empire when necessary and they went to war with an image and expectation of how they 
should behave by conforming to masculinity norms created by Victorian and Edwardian 
society.8 By examining their role in war and in particular by considering both the Boer War and 
the First World War, it has allowed two very different styles of conflict to be examined. In 
particular, it has questioned the limitations of existing historiography which has omitted sailors 
under the misapprehension that the study of them has little to add to socio-cultural imperial 
studies because they were not volunteers and were clearly imperialistic. However, whilst 
imperial duty occupied a significant part of their image, to accept this and disregard its 
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importance without question is problematic and ignores the nuances of the lower deck. 
Furthermore, many volunteered for roles ashore in the naval brigades during the nineteenth 
century and this contribution has so far been overlooked. Whilst in part this volunteering was 
due to enthusiasm for battle and eagerness to fight, there were a number of different reasons 
why they volunteered. Firstly, their relationship with imperialism did have a significant impact, 
and both society and their training had inculcated them with the belief that they were servants 
of the Empire, and thus it was their duty. Enthusiasm was not universal and sailors were not 
blind to the possible dangers of death that they faced whilst at war, but loyalty and feelings of 
duty both to the Empire and the service remained a powerful factor. Even when enthusiasm 
waned, this belief in duty remained strong. 
Consequently, the imagery of both wars is important. The role sailors played in war during the 
nineteenth century enhanced and was enhanced by their actions, especially their active role 
serving ashore in naval brigades. This put them in the public eye and resulted in them being 
feted as heroes. Their exploits during the Boer War further enforced this, fulfilling their image 
as the imperial handyman. However, the stalemate at sea during the First World War was to 
severely challenge both their public image and their own understanding of their identity as the 
chief symbol of British imperial strength. The realities of the Great War thus conflicted with the 
image built up over the course of the nineteenth century, together with the dominance in British 
culture of naval heritage such as Trafalgar. This was not just a perception amongst the public 
but also an expectation of sailors who had been inculcated by the service to believe their image. 
It is evident that this issue was present for many sailors during the First World War and that 
the criticism and lengthy periods either at Scapa Flow or at sea enforcing blockades, meant 
that sailors had a real desire to be a part of the war effort and, more importantly, make it 
known to the public. This inactivity cut across their own perceptions of masculinity and 
challenged them. Furthermore, despite their understanding of masculinity, the realities of war 
further challenged how they identified themselves with their imperial image. By drawing 
comparisons to existing studies of soldiers such as those by Joanna Bourke and Simon Harrison, 
it is evident that sailors faced similar problems. They too had to cope with stress, nerves and 
death on a daily basis and, like soldiers, they employed a variety of mechanisms ranging from 
humour to sport through which they attempted to cope with these pressures and, to some 
extent, control them. 
The end of the Great War did not bring a return to the old order, and the inter-war years 
similarly had the potential to threaten the established image of the navy and its sailors. Having 
been effectively side-lined by the army during the war in the eyes of the public, the economic 
and political situation also affected the Royal Navy. In particular, the reduction of the navy 
following the Washington Treaty and inter-war disarmament agreements had the potential to 
damage the service both publically and professionally. As anti-militarism grew, there was a 
noticeable decrease in naval pageantry in comparison to the pre-war years, and the symbolism 
of the navy in society was challenged. However, by the mid-1920s naval pageantry was again 
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taking place and sailors were once again part of the imperial symbolism being displayed to the 
public and to the world. In particular, it is suggested that events such as the Empire Cruise of 
the Special Service Squadron confirmed the continued value of naval pageantry and 
demonstrated that the public were not averse to such displays. Furthermore, the examination 
of the Empire Cruise as a case study for the policy of showing the flag, determines that 
imperialism remained important and they continued to frame their experiences within the same 
imperial themes. Their voyage around the world, and the visits to the colonies of the Empire, 
was a varied experience, both exciting and boring at times. It introduced them to a large range 
of patriotic experiences and demonstrated that they did not often doubt the imperial loyalty 
and support of the colonies and dominions. Whether or not this was realistic, this was how they 
interpreted what they experienced. In particular, this examination has revealed their 
expectations of the colonies and how such expectations were shaped by imperial views. Thus 
they wanted, and looked for, the experience of otherness; they wanted their own experiences 
from these encounters and went out of their way to ensure that they had these experiences. 
Therefore, whilst sailors were concerned on some level with the loss of what they recognized 
as their rightful position of prestige on the world stage, it was not seriously detrimental to their 
image or how they perceived the navy. 
However, these challenging conditions continued into the 1930s, and in particular this was 
brought into sharp relief by the growing naval power of the United States of America, Italy, 
Germany and Japan. Yet despite this many sailors did not doubt the Royal Navy’s prestige and 
superiority. For instance, the rising power of Italy and the posturing of its navy was not viewed 
as a significant threat by British sailors, but rather Italy was viewed as something of an upstart. 
The claims by Italy of “Mare Italia” in respect of the Mediterranean was especially disliked as 
Britain had controlled the middle sea since Nelson, and a number of sailors continued to draw 
this link to their heritage which formed a keystone of their identity. Consequently, the fact that 
Britain did not take a firmer hand during the Abyssinian Crisis disappointed some elements of 
the lower deck who felt that Britain was not fulfilling its imperial moral duty. In addition, their 
mood was also shaped by continuing stereotypical racial beliefs, particularly that Italians were 
slovenly; this further demonstrates how ingrained racial ideas fused with concepts of identity 
and imperialism. Together this made for poor relationships between British and Italian sailors 
when they encountered each other in port, despite having to observe the niceties of etiquette 
at sea. Therefore, rearmament was welcomed and the attention being directed at the navy was 
met with approval by sailors who were not oblivious to the external pressure and threats the 
Royal Navy faced. Although the deteriorating global situation was a cause for concern amongst 
sailors, the continued symbolism of the navy, and its position in society, reinforced their 
imperial standing. 
Consequently, sailors saw nothing unusual in the reassertion of British naval power during the 
1930s, and many accepted the continuation of their age-old role as policeman of the world’s 
oceans, especially in response to Italy during the Abyssinian Crisis. They saw it not only as 
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their moral duty to stand up for a lesser nation but also a chance to demonstrate their power 
to the Italians. On the other hand, the Royal Navy’s involvement in the Spanish Civil War was 
a different matter and one that challenged sailors. Neither the Nationalists nor the Republicans 
wanted the Royal Navy to be involved, and thus sailors were left with the clear knowledge that 
it was not their war. Therefore, their sense of duty was compromised in comparison to the 
moral duty felt during the Abyssinian Crisis to stand up to an aggressor nation. Many also felt 
that they received little appreciation for putting themselves in the line of fire to protect civilians, 
which further supports the argument above that they liked to know their efforts were 
appreciated. However, this did not amount to anything more than minor discontent and 
grumbling; sailors were conscious that the Spanish coast was where their orders had taken 
them, and they accepted that it was still their duty to fulfil this obligation.  
Therefore, the key argument is that the Empire, imperialism, patriotism and pride were an 
integral part of a sailor culture, shaping their character and identity. This culture drew on a 
shared naval heritage and imperial themes inculcated by through elements of British culture 
and the teachings of the Royal Navy. As John Mackenzie argued about British imperial culture, 
it ‘set them apart’ and it helped to give British sailors an identity.9 Their exposure to imperialism 
meant that it formed an important part of how they understood the Empire and framed their 
experiences. In particular, this has been demonstrated by the importance of 
the exotic and otherness of the colonial experience. Sailors drew upon what they knew of the 
Empire from popular culture and clearly expected certain experiences. In addition, the way in 
which they viewed the colonies and the indigenous populations was predicated on common 
racial stereotypes and understandings inculcated through imperial culture. Furthermore, they 
accepted a certain level of responsibility over the colonies because they believed it was the 
Empire’s duty to keep the peace, and they were the foremost means by which to do this.  
However, this sailor culture was not only imperialistic. As British imperial culture was not 
‘monolithic’ but rather multi-layered’, so too was sailor culture.10 It was independent and 
grouped together many competing themes which consequently allowed other elements of sailor 
culture to take precedence as circumstance dictated. This has been demonstrated by the 
consideration of how sailors responded to important themes such as naval pageantry both at 
home and in the wider Empire, and their response to charged atmospheres of imperialism 
particularly through war. By examining these themes, it has shown how conflicting beliefs and 
ideals could come together within sailor culture. These can be disassociated and viewed 
separately but were also equally important to each other and mutually reinforcing.  
Although this thesis has continued to consider British sailors as a collective body of men in 
order to examine their relationship with the Empire, it has demonstrated the importance of 
                                            
9 John M. Mackenzie, Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 1880-1960, (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2003 [first edition 1984]); p. 2 
10 Andrew Thompson, The Empire Strikes Back? The impact of imperialism on Britain from the mid-nineteenth century, 
(Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2005); p. xiv; Brad Beaven, Visions of Empire: Patriotism, popular culture and the city, 
1870-1939, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012); p. 208 
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recognizing the nuances of their character and that relationship. In particular, by using sailor 
testimony it has argued that the Empire was deeply ingrained in their identity and a significant 
element of sailor culture. Therefore, they had a very strong relationship with the Empire; it 
was both a concept and something tangible that generated pride and displays of patriotism. 
Although they were not simply passive recipients, the Empire was used to frame their 
experiences and they viewed the world through the imperialistic prism in which they lived and 
worked, and were very much a part.  
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With the Royal Navy for half an hour. Our Gallant Tars.  
These brave protectors of the State 
Our Empire guard from jealous hate,  
We rest at night, in peaceful sleep 
While they patrol & watch the deep.  
For we who live on land.  
Their hearts are stolid, like their ships  
God help the foe who comes to grips 
God grant no need to sound those guns 
So bravely manned by British sons,  
Appendix 1.5 The Gridiron Movement (The 
Times, 18 August 1902) 
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We trust, who live on land.  
We never heard, we never shall 
Jack forgot his duty, or a pal 
And should our country stand in need,  
We are sure that Jack will always lead. 
We know, who live on land.  
Our homes, our peace, our very lives,  
Are in the hands with which he strives, 
Lets thank him heartily this year,  
And give him just a rousing cheer,  
From we, who live on land. 
Appendix 1.6 ‘With the Royal Navy for half an hour. Our Gallant Tars’, RNM 2013/100/1: Diary of 
William Brooman 
